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1. Introduction 
Early economists and utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (e.g. 1789[1907]) and Francis 
Ysidro Edgeworth (e.g. 1881) were convinced that utility is – at least in principle – measur-
able. In their view, the concept of utility thus allows society to put government action – from 
judicial and legal reform to distribution of wealth and labor – on a rational footing. The 
“ordinalist revolution” in economics in the 1930s led by Lionel Robbins (e.g. 1932), aban-
doned any substantive and measurable idea of utility. Hicks and Allen (1934) showed that 
price theory can dispense with a cardinal utility concept and Samuelson (1938) formulated the 
behaviorist concept of utility as preferences summarizing choice – the concept of “revealed 
preference”, which is now standard in economics (see Stigler 1950; Cooter and Rappoport 
1984; Frey and Stutzer 2002a; Colander 2007). 
This fixation on observable market behavior deprives economics of its ability to contribute to 
many important policy issues. One of these policy issues that will take center stage in what 
follows is the valuation of public and publicly provided goods. While market prices reflect the 
value of marketed goods to the marginal consumer and guide scarce resources to their most 
valuable use, market forces cannot be relied on to reveal prices that reflect the true social 
value of public or publicly provided goods. Because individuals have no incentive to disclose 
their true demand for non-excludable goods, for long, economists have been very pessimistic 
as to whether it is possible to assess people’s preferences for public goods. This pessimism is 
exemplified by the following statement: “[T]he very essence of public goods problem is that 
there is no way these preferences can be determined” (Due and Friedlaender 1973, p. 53; simi-
lar skepticism is expressed by Eckstein 1958; Fisher and Peterson 1976). 
A failure of economists to take part in the debate on the value of public goods would be espe-
cially severe in light of the increasing importance of these goods. In most countries, govern-
ment spending soared. In percent of GDP, it increased from 11% in 1870 to 46% in 1996 in a 
sample of 17 OECD countries (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000, table 1.1). Not all of this spending 
finances public goods and many public goods will be provided through regulation rather than 
spending. Nevertheless, the figures suggest that the supply of publicly provided goods did in-
crease. Further, it is highly likely that demand too increased as public goods typically have 
high income elasticities (e.g. Costa, D. L. and Kahn 2003 on mortality risk). 
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Fortunately, economists have overcome both the self-restriction and the resulting difficulties. 
Non-market valuation is now a firmly established field in economics. A vast literature exists, 
reflecting extensive research and considerable progress in valuing public goods. Economists 
have developed non-market valuation techniques that do not require direct measures of utility. 
Essentially, two avenues have been pursued: revealed preference methods on the one hand and 
stated preference methods on the other hand. The former are based on actual behavior and 
utilize complementary and substitutive relationships between public and various marketed 
goods to infer the value attributed to public goods from market transactions in private goods. 
In the case of stated preference methods, individuals are directly asked to value the public 
good in question; the most prevalent method is contingent valuation. However, despite their 
ingenuity, most of the approaches have serious flaws. A much more recent development or, 
more aptly, “revolution” (Frey et al. 2008) in economics is the use of subjective well-being 
data. In happiness research in economics it is the common understanding that subjective well-
being is a suitable approximation to individual utility. Thus, researchers in the field of happi-
ness research revived the concept of utility as a measurable quantity. 
This thesis aims at connecting these two largely separate strands of literature and at rendering 
data on subjective well-being useful for the valuation of public goods. Specifically, it presents 
the life satisfaction approach to valuing of public goods. With the life satisfaction approach, 
subjective well-being is regressed on the public good of interest, income and other covariates. 
Using the coefficients for the public good and income, it is possible to calculate utility con-
stant trade-off ratios between the public good and income for marginal and inframarginal 
changes in the public good provision. In addition to discussing conceptual issues, we apply the 
life satisfaction approach to estimate the utility losses caused by air pollution, flood disasters 
and terrorism. These three public bads have been, are and will be top priorities in the public 
debate and the political process for a long time. 
Air pollution belongs to the long-standing environmental concerns. It has been addressed by 
some of the earliest and most significant environmental regulations ever enacted. As a conse-
quence, air quality has considerably improved in many countries. An example is the develop-
ment of sulfur dioxide (SO2) in Germany between 1985 and 2003 documented in chapter 3. 
The situation is less favorable in other countries and for other pollutants. In developing coun-
tries, premature deaths from pollution-related illnesses are still legion (e.g. Economist 2007b). 
 3
But also in developed countries, air pollution makes time and again headline. For example, in 
early 2007 in the United Kingdom, high concentrations of particulate pollution and nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) prompted alarmist headlines by newspapers: “Britain’s dirty cities more dan-
gerous than an A-bomb” (The Independent 2007, p. 14). In the policy arena, greenhouse-gases 
currently receive the most attention. Even more prevalent in the media than air pollution are 
natural disasters and terrorism. As witnessed by the surprising re-election of the German chan-
cellor Gerhard Schroeder after the flood disaster in eastern Germany and the sudden and sub-
stantial drop in votes going to the reigning Partido Popular after the Madrid bombings in 2004, 
incidents of floods and terrorism as well has their handling can have considerable political 
impacts. Moreover, the threat is increasing. Global warming-induced changes in precipitation 
and run-off patterns as well as rising sea levels will increase the risk of floods. Terrorism re-
mains an ever-present danger though its face is changing. In Europe, the conflicts from the 
heyday of European terrorism are largely settled: Most left-wing terrorist groups have ceased 
to exist and the Spanish ETA is only a pale version of the terrifying terrorist group it once 
was. In Northern Ireland, the peace process has drastically reduced the bloodshed and the 
power sharing agreement between Sin Fein and Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party gives 
hope that peace will endure. At the same time, however, the threat of Islamic terrorism is in-
creasing worldwide (Economist 2007c). 
The remainder of this thesis is organized in five chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the general 
idea of using subjective well-being data to value public goods. The basics of the life satisfac-
tion approach can be explained briefly because the underlying ideas are simple. As the ap-
proach stands and falls with the quality of subjective well-being data, we devote a longer dis-
cussion to measurement issues and data requirements. In order to highlight the strengths of the 
life satisfaction approach, we compare it to the standard approaches for the valuation of public 
goods. Further, we discuss several identification issues and present a review of previous appli-
cations. Chapters 3 to 5 contain the own applications. In chapter 3, we use the life satisfaction 
approach to value air quality. The estimates are based on individual-level panel and high-res-
olution SO2 data for Germany in the years 1985 to 2003. To avoid simultaneity problems in-
herent in estimating the effects of pollution, we construct a novel instrument exploiting the 
natural experiment created by the mandated scrubber installation at power plants, with wind 
directions dividing counties into treatment and control groups. The estimates based on the life 
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satisfaction approach are complemented with estimates based on hedonic housing regressions. 
Chapter 4 applies the life satisfaction approach to assess and monetize utility losses caused by 
flood disasters in 17 OECD countries between 1973 and 2004. We compare our estimates to 
price discounts found in U.S. housing markets for houses located in floodplains. Moreover, in 
an exploratory analysis, we estimate the mitigating effects of different risk transfer mech-
anisms. In chapter 5, we use the approach to assess the overall social costs of terrorism. We 
estimate the consequences for the individuals affected by terrorist activities in France, the Re-
public of Ireland and the United Kingdom in the years 1973 to 2002. France is the Western 
European country with the highest number of recorded international terrorist incidents in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century and the Northern Ireland conflict is, beyond doubt, one of 
the most violent conflicts in Europe’s recent history. Chapter 6 draws conclusions for two re-
search areas in economics – happiness research and non-market valuation – and policy. To 
avoid giving naïve policy recommendations, we shortly discuss from a politico-economic 
perspective the role benefit estimates can play in the political process. Finally, the chapter also 
suggests directions for future research. 
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2. The life satisfaction approach to value public goods 
2.1 The basic concept 
The life satisfaction approach is grounded in the recent revolution in economics that has 
enriched anew the concept of utility with psychological or hedonic content. In mainstream 
economics, the concept of utility is completely devoid of any such elements. The concept of 
utility has thus come to carry two quite distinct meanings. Following the terminology pro-
posed by Kahneman and Varey (1991) and Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin (1997) one can dis-
tinguish between the concepts of experience and decision utility. 
The notion of decision utility refers to the utility concept in mainstream economics. Decision 
utility is given a technical definition as that which is maximized in consistent choice. It is a 
representation of preferences which are simply choice-connected rankings of outcomes. The 
axiomatic approach holds that the choices made by individuals provide all the information 
required to infer the utility of outcomes. Subjectivist experience as captured by surveys is re-
jected as being not objectively observable and therefore “unscientific”. However, this position 
restricts the questions that can be addressed. It is, for example, not possible to discriminate 
between competing theories that predict the same patterns of behavior, but differ in what they 
put forward as people’s utility level (Frey and Stutzer 2005b). Moreover, conceptions about 
individuals’ preferences or utility functions remain vague and the valuation of public goods is 
hampered (Arrow 1958, pp. 8-9; Schelling 1968, pp. 143-144). Revealed preference methods 
cannot be applied in all cases of interest and non-use values leave no behavioral trace. It is, 
therefore, no coincidence that non-market valuation is a field in economics where surveys 
have been widely used. 
In contrast to decision utility, experienced utility refers to the hedonic quality of experience, 
broadly construed to include satisfaction as well as pleasure (Kahneman and Varey 1991). The 
concept of experienced utility is similar to the original, Benthamite meaning of utility. Em-
pirically, experienced utility can be captured by measures of subjective well-being. Because 
measures of subjective well-being are fundamental for the life satisfaction approach, we de-
vote a separate section to the discussion of these measures and the corresponding measure-
ment techniques (see section 2.2). The empirical study of subjective well-being used to be the 
province of hedonic psychology (for surveys, see Diener 1984; Diener et al. 1999; and the 
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contributions in Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz 1999). However, this interpretation of utility 
and its measurability by subjective well-being data is largely accepted in the recent develop-
ment of happiness research. Economists have begun to use these measures to tackle a variety 
of questions and to shed light on individuals’ preferences or utility functions.1 Examples are 
studies on the psychological costs of unemployment (e.g. Clark and Oswald 1994; Gerlach 
and Stephan 1996; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey 2001), 
the effect of work norms (Clark 2003b; Stutzer and Lalive 2004), utility premiums of public 
sector employment and sectoral sorting (Luechinger, Stutzer and Winkelmann 2006; 
Luechinger, Meier and Stutzer 2008), the importance of relative concerns, whereby compari-
sons may refer to others (e.g. McBride 2001; Senik 2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 
2005 on status), oneself in the past (e.g. Di Tella, Haisken-DeNew and MacCulloch 2005; 
Clark et al. 2006 on adaptation), and one’s own aspirations (e.g. Easterlin 2001; Stutzer 2004; 
Bruni and Stanca 2006 on income aspirations), on preferences over inflation and unemploy-
ment rates (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 2001; 2003) and on preferences for inequality 
(Clark 2003a; Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2004). Further examples are studies on inter-
dependent preferences such as altruism (Schwarze, J. and Winkelmann 2005) and on time-in-
consistent preferences (Gruber and Mullainathan 2005; Benesch, Frey and Stutzer 2006; 
Oswald and Powdthavee 2007; Stutzer 2007), on preferences for political institutions and 
processes (Frey and Stutzer 2000; 2005a), politics (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005b), good 
governance (Helliwell and Huang 2006) and institutional trust (Hudson 2006) as well as on the 
importance of social capital and relational activities (Björnskov 2003; Helliwell and Putnam 
2004; Helliwell 2006; Bruni and Stanca 2007), religion (Clark and Lelkes 2005; Lelkes 2006; 
Dehejia, DeLeire and Luttmer 2007) and sex (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004a). The literature 
is reviewed by Frey and Stutzer (2002a, b), Easterlin (2003; 2005), Layard (2005; 2006) and 
Clark, Frijters and Shields (2007). 
As Kahneman and Thaler (1991) suggest, experienced utility is presumably what people try to 
maximize and what policies should be about. The use of decision utility can thus only be justi-
fied if experience and decision utility coincide or are, at least, closely related. In many situa-
                                                 
1 The origins of happiness research in modern economics are usually traced back to Easterlin’s (1974) seminal 
article and his paradoxical observation that there is a noticeable association between income and happiness within 
countries but that at the same time average happiness does not increase in tandem with the increase in average 
income over time (see also Easterlin 1995). 
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tions this may be the case. However, there is evidence indicating that in some situations the 
two concepts diverge systematically (e.g. Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997; Frey and 
Stutzer 2004a; Kahneman and Thaler 2006). The divergence of the two concepts of utility has 
immediate consequences for cost-benefits analysis and the valuation of public goods. On the 
one hand, standard methods of non-market valuation are based on the concept of decision util-
ity (see also section 2.3.2). On the other hand, the measurability of experienced utility opens 
up the possibility to directly assess the public goods in utility terms. In section 2.2.3 below we 
discuss six conditions that should be met in order that measures of subjective well-being can 
be used for valuing public goods. If these conditions are met, non-market valuation becomes 
straightforward. The basic idea of the life satisfaction approach is simple. The public good or 
externality faced by individuals is included as an additional argument in micro-econometric 
subjective well-being or life satisfaction functions. Technically, multiple regression analyses 
are conducted and individual life satisfaction is regressed on the public good of interest, in-
come and other covariates. Using the coefficients for the public good and income, it is possi-
ble to calculate utility constant trade-off ratios between the public good and income for mar-
ginal and inframarginal changes in the public good provision. 
2.2 Measurement of subjective well-being 
The applicability of the life satisfaction approach to value public goods crucially depends on 
whether subjective well-being is an empirically adequate and valid approximation to expe-
rienced utility. In the following, we therefore discuss the current state of research on the sub-
jective well-being measures and measurement techniques. Because a judgment on the ade-
quacy of the data ultimately depends on the intended use, the measures and techniques are 
evaluated in the last part of this section on the basis of several conditions that are important for 
valuing public goods. 
2.2.1 Measures 
Subjective well-being is the umbrella term for different measures that can be distinguished 
along two dimensions. A first dimension distinguishes between different components of sub-
jective well-being, a second between level and duration of well-being. Regarding the first di-
mension, a common distinction is between cognition, the cognitive, evaluative or judgmental 
component of well-being, and affect, the pleasure-pain component of well-being (see e.g. 
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Ostrom 1969; Diener 1984; Veenhoven 1984). With regard to affect, we can differentiate be-
tween the two independent components, positive and negative affect (Andrews and Withey 
1976). Although this tripartite solution was not always uncontroversial (see e.g. Fordyce 
1986), rigorous empirical analysis has shown that cognition, positive affect and negative affect 
are separable constructs and that cognition meets the criteria of discriminant validity from 
both the affective components (Lucas, Diener and Suh 1996; Arthaud-Day et al. 2005).2 
Cognition is usually assessed with life satisfaction. Life satisfaction questions assume that a 
person makes a global evaluation of his or her life, examines the tangible aspects and condi-
tions, weighs the good against the bad and arrives at a judgment of overall satisfaction. It is 
presumed that the global nature of this judgment makes it a relatively stable evaluation that is 
not completely dependent on the affective state the person is in at the time of judgment and is 
more than an evaluation of the amount of time spent in a positive versus negative mood (e.g. 
Lucas, Diener and Suh 1996). However, satisfaction measures are not pure indicators of cogni-
tion but reflect some affect as well (Andrews and Robinson 1991). This kind of affect con-
taminated cognition closely corresponds to what has been considered the best theory on the 
nature of welfare in philosophy (e.g. Sumner 1996, pp. 140-156). Affect, on the other hand, is 
the label for the combination of moods and emotions and represents people’s on-line evalua-
                                                 
2 The discussion of subjective well-being deliberately omits objective theories of well-being. Objective theories 
deny a logical dependence of a subject’s well-being on the subject’s attitude and typically offer a list of “values” 
or “goods” that represent different dimensions of welfare (Sumner 1996, p. 38; Adler and Posner 2006, p. 31). 
This strand of theory has its roots in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; Aristotle’s ideal of the good life is eudai-
monia, a life in which the person flourishes and fulfills his or her true potential. This ideal reverberates in modern 
theories. For example, Waterman’s (1993) summum bonum is personal expressiveness, a state of feeling alive and 
authentic, that occurs when people’s life activities are congruent with deeply held values and are holistically or 
fully engaged. The choice of the “positive psychologists” Csikszentmilhalyi (1997) and Seligman (2002) is the 
autotelic personality and the experience of flow. Ryan and Deci’s (2000) self-determination theory embraces 
self-realization as a central definitional aspect of well-being and theorizes that the fulfillment of three psycho-
logical needs, autonomy, competence and relatedness, is essential for psychological growth. Ryff (1989) asserts 
that well-being involves a broad suite of elements including self-acceptance, positive relations with others, au-
tonomy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and personal growth. Nussbaum’s (2000) list is even longer and 
includes life itself, bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the senses, imagination and thought, the emotions, 
practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other species, play, and control over one’s environment. Sen’s (e.g. 
1984; 1993) capabilities approach can also be counted among the objective theories with its core notions of func-
tionings, anything which a person manages to do or be, and capabilities, freedom and opportunity to achieve 
certain functionings. One essential feature of ordinary concepts of welfare is their subject-relativity. Since objec-
tives theories exclude all reference to the subject’s attitudes or concerns, they will have to supply some alterna-
tive account. Therefore, they are difficult to reconcile with the subject-relativity of welfare (Sumner 1996, pp. 42-
44). As Dworkin (1990, p. 77) notes, “my life cannot be better for me in virtue of some feature or component I 
think has no value.” The subjectivists’ standpoint does not deny that the values and goods proposed by objectiv-
ists are instrumental to reach the goal of increased well-being (see especially the social production function-
theory on this point, e.g. Lindenberg 1990); it does, however, deny that they have intrinsic importance. From the 
subjectivists’ perspective, objective theories take the sources of well-being for its nature (Sumner 1996, p. 64). 
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tions of the events that occur in their lives (Diener et al. 1999). Finally, happiness, another 
common measure of well-being, lies between the two poles of cognition and affect (Andrews 
and Robinson 1991). 
The second dimension distinguishes between measures that capture a person’s level of subjec-
tive well-being and the duration in the one rather than another mental state. Because life satis-
faction is a relatively stable construct, duration measures usually refer to affect. For example, 
the U-index discussed below measures the proportion of time an individual spends in an un-
pleasant state. Thus, the combination of the dimensions entails four typical measures: the level 
of life satisfaction, the level of positive affect, the level of negative affect (or the difference 
between the two affective levels) and the duration in one affective state. 
2.2.2 Measurement techniques 
Before we discuss different measurement techniques in detail, it is important to note that the 
two aspects, measures and measurement techniques, are not independent of each other. For 
example, while the stable and cognitive component is usually captured by global self-reports, 
measures with an inherent time components such as the U-index are best captured with real-
time or time-use measurement techniques. 
Global self-reports. Global self-reports are the workhorse technique in happiness research. 
This approach elicits subjective well-being in large and representative surveys either by sin-
gle-item or by multi-item questions (see Andrews and Robinson 1991 for a survey). A promi-
nent single-item question of life satisfaction can be found in the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP), which asks: “How satisfied are you at present with your life, all things con-
sidered?” Respondents can answer on an 11-point scale from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 
(completely satisfied). An example of multi-item questions of life satisfaction is the Satisfac-
tion with Life Scale (SWLS; Diener et al. 1985; Pavot and Diener 1993b). It is the average of 
five related questions, each of which is rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). The items are: “In most ways my life is close to my ideal”; “The conditions 
of my life are excellent”; “I am satisfied with my life”; “So far I have gotten the important 
things I want in life”; “If I could live my live over, I would change almost nothing”. A single-
item affect measure is the Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss and Mendelsohn 1989), a multi-item 
affect measure the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark and 
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Tellegen 1988). The PANAS consists of ten positive affects (interested, excited, strong, enthu-
siastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, and active) and ten negative affects (dis-
tressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid). Partici-
pants are asked to rate items, based on the strength of emotion, on a scale from 1 (very slightly 
or not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Multi-item questions have higher reliability because random measurement errors tend to be 
cancelled out across the different items; further, they are able to reflect different aspects of 
subjective well-being (Andrews and Robinson 1991; Pavot and Diener 1993a). The downside 
is that multi-item questions may prompt respondents to search their memory for evidence re-
levant for a particular item and, thereby, give this particular aspect more weight than it other-
wise would carry. In the same way, multi-item questions give different aspects arbitrary 
weights, whereas single-item questions rely on respondents’ integration of different aspects. 
Measures of global self-reports passed a series of validation exercises. As cognition and affect 
are separable constructs, a separate discussion of the validity and reliability of the measures is 
required.3 Respondents who are satisfied with their lives are also rated as satisfied by family 
members and friends (Pavot et al. 1991; Pavot and Diener 1993a; Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz 
1993; Lepper 1998) and by experts (Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz 1993). Life satisfaction 
scores correlate with other variables that can be plausibly claimed to be associated with true 
utility (e.g. Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). In two 20-year follow-up studies, low levels of 
reported life satisfaction predicted all-cause, disease and injury mortality, especially for male 
respondents (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2000) and suicide (Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 2001). 
At the national level, life satisfaction and suicide rates are also associated (Helliwell 2004; 
2006), but the ecological fallacy prevents us from making strong inferences regarding the va-
lidity of self-reported life satisfaction. Satisfied individuals are less likely to suffer from 
hypertension, a relationship that even translates into a correlation between hypertension and 
satisfaction at the national level (Blanchflower and Oswald 2007). Finally, life satisfaction 
predicts both, future marriage (Stutzer and Frey 2006) and future marital break-up (Gardner 
and Oswald 2006). As is the case with life satisfaction measures, self-reported affect correlates 
                                                 
3 One often cited validation result is that different measures of well-being correlate with one another, allegedly 
revealing a single unitary construct underlying the different measures. However, this is at best evidence for 
missing discriminant validity of different life satisfaction and affect measures. Not surprisingly, this view is most 
vehemently expressed by Fordyce (1988) who is an advocate of the single-component solution. 
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with ratings by family members and friends (Costa, P. T. and McCrae 1988; Sandvik, Diener 
and Seidlitz 1993; Lepper 1998) and by experts (Sandvik, Diener and Seidlitz 1993). Self-re-
ports of subjective emotional experience during a movie screening also correlate with 
(Duchenne) smiling (Ekman, Friesen and Davidson 1990). Individuals expressing a high level 
of positive affect are less likely to catch a cold when exposed to a cold virus, recover faster if 
they do (Cohen et al. 2003) and produce more antibodies after vaccination (Morag et al. 1999). 
Emotional content expressed in autobiographical sketches of a cohort of nuns entering the 
convent predicts longevity, even though most factors influencing longevity were identical or 
similar for the rest of the nuns’ lives (Danner, Snowdon and Friesen 2001). In sum, measures 
of life satisfaction and affect correlate with judgments of others, objective circumstances and 
physiological phenomena, and they can predict behavior. Although no single piece of evidence 
on its own is decisively convincing, the body of evidence lends credibility to the validity of 
the subjective well-being measures. 
Different studies assess the reliability of the measures using test-retest correlations. Life satis-
faction exhibits strong correlations of above 0.8 over short time intervals (between 2 weeks 
and 2 months; Pavot et al. 1991; Alfonso and Allison 1992; Pavot and Diener 1993a), weaker 
correlations of mostly above 0.5 but below 0.75 over the medium term (between 9 months and 
4 years; Atkinson, T. 1982; Headey and Wearing 1989; Magnus et al. 1992; Lepper 1998; 
Ehrhardt, Saris and Veenhoven 2000) and weak correlations of around 0.3 in the long run (11 
years; Ehrhardt, Saris and Veenhoven 2000). This pattern makes sense if life satisfaction is a 
stable construct but sensitive to changing life circumstances. Sensitivity to changing life cir-
cumstances has also been explicitly tested and confirmed (Atkinson, T. 1982; Ehrhardt, Saris 
and Veenhoven 2000). Affect measures have a test-retest correlation of slightly above 0.5 over 
a 9 month interval (Lepper 1998) and correlations of between 0.35 and 0.4 over a 2 year inter-
val (Headey and Wearing 1989). Thus, test-retest reliability is lower for affect measures than 
for life satisfaction measures, a result that is well in accordance with the nature of the different 
components of subjective well-being. 
As subjective data are based on individuals’ judgments, they are prone to a multitude of bi-
ases. Studies document indeed a number of systematic and non-systematic biases. Some of 
these biases will be discussed in more detail in section 2.2.3 below. However, we will briefly 
discuss retrospective recall biases because they are important to the understanding of the po-
 12
tential merits of the measurement techniques presented below. In various experiments 
(documented in Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997; Kahneman 1999; Kahneman and Thaler 
2006) participants recorded their real-time experience of a painful procedure and, in addition, 
provided a global retrospective evaluation of the procedure. The global evaluations closely 
followed peak-end evaluations, i.e. the average of the peak affective response during the pro-
cedure and the end value recorded. Hence, the global evaluations systematically differ from 
total experienced pain, defined as the temporal integral over the moment-by-moment evalua-
tions. Although Kahneman (1999, p. 19) warns that the conclusions should not be extended 
beyond the range of the experimental situations, two implications for global self-reports do 
emerge: First, global self-reports may be influenced by cognitively accessible and salient 
memories and by recent events. Second, in retrospective evaluations, people tend to neglect 
the duration of different episodes. Whether this bias is detrimental for empirical research de-
pends on the answers to two questions. The first question is normative and asks what the right 
approximation for utility is. Total pain or total utility are normative concepts that assume that 
life is experienced as a series of discrete, momentary hedonic satisfactions, time-neutral 
weighting of these moments and time separability of utility (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 
1997). Of course, all assumptions are open to debate (e.g. Sumner 1996, p. 148; Kelman 
2005). The second question is whether retrospective recall biases have a systematic influence 
on empirical results. Most likely, the idiosyncratic effects of recent, irrelevant events average 
out in representative surveys (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). 
Experienced sampling method (ESM) or ecological momentary assessment (EMA). In ESM 
studies, participants are prompted in their natural environment to record their momentary or 
near-momentary affective state, together with information on where they are, what they are 
doing and whom they are with. The records are collected several times per day at random in-
stances of time with handheld computers, beepers reminding respondents to write down the 
information or printed schedules (introductory surveys of the method are given in Brandstätter 
1991; Stone, Shiffman and DeVries 1999; Scollon, Kim-Prieto and Diener 2003).4 The 
method is aimed at mitigating recall biases and allows researchers to examine the influence of 
the immediate environment and fluctuations of affect. Given the relatively stable nature of life 
satisfaction, ESM studies generally focus on the affective component of subjective well-being. 
                                                 
4 See Csikszenhmihalyi and Larson (1987) for a review on reliability and validity studies of the ESM. 
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Exceptions are Steptoe, Wardle and Marmot (2005) eliciting respondents’ happiness and Riis 
et al. (2005) eliciting overall life satisfaction on 10% of the prompts. 
Major drawbacks of the ESM method are its high cost and the burden it poses on respondents. 
These drawbacks are the reason for the typically small and unrepresentative samples. The 
samples are unrepresentative because they are often drawn from particular sub-groups of the 
population and because of a self-selection bias. The samples in ESM studies on subjective 
well-being range from around 40 students (Thomas and Diener 1990; Oishi 2002) to slightly 
over 800 primary school students (Csikszentmihalyi and Hunter 2003). 
ESM studies coupled with global self-reports allow researchers to assess the importance of 
retrospective recollection biases. In a study of 49 hemodialysis patients and 49 healthy con-
trols by Riis et al. (2005), recollections are accurate for the hemodialysis patients, but recollec-
tions significantly underestimate the average ESM response in the group of healthy controls. 
Scollon et al. (2004) find that in their sample of 416 students recollections closely correspond 
to real-time measurements. Moreover, the rank ordering of different groups is maintained 
across different measures. 
Day reconstruction method (DRM). The DRM is similar in spirit to the ESM, but addresses 
several problems of the ESM such as the high costs and the burden on the respondents as well 
as the infrequent sampling of rare activities. In DRM studies, respondents are asked to recon-
struct the activities of the preceding day by constructing a diary and by indicating when an 
episode began and ended, what they were doing, where they were and whom they were with. 
They then state how they felt during the episode on selected affect dimensions. Evoking the 
context of the previous day is intended to elicit specific and recent memories, thereby reducing 
recall biases. Hence, the DRM is a hybrid approach combining features of time-budget mea-
surement common in time-use studies and experience sampling (see Kahneman et al. 2004b, c 
for a description of the method). 
In DRM studies, respondents’ answers can be summarized in different measures. A first 
measure is “net affect” (see e.g. Kahneman et al. 2004c); an individual’s net affect is the dura-
tion-weighted average over all episodes of the average positive adjectives less the average of 
the negative adjectives. Another measure is the “U-index”, where the “U” stands for “un-
pleasant” or “undesirable” (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). The U-index corresponds to the 
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proportion of time an individual spends in an unpleasant state. The dichotomous categoriza-
tion of moments is achieved by classifying a moment as unpleasant if the most intense feeling 
for that moment is a negative one. Kahneman and Krueger (2006) justify this categorization 
by asserting that one dominant emotion colors an entire period. The correlation between these 
two measures of affect is -0.79; the correlation between net affect and global life satisfaction is 
0.34, the correlation between the U-index and global life satisfaction is -0.26 (own calcula-
tions based on the data of Kahneman et al. 2004b, c). Thus, the different measures seem to 
capture different aspects of subjective well-being. The test-retest correlation over a 2-week 
period is similar for all measures: 0.59 for life satisfaction, 0.64 for net affect and 0.50 for the 
U-index (Krueger and Schkade 2007). 
The diurnal pattern of affect found in DRM studies is very similar to the pattern found in ESM 
studies. This suggests that the methods are able to capture the same aspects and that, thus, the 
DRM is a more efficient substitute method for the ESM (Kahneman et al. 2004b). 
Physiological measures. Two different views can be found in the literature concerning the role 
of physiological measures. According to a first view, physiological measures are substitutes or 
at least complements to self-reports and allow for a precision in subjective well-being research 
previously limited to the natural sciences (e.g. Larsen and Frederickson 1999). As Kelman 
(2005) points out, the significance of physiological responses is ultimately parasitic on self-
reports. Physiological responses are thought to measure subjective well-being because they 
correlate with self-reports. Thus, if self-reports are inaccurate, physiological measures become 
uninterpretable. A second view assigns physiological measures a more humble, but currently 
more realistic, part: a further validation of subjective self-reports. 
Various physiological correlates of well-being have been documented. However, subjective 
well-being does not always manifest itself in reliable physiological markers and often the ex-
act relationship between a physiological phenomenon and subjective experience is unclear 
(see e.g. Sapolsky 1999). We focus, therefore on two neural correlates of well-being that have 
received considerable attention: activation asymmetry of the prefrontal cortex and activation 
asymmetry of the amygdala (see Davidson 2003; 2004 for surveys).5 
                                                 
5 See the surveys by Zak (2004), Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) and Fehr, Fischbacher and Kosfeld 
(2005) on how neuro-science can inform economics in other areas. 
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Early research on prefrontal activation asymmetry was spurred by clinical observations on the 
link between stroke-related lesion and affective symptomology (e.g. Robinson et al. 1984). 
More recent research is experimental and uses electro-encephalography (EEG). Activation 
asymmetry is measured as the difference in alpha power density between the right and left 
prefrontal cortex. Alpha waves are the dominant brain wave activity of awake adults and can 
either be measured when participants are at rest (tonic or resting activation) or when they are 
exposed to emotional stimuli (phasic activation). Resting anterior EEG asymmetry correlates 
with reported affect in the PANAS (Tomarken et al. 1992), global life satisfaction expressed 
on the SWLS (Urry et al. 2004) and reactivity to experimental elicitors of emotion (Wheeler, 
Davidson and Tomarken 1993). In right-handed individuals, more left-sided and less right-
sided hemispheric activation at baseline is associated with higher subjective well-being, 
stronger reactivity to positive emotion elicitors and less vulnerability to negative emotion 
elicitors. Over a 3-week time interval, measures of activation asymmetry have a relatively 
high test-retest correlation of 0.65 to 0.75 (Tomarken et al. 1992). However, the degree of 
asymmetry is far from being a fatality. Positive and negative stimuli induce short run variance 
with the phasic influence being superimposed upon the more tonic differences in the asymme-
try (Davidson and Tomarken 1989). In the medium-term, changes in activation asymmetry 
have been found in people randomly assigned to meditation groups compared to people as-
signed to a control group (Davidson et al. 2003). 
Neuroimaging techniques, such as positron emission topography (PET) and functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI), make it possible to analyze another important structure in the 
emotion circuitry of the brain, the amygdala. Differences in both resting and phasic amygdalar 
activation asymmetry predict dispositional affect. Subjects with greater tonic or phasic activa-
tion in the right amygdala report greater negative affect (Abercrombie et al. 1998; Irwin et al. 
1998). 
2.2.3 Evaluation of measures and measurement techniques 
All of the four measurement techniques and their corresponding measures have their strengths 
and weaknesses. Which measure and measurement technique is to be preferred depends ulti-
mately on its intended use. In the following, we evaluate the measures on the basis of six crite-
ria that are relevant for the evaluation of public goods: the measures of subjective well-being 
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should (i) be broad and inclusive, (ii) refer to respondents’ present situation, (iii) have small 
measurement errors, and no systematic ones (iv) be interpersonally comparable, (v) have a 
cardinal meaning, and (vi) be available at a sufficiently large scale (at a sufficiently low cost). 
Inclusiveness. Essentially, this criterion asks whether subjective well-being is an appropriate 
empirical approximation of experienced utility or individual welfare. The broad consensus in 
happiness research considers subjective well-being to be a good empirical approximation for 
experienced utility (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002b; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). Critics 
claim that subjective well-being is extremely narrow and constitutes only one of many com-
ponents of individual welfare (Adler and Posner 2006, p. 77), one sub-utility function among 
others (Kimball and Willis 2006). This debate parallels the normative question of the nature of 
welfare with the “objectivist” ascribing various goods intrinsic importance and “subjectivists” 
conceding other goods only instrumental importance insofar as they contribute to well-being 
(see footnote 2). The positive question asks whether other “higher order” goods are sub-utility 
functions of equal standing with subjective well-being or whether these goods are arguments 
in the subjective well-being function with no independent effect on individual utility. This 
question is of uppermost importance whenever data of subjective well-being are used to ana-
lyze issues involving trade-offs, i.e. all issues with political and economic importance. Data on 
subjective well-being can only be used to shed light on individual decision making and errors 
in decision making or to evaluate policies if subjective well-being is a broad and (all-)inclu-
sive concept. As Adler and Posner (2006, pp. 88-100) note, narrow measures used for policy 
evaluation have a high intrinsic inaccuracy in distinguishing between projects which increase 
and such that decrease welfare. Hence, the degree of inclusiveness is of immediate importance 
for the life satisfaction approach. Assume, for the sake of argument, that subjective well-being 
is one sub-utility function together with health and the ability to care for the family. If this is 
the case, public goods such as security and environmental quality as well as income are likely 
to affect overall utility mostly through these other sub-utility functions. The trade-off between 
the public goods and income (or any other policy relevant variable) is then not adequately re-
flected in subjective well-being. If, on the other hand, health and the ability to care for the 
family are mere arguments in the subjective well-being function, the utility constant trade-off 
ratio between public goods and income can be extracted from subjective well-being data. 
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The strategy of the critics is to equate subjective well-being with pleasure and pain and declare 
the ESM or DRM as the gold standard of measurement techniques. They then reject the view 
that subjective well-being thus understood is a meaningful measure of overall utility and ex-
tend the conclusions beyond the narrower measure to happiness research as such. This victory 
over measures of subjective well-being is cheap and hollow. As we have seen, there is a wide 
array of measures and measurement techniques. Since the components of life satisfaction and 
affect are potentially distinct, it is important to establish for each component the degree of in-
clusiveness. The relative degree of inclusiveness can be assessed empirically by investigating 
whether the correlate of one component also correlates with other components. However, it is 
important to note that this approach does not allow us to determine the absolute degree of in-
clusiveness, but only the relative one. 
Table 1 depicts the correlations of various personal and job related characteristics with global 
life satisfaction, duration weighted net affect and the U-index; the correlations are based on 
the data of the DRM study reported in Kahneman et al. (2004b, c). Only life satisfaction is 
correlated with most personal characteristics reflecting general circumstances. An exception is 
the weak correlation between age and net affect. A similar picture emerges for job charac-
teristics. While some long-term job characteristics such as the opportunity to help others have 
a positive effect on subjective well-being according to all measures, other long-term charac-
teristics such as the possibility to work at home or telecommute have only and effect on life 
satisfaction but not on the affect measures. On the other hand, features of the immediate work 
situation such as the opportunity to chat with coworkers positively influence reported affect 
but not life satisfaction. In a new DRM study, Kahneman et al. (2006) report similar results. 
Table 1. Covariates of different subjective well-being measures 
 Life satisfaction Net affect U-index 
Personal characteristics  
  ln(HH income) 0.20** 0.05 -0.04 
  Age 0.12** 0.07(*) -0.04 
  Married 0.14** -0.01 0.00 
  Has children 0.03 0.03 -0.01 
  Years of education 0.20** 0.04 -0.01 
 To be continued. 
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Table 1, part 2 
 Life satisfaction Net affect U-index 
Job characteristics  
  Opportunity to help 0.14** 0.15** -0.11** 
  Low job security -0.12** -0.07* 0.04 
  Opportunity to chat -0.01 0.06(*) -0.06(*) 
  Work at home/telecommute 0.10** 0.02 0.00 
Notes: Life satisfaction is elicited on scale ranging from 1 (“not at all satisfied”) to 4 (“very satis-
fied”). Net affect is the duration-weighted average over different episodes of a respondents’ day of 
the average of three positive adjectives (happy, warm/friendly, enjoying myself) less the average of 
six negative adjectives (frustrated/annoyed, depressed/blue, hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile, 
worried/anxious, criticized/put down). All adjectives are reported on a scale ranging from 0 (“not at 
all”) to 6 (“very much”). The U-Index is the proportion of each person’s time engaged in an activity 
in which the dominant emotion was negative. Sample consists of one day in the life of 909 em-
ployed women in Texas. 
Source: Own calculations based on the data of Kahneman et al. (2004b, c). 
The results in table 1 parallel earlier findings. Diener and Biswas-Diener (2002) report higher 
correlations between income and global happiness or global satisfaction than between income 
and measures of affect for U.S. samples. In their ESM study on adolescents, Csikszentmihalyi 
and Schneider (2000) even find a small but statistically significantly decreasing trend in hap-
piness across respondents in higher socioeconomic status communities. Overall, therefore, 
measures of affect, especially those captured with ESM and DRM, are not correlated with 
factors that play an important role in preanalytic convictions and ordinary theories of welfare. 
Hence, they lack descriptive adequacy (Sumner 1996, pp. 10-20) and may indeed be too nar-
row for the present purpose, i.e. valuing public goods. 
Reference to presence. Measures of subjective well-being should refer to the respondents’ 
present lives and represent their period- or flow-utility. If scores of subjective well-being re-
flected discounted expected future utility, it would become difficult to relate changes in objec-
tive circumstances to changes in subjective well-being. 
In measures of global self-reports, the focus on the present situation is often indicated by 
means of the wording of the question. Often the questions have extensions such as “these 
days”, “now”, “nowadays” or “at present”. In the ESM and DRM, the focus on the presence 
or, more precisely, on the moment to be assessed naturally arises from the method itself and is 
made explicit in the question. For example, a typical DRM questionnaire asks “How did you 
feel during this episode?” (Kahneman et al. 2004a; emphasis removed). 
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Measurement errors. The major concern in the discussion of degree of inclusiveness was that 
measures of subjective well-being may exclude important aspects of utility. The converse con-
cern is that measures of subjective well-being include a lot of noise and are contaminated by 
confounding factors. Most research on this problem has focused on global self-reports. 
Normally, the global judgments are only construed when asked. Answering the question in-
volves cognitive (memory and aggregation) and communicative processes. At the level of the 
cognitive processes, concerns may arise that respondents may make little mental effort and 
instead rely on easily accessible information (Larsen and Frederickson 1999; Schwarz and 
Strack 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Experimental research shows that self-reports 
can be influenced by the immediate context as well as by artificially induced intra- and inter-
personal comparisons and temporal mood states (see Schwarz and Strack 1991; 1999 for refer-
ences). At the level of the communicative process, issues of communicative norms, self-repre-
sentation and social desirability become important (Larsen and Frederickson 1999; Schwarz 
and Strack 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). 
In order to assess the importance of these findings for the life satisfaction approach, it is useful 
to integrate them into a measurement error framework (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; 
Ravallion and Lokshin 2001). This allows us to distinguish two types of errors: White noise 
errors that are unrelated to right hand side variables on the one hand, and systematic errors that 
are correlated with the explanatory variables on the other hand. Mood variability and most 
context effects fall in the first category. Conceptually, errors of this sort pose no problem. 
They entail no systematic bias as the idiosyncratic effects cancel each other out. However, the 
random variation reduces the statistical fit. Therefore, the ratio of error variance to true 
variance has to be sufficiently low to make statistical work productive. There is substantial 
evidence for this. Eid and Diener (2004) use a structural decomposition model to separate ran-
dom error and situation variability (in our context also random error) from basic stability. For 
life satisfaction, only between 4% and 10% of the observed variance in life satisfaction is due 
to measurement errors, and between 12% and 16% due to occasion-specific variability. Mea-
surement error and occasion specifity coefficients are slightly larger for measures of affect. 
Therefore, differences in the immediate context and temporary mood have a smaller effect if 
 20
they occur in natural settings than if they are manipulated in the controlled environment of 
experiments.6 
Measurement errors that fall into the second category pose a more serious problem. Two 
findings of the experimental research are of potential relevance for the life satisfaction ap-
proach. First, other questions in the questionnaire and the order of the question can influence 
the reported subjective well-being. If the questionnaire includes questions referring to the 
public good to be evaluated and to income, these questions may systematically bias the results, 
especially if the questions precede the subjective well-being question. On the one hand, the 
questions increase the accessibility of information on the public good and income and 
heighten their awareness, thereby increasing the weight of these aspects in the global judg-
ment. On the other hand, conversational norms of non-redundancy may decrease the weight of 
these aspects. The latter effect is to be expected if questions of satisfaction with the public 
good or satisfaction with income immediately precede the subjective well-being question. 
Both effects have been documented (Strack, Martin and Schwarz 1988). Second, answers 
deemed to be socially desirable or serving self-representation purposes can also systematically 
influence the results. For example, a well-to-do respondent may want to live up to the expec-
tations of observers and state an overly high satisfaction. Or, a pauper may refuse to admit 
failure and also state an overly high satisfaction. Both kinds of answering behavior would ob-
scure the true relationship between income and subjective well-being. Thus, problems of the 
second category have important implications for the questionnaire design and survey mode as 
well as for the choice of existing data. 
ESM and DRM are both measurement techniques that lessen or even remove the cognitive 
burden in memory and aggregation processes. Contextual factors should, therefore, have less 
influence on the answers (Schwarz and Strack 1991; 1999). Similarly, as the problems are at-
tributed to cognitive and motivational deficiencies in observing and reporting own subjective 
well-being, physiological measures are not afflicted by contextual factors. Mood effects are 
also of less importance because mood is part and parcel of the concept of affect that is usually 
assessed by these techniques. Of course, the latter aspect only counts as a factor reducing mea-
surement errors if affect is the correct concept. 
                                                 
6 Careful questionnaire design, choice of appropriate response scales and interview mode can further reduce mea-
surement errors (Cummins and Gullone 2000; Kroh 2006). 
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Interpersonal comparability. The problem of the impossibility of interpersonal welfare com-
parisons has two different aspects: First, it is not possible to observe the level of an individ-
ual’s utility and, therefore, compare utility levels of different persons in standard scientific 
ways (e.g. Robbins 1938). Individuals with identical preferences (as revealed through be-
havior) and with identical expressive reactions to any situation may nevertheless attach differ-
ent utilities to identical situations. People can have different susceptibilities to satisfaction and 
identical orderings of alternatives are compatible with different absolute levels of utility. Fur-
ther, identical expressive reactions may well indicate different mental states. Respondents may 
convert their true inner utility differently into expressions of subjective well-being with some 
respondents’ reported well-being responding more strongly to changing life circumstances 
than others’. Harsanyi (1955) calls this the metaphysical problem. The second problem is one 
of morale and can be reduced to the question of whether people with higher susceptibility to 
satisfaction and stronger (possibly exaggerated) expressions of feelings should get more 
weight in collective decisions (e.g. Scanlon 1991). The relevant questions in the present con-
text are whether identical (verbal and physiological) expressions reflect identical mental states 
and what the consequences for empirical research are if they do not. 
Kahneman (2000) suggests that there is evidence of considerable interpersonal convergence in 
ranking of pleasure and pain. In painful medical procedures, for example, the relationship 
between expressed pain and physiological reactions is similar across persons. Similarly, the 
correlations between self- and other-reports discussed above show that self-reports are not just 
artifacts of individual specific response behavior but are related to shared standards of evalua-
tion. More importantly, for most empirical research (including research using the life satisfac-
tion approach), comparisons at the individual level are not necessary. Instead, empirical analy-
sis is focusing on groups and compares the subjective well-being of individuals under different 
circumstances, e.g. the subjective well-being of groups of individuals exposed to different 
levels of a public good. By focusing on groups, personal peculiarities of individuals counter-
balance one another (for this reason, intergroup comparison was already advocated by 
Marshall 1920, p. 152). 
The questions thus becomes whether there are difficulties with intergroup comparisons of 
well-being. In this respect, there are reasons for concern, especially for groups at the bottom or 
the top of subjective well-being scales. First, the bounded nature of subjective well-being 
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scales makes it impossible to adjust self-reports of persons already at the bottom/top of the 
scale if the situation further deteriorates/improves. Second, as respondents approach the bot-
tom/top of the scale, self-reports may become less sensitive to changes in true inner utility 
because respondents want to preserve their possibility to indicate further changes. Third, the 
way in which people interpret scales can change owing to self- and scale-norming effects (on 
self- and scale-norming, see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). These problems can make it 
difficult or impossible to establish the exact relationship between experienced subjective well-
being and its covariates. For example, Oswald (2005) disagrees with the common view held in 
happiness research that the concave relationship between happiness and income is evidence 
for diminishing marginal utility. He draws a distinction between concavity of the utility func-
tion and concavity of the reporting function, i.e. the function relating reported well-being to 
actual well-being with unknown curvature. These problems are likely to be less important if 
subjective well-being effects of a variable analyzed are likely to be small as it is the case with 
many public goods. 
Overall, there are no apparent differences between the various measures of subjective well-
being with two potential exceptions: the U-index and physiological measures. Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006) developed the U-index with the explicit aim of addressing the related prob-
lems of interpersonal comparability and cardinality (discussed below). As explained, with the 
U-index, an episode is classified solely according to the most intense feeling expressed. The 
classification is, therefore, largely independent from interpersonal differences in the use of the 
scales and does not rest on a cardinal interpretation of the scales. However, as Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006) acknowledge, an identical proportion of time spent in episodes with the single 
most intense feeling being an unpleasant one does not necessarily or generally imply a similar 
hedonic experience. Furthermore, the U-index relies on the intrapersonal comparable use of 
the scale for different feelings. If self- and scale-norming effects are not uniform across feel-
ings, the U-index loses much of its informational content. Physiological phenomena such as 
the activation asymmetry of the prefrontal cortex can be measured in objective, interpersonal 
comparable units. However, there is of course no a priori reason to assume that the physio-
logical phenomena are experienced in an interpersonal comparable way. 
Hence, Robbins’ (1938) statement that utility cannot be interpersonally compared with stan-
dard scientific rigor still holds and pertains to all measures of subjective well-being. But it is 
 23
important to remember that without the assumption of interpersonal comparability of utility, 
no form of cost benefit analysis is possible (e.g. Van Praag and Frijters 1999) and, in fact, eco-
nomics can say nothing in way of prescription (e.g. Robbins 1938). Further, intuition, ordinary 
practice and the widespread use of interpersonal comparisons in moral theorizing all undercut 
the view that these comparisons are impossible (Adler and Posner 2006, p. 43). 
Cardinality. Subjective well-being scores are reported on an ordinal scale. Again, the same is 
true for the physiological measures even though they are usually measured in cardinal units. 
For example, there is no reason to believe that an increase in the EEG alpha asymmetry by one 
microvolt squared is experienced similarly at different base levels of activation asymmetry. 
Using adequate statistical techniques such as the two common ordered response models, or-
dered probit or ordered logit, the ordinal information is sufficient to calculate individuals’ im-
plicit willingness-to-pay (WTP). However, in many applications, similar results are obtained 
when interpreting the scores of subjective well-being in cardinal terms (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters 2004). This is consistent with the validation results of the income evaluation approach. 
In a context free setting, respondents translated verbal labels on a numerical scale roughly in a 
cardinal manner (Van Praag 1991). 
In the applications of the life satisfaction approach in chapters 4 and 5, we also report the WTP 
estimates based on ordered probit estimates. As can be seen, the results based on the two 
methods are very similar and differ by less than 5% on average. 
Availability and costs. Most public goods can be expected to have relatively small effects on 
subjective well-being, in particular, smaller effects than personal characteristics. In order to 
statistically detect the effects, large sample sizes are required. Therefore, the cost component 
is another criterion for evaluating measures and measurement techniques. Beyond doubt, the 
least expensive measurement technique are surveys including global self-reports. The most 
expensive measurement techniques are probably the ESM and physiological techniques, the 
DRM falling between these two extremes. These cost differences are reflected in sample sizes 
in the past. For example, while the GSOEP with a life satisfaction question interviews over 
22,000 individuals each year (this figure refers to 2004), sample sizes for the ESM are below 
1,000 individuals (and usually much smaller) and sample sizes of neuro-physiological 
measures usually below 100. In the case of neuro-physiological measures, large and repre-
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sentative samples are also difficult to achieve because the measurement apparatuses are lo-
cated at few sites. However, both factors may become less important in the future. The af-
fordability of tools used in ESM is growing (Scollon, Kim-Prieto and Diener 2003); similarly 
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) speculate that the portability of EEG will eventually 
reach the point where it will be possible to take unobtrusive measurements from people as 
they go about their daily affairs. 
The identification of the effect of public goods on subjective well-being often requires sam-
ples with respondents living in different geographical areas, e.g. different countries or differ-
ent regions. Up to now, only data containing global self-reports meet this criterion, but the first 
DRM study on a global scale is under way (Kahneman in email to Frey; March 6, 2007). 
Summary of evaluation. Table 2 summarizes the evaluation by noticing which of the six crite-
ria the four measurement techniques and their corresponding measures meet. 
It is important to note that the criteria are neither of equal importance nor independent of each 
other. For example, at a conceptual level, a sufficient degree of inclusiveness is a sine qua 
non. On a practical level, availability of subjective well-being is another binding constraint. 
Compared to these criteria, the impossibility of interpersonal comparison and ordinality of 
utility may seem as mere obsessions of economists. Several criteria are related. For example, 
the ESM and DRM are only associated with less measurement errors compared to global self-
reports if instantaneous affect is the right concept to be measured.7 Further, the higher preci-
sion of the ESM, DRM or of physiological measures leads to a better statistical fit, thereby 
reducing the necessary sample size. Overall, despite the unfavorable treatment in the literature, 
for the purpose at hand, the global self-reports score high. 
The review of measures and measurement techniques emphasized the strengths and weak-
nesses of the techniques and their corresponding measures. Hopefully, it also showed “that the 
measurement of experienced utility should be viewed as a difficult technical problem, not a 
hopeless quest” (Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997, p. 394). 
                                                 
7 As explained in section 2.2.2, in DRM studies, respondents do not actually report their affect instantaneously. 
Nevertheless, by evoking the context of specific episodes of the previous day, thereby reducing errors and biases 
of recall, the DRM aims at capturing instantaneous affect. For example, Kahneman et al. (2004b, p. 1777) write 
that “the DRM is intended to reproduce the information that would be collected by probing experiences in real 
time”. 
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Table 2. Evaluation of measures and measurement techniques 
 Global self-reports ESM/EMA DRM Physiological 
 Life satisfaction Affect   measures 
Broad and inclusive Yes No No No No 
Refer to present situation Not necessarily Not necessarily Yes Yes Yes 
Low and no systematic 
measurement errors 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Interpersonally comparable No No No No No 
Cardinal interpretation No No No No No 
Available at large scale 
Yes, even 
retrospectively 
Yes, even 
retrospectively 
No Not yet No 
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2.3 Comparison with alternative approaches 
Economists have developed several ingenious methods to value public goods. The two main 
avenues pursued have been stated preference methods on the one hand and revealed pref-
erence methods on the other hand. The principal difference between stated and revealed pref-
erence methods is that the former draw their data from people’s responses to hypothetical 
questions and the latter from observations of real-world choices. In the following, we discuss 
the most prominent methods and their inherent problems. In order to highlight the strengths of 
the life satisfaction approach, the focus is on those problems which the life satisfaction ob-
viates. 
2.3.1 Stated preference methods: Contingent valuation 
By far the most often used stated preference method is the contingent valuation method.8 The 
contingent valuation method is a survey based technique of non-market valuation (for intro-
ductions see Mitchell and Carson 1989; Boyle 2003; Freeman 2003, pp.161-172).9 It involves 
asking people directly about the values they place on a public good by creating a hypothetical 
market or referendum situation.10 Thus, the core of every contingent valuation survey is a 
question eliciting respondents’ WTP for the particular public good. This question can either be 
open-ended or a dichotomous-choice. A typical open-ended question asks respondents “how 
much would you pay” for the specified change in public good provision. The dichotomous-
choice question asks respondents “would you pay $x” for the specified change. Dichotomous-
choice questions are often framed as a referendum, i.e. they are often combined with the deci-
sion rule that the change in public good provision will be implemented if at least 50% of re-
spondents answer in the affirmative. Dichotomous-choice questions reveal only an upper or a 
lower bound of an individual’s WTP. However, if it is applied to a large sample of individuals 
and if the bid amount “x” is varied over different individuals, responses can be used to esti-
mate WTP functions. 
                                                 
8 Other stated preference methods are, for example, contingent rankings, choice experiments and conjoint anal-
yses (Holmes and Adamowicz 2003). 
9 See Carson et al. (2003) for an elaborate and state-of-the-art contingent valuation study; they estimate individu-
als’ WTP to prevent another Exxon Valdez type oil spill. The survey was administered to a national sample of 
U.S. households and was designed to capture both, use and non-use values. The median WTP is around $30, the 
mean around $97 (in 1990 U.S. dollars). 
10 It is called “contingent” valuation because people are asked to state their WTP, contingent on a specific 
hypothetical scenario and description of the public good or policy. 
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Stating a WTP for a public good is an unfamiliar situation and gives rise to problems of stra-
tegic responses. Therefore, the credibility, validity and reliability of results based on contin-
gent valuation are the subject of heated controversy in economics. Skepticism is largely based 
on the empirically observed “embedding effect” (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992) that refers to 
several interrelated regularities in contingent valuation surveys. First, in some studies, the 
WTP is almost independent of the quantity of the public good provided (insensitivity to scale 
and scope). Second, if multiple goods are valued in one survey, the WTP for a particular pub-
lic good often depends on its position in the sequence (sequencing effect). Finally, the sum of 
the WTP for individual changes separately exceeds the WTP for a composite change in a group 
of public goods (sub-additivity effect). Critics see the “embedding effect” as evidence for the 
non-existence of individual preferences for the public good; individuals receive positive feel-
ings from expressing support for good causes and, accordingly, the survey process creates the 
values it seeks to reveal (e.g. Diamond and Hausman 1994). However, meta-analyses find sig-
nificant sensitivity to scale and scope (e.g. Smith, V. K. and Osborne 1996) and, according to 
proponents, the sequencing and the sub-additivity effect can be explained in terms of substitu-
tion effects and diminishing marginal rates of substitution (e.g. Hanemann 1994; Carson, 
Flores and Meade 2001). 
A number of guidelines have been developed to assure credibility, validity and reliability 
(Arrow et al. 1993; Portney 1994). The most important are the presentation of adequate infor-
mation, the choice of a credible (hypothetical) method of public good provision and payment 
mechanism and the use of the referendum format. Contingent valuation surveys usually in-
clude information on the public good in question. For some public goods such as clean air, 
information would often include a range of dose-response relationships between pollution ex-
posure and health effects. In order to reduce the cognitive burden for the respondents but at the 
same time avoiding having to rely on respondents’ previous knowledge, a common practice is 
to value pollution related morbidity and mortality risks instead of changes in pollution levels 
(see e.g. Alberini et al. 1997). In combination with dose-response relationships, this allows to 
value the health related benefits of clean air. However, this approach neglects important bene-
fits of clean air such as reduced material damage, improved visibility and minor symptomatic 
discomforts including watering eyes, chest pain and general malaise. Providing adequate in-
formation also includes reminding respondents of substitutes and their budget constraint. The 
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other design elements aimed at reducing the unfamiliarity of the task and the danger of sym-
bolic valuation are the hypothetical method of provision and the hypothetical payment 
mechanism. Respondents are usually asked to value a policy that provides a public good rather 
than the public good itself. This is complicated by the fact that the chosen method of provision 
may provide unintended clues to respondents that affect their decision (Boyle 2003). Further, 
as the case of terrorism and the failure of most traditional anti-terrorism policies suggests, 
there will often be no consensus on what the effective policies are (see e.g. Enders and Sandler 
1993; Frey and Luechinger 2003; Frey 2004 on anti-terrorism policies). The choice of a hypo-
thetical payment mechanism (e.g. price increase, tax increase etc.) often requires a balancing 
of realism against payment mechanism rejection (Mitchell and Carson 1989). In order to re-
duce the strategic bias, the guidelines prefer the referendum format. The referendum format is 
the only elicitation format that is – at least under certain circumstances – incentive-compatible 
(for a discussion of incentive compatibility of hypothetical referenda see Cummings 1997; 
Haab, Huang and Whitehead 1999; Smith, V. K. 1999). 
Despite these guidelines, the two basic problems of the contingent valuation method – sym-
bolic valuation and strategic bias – are difficult to overcome. The hypothetical nature of the 
questions asked and the unfamiliarity of the task often entail superficial answers and symbolic 
valuation in the form of attitude expression (Kahneman and Ritov 1994; Kahneman, Ritov and 
Schkade 1999). This is well demonstrated in a contingent valuation analysis of a flood reduc-
tion project in Roanoke, Virginia (Thunberg and Shabman 1991). Although the characteristics 
of the project have been carefully described to respondents in a face-to-face interview and al-
though the interviews were conducted two years after a major flood occurred in Roanoke, 15% 
of the respondents could not attach a monetary figure to the reduction in flood risk; another 
25% refused to respond because they thought it unfair to ask those who suffered food related 
loss to have to pay for the project. If 40% are either not able to answer or express an attitude 
rather than value the project, the credibility of the answers of the remaining 60% is 
challenged. The authors themselves assert that, because of the complexity and unfamiliarity of 
the task, the interview process constructed preferences rather than eliciting existing pref-
erences. 
Similarly, the problem of strategic behavior can only be addressed to a limited extent. In a 
contingent valuation study of protective measures to prevent deathly avalanche accidents in 
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Tirole, Austria, Leiter and Pruckner (2005) find that the expressed WTP strongly depends on 
the perception of the own risk and, therefore, own benefits of protective measures. Even 
though respondents are asked to value an objective change in future risks, skiers and persons 
who perceive their own risk above average risk are willing to pay significantly more. As long 
as such confounding factors cannot be accounted for, the valuation of an objective change in 
risk is compromised. 
The life satisfaction approach is not affected by either of these problems. It does not rely on 
respondents’ ability to consider all relevant consequences of a change in the provision of a 
public good. It suffices if they state their own life satisfaction with some degree of precision. 
This considerably reduces the “informational and computational burden” on the subjects (Di 
Tella, MacCulloch and Layard 2002, p. 9). Moreover, there is no reason to expect strategic 
behavior because the connection between life satisfaction and the public good is made ex post 
by the researcher. Of course, one might argue that a respondent living in a polluted and ter-
rorized region, anticipating that his reported life satisfaction is used to value air quality and 
national security, strategically reports an overly low life satisfaction. While theoretically 
possible, this problem is most likely to be of minor importance in practice. Life satisfaction 
data are usually collected for a multitude of purposes and the same data can be used to value a 
wide array of public goods. This effectively prevents strategic biases. At most, this theoretical 
possibility is a further argument against using life satisfaction data collected by questionnaires 
with extensive references to the public good of interest. 
2.3.2 Revealed preference methods 
This other group of non-market valuation techniques is based on the idea that, when choosing 
between different bundles of public and private goods, individuals make a trade-off, revealing 
something about the value they place on these goods. Under specific circumstances, this al-
lows for inferences to be made about individuals’ WTP for the public good from market trans-
actions in the private good. The most prominent revealed preference methods are (i) the he-
donic method, (ii) the travel cost approach, and (iii) the averting behavior method. These 
methods and their respective weaknesses are compared to the life satisfaction approach. 
Hedonic method. The hedonic method can be applied if the public good is weakly comple-
mentary to private goods such as housing and jobs (for introductions see Palmquist 1991; 
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Freeman 2003, pp. 343-416; Taylor 2003).11 This is the case, for example, if the (local) public 
good is a qualitative characteristic of the differentiated market good housing and of jobs. In 
this situation, the housing and labor market function as markets for the public good and infor-
mation on public good demand is embedded in the prices and consumption level of private 
goods. People can choose their level of consumption of a public good by their choice of a ju-
risdiction in which to reside and work. The higher the value individuals attach to a particular 
public good, the more they will bid up house prices and bid down wages in regions with a high 
amount of the public good. Wage and rent differentials serve as implicit prices for the public 
good. In equilibrium they correspond to the individuals’ marginal WTP (MWTP) for the public 
good (Rosen, S. 1974; Roback 1982). 
The assumption that housing and labor markets are in full equilibrium is a first and funda-
mental difficulty of the hedonic method. This assumption is only met when households have a 
very high degree of information, when there is a sufficiently wide variety of houses and jobs, 
when prices adjust rapidly, when there are no market restrictions and when transaction and 
moving costs are low (Freeman 2003, p. 366). The equilibrium assumption is often violated. 
For example, moving is associated with considerable out-of-pocket and psychic costs. If mo-
bility is costly, the true value of a change in the public good provision is greater than the house 
price effects imply. Consider the case of an exogenous improvement in air quality in a partic-
ular region. The cleaner air attracts new residents and, as a consequence, costs of housing rise 
until a new equilibrium is reached. Without mobility costs, the change in the costs of housing 
fully reflect the value of cleaner air. But if migration is costly, a person will only move to the 
region with improved air quality if the cleaner air compensates him or her for both, the higher 
rents and the cost of moving. In order to estimate the full WTP in presence of migration costs, 
Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2006) develop an alternative discrete choice approach that 
models household decision directly and does not rely on the equilibrium condition. They use 
                                                 
11 Exemplary contributions are Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) and Chay and Greenstone (2005). 
Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) estimate compensations for intra-urban and inter-regional differences in 
climatic, environmental and urban amenities in the labor and housing market for U.S. counties in 1980. Accord-
ing to their results, among the most important factors are central city status (annual WTP of $645 in 1980 U.S. 
dollars), whether the county touches an ocean or one of the Great Lakes (annual WTP of $468), the teacher-pupil 
ratio (annual WTP of $136 for a reduction of one pupil per teacher) and the number of designated hazardous 
waste sites (annual WTP of $106 per site). Chay and Greenstone (2005) investigate the effect of total suspended 
particulate (TSP) pollution and successfully address the identification issues hedonic method studies are usually 
plagued with. They find a marginal WTP (MWTP) of between $176 and $315 (in 2001 U.S. dollars) for a 
reduction of one μg/m3 in TSP. 
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their approach to value air quality (total suspended particulate, TSP) in the U.S. metropolitan 
areas in 1990 and 2000. The estimated annual MWTP for the median household income 
amounts to between $149 and $185 (in 1983 U.S. dollars). By comparison, the MWTP es-
timated with the conventional hedonic model is only $55. The same problem can be viewed 
from a different perspective. If mobility costs restrict migration to the region with improved 
air quality, residents of that region who are not property owners get a rent. This rent is not re-
flected in the changes in aggregate property values. To recover residents’ total WTP for the 
improvement in air quality, the rent has to be added to the changes in aggregate property val-
ues. Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1977) measure these rents by assuming a particular utility func-
tion and by interpreting the coefficients of the house and rent price regressions as parameters 
of the utility function. The approach is applied to value air quality (TSP and SO2) in St. Louis, 
Missouri, in 1960. They estimate a total WTP for a reduction in air pollution by 5% of around 
$147 million (in 1960 U.S. dollars). In contrast, the total WTP implied in the changes in ag-
gregate property values is only around $55 million. Thus, both studies suggest that conven-
tional hedonic models underestimate the WTP for clean air by a factor of around three. In both 
studies, restrictive assumptions have to be imposed in order to estimate WTP. Nevertheless, 
the studies suggest that migration costs are important and that therefore the hedonic method 
may severely underestimate WTP. In contrast to the hedonic method, the life satisfaction ap-
proach explicitly captures utility in the absence of market equilibria. In the case of public 
goods for which it is useful to distinguish between expected benefits and materialized benefits 
and for which the effects on life satisfaction are identified on the basis of the latter, the life 
satisfaction approach can recover the full utility consequences independent of the degree of 
capitalization in the housing and labor market. For all other public goods, compensating vari-
ation in the private markets has to be accounted for. If they are not, the life satisfaction ap-
proach captures only the residual effect. These issues are discussed in more detail in section 
2.4.2. Anticipating one of the main conclusions, the discussion suggests that, if anything, the 
life satisfaction approach works best if there is no market equilibrium. 
Another drawback of the hedonic method is the need to account for adjustments people are 
likely to make in response to changes in the level of an externality, for reactions of the supply 
side of the hedonic market and for general equilibrium effects (see e.g. Pommerehne 1987, pp. 
67-71; Freeman 2003, pp. 372-373). 
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Travel cost approach. As the hedonic method, the travel cost approach rests on the assumption 
of weak complementarity between public and private goods (for introductions see Clawson 
and Knetsch 1966; Freeman 2003, pp. 417-447; Parsons 2003).12 But whereas in the hedonic 
method people are assumed to relocate with regard to regional differences in public goods, the 
travel cost approach rests on the premise that location decisions are driven by other factors. 
Instead, individuals spend time and money traveling to and consuming publicly provided 
goods, like recreational sites and cultural institutions. The travel cost approach takes advan-
tage of the fact that each visit to a site involves an implicit transaction in which the costs of 
traveling to the site is incurred in return for access to the site. Hence, inferences about individ-
uals’ WTP for the site and site characteristics can be drawn by treating the cost of travel to the 
site as an implicit price. Variation in price is generated by observing individuals at different 
distances from a particular site and sites at different distances for any individual. 
In contrast to the life satisfaction approach, the travel cost approach is only applicable if the 
consumption of the publicly provided good entails costs and is restricted to a small number of 
public goods. Further, in the case of the travel cost approach, the shadow price of time is criti-
cal to the evaluation of the public good, but inherently difficult to observe (Randall 1994). 
Finally, it is a central but equivocal assumption that travel serves no other purpose than the 
consumption of the public good and provides no utility or disutility in itself. 
Defense expenditure approach. The defense expenditure approach can be applied if the con-
sumption of private goods substitutes for the provision of public goods. For example, private 
expenditures for security measures may serve as a substitute for public security measures. Be-
hind the simplest applications of the defense expenditure approach lies the assumption of per-
fect substitutability (Zeckhauser and Fisher 1976). An increase in public security measures 
then leads to a decline in private defense expenditures which in turn corresponds to an indi-
vidual’s MWTP for the increase in public security. While a substitutive relationship is often 
plausible, perfect substitutes represent a special case that is unlikely to prevail in many policy 
areas of interest (Pommerehne 1987, p. 25). Therefore, substitution is often modeled more 
generally in a household production framework. In this framework, the public and the private 
                                                 
12 For an application of the travel cost model, see e.g. Hausman, Leonard and McFadden (1995). They estimate 
utility losses due to the Exxon Valdez oil spill like Carson et al. (2003), the latter study using contingent valua-
tion surveys. The effect estimated with contingent valuation is more than 700 times higher than the one estimated 
with the travel cost approach. 
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goods simultaneously contribute to the production of a utility-yielding good such as health. 
The MWTP for the public good then typically is a function of the price for the private good 
and the marginal rate of technical substitution between the private and the public good (see 
Bartik 1988; Dickie 2003; Freeman 2003, pp. 105-110).13 
Several conditions have to be met for the defense expenditure approach to reveal the correct 
WTP. First, the private good has to be a necessary input in the production of the utility-yield-
ing good. Second, there should be no major costs involved with adjusting defense ex-
penditures or averting behavior. Third, there must be no joint production in the sense that the 
private and public good jointly produce more than one good, nor in the sense that the private 
or public good contribute to utility directly in addition to their contribution to the utility-
yielding good. If the public good has additional direct effects on utility, the WTP is under-
estimated. For example, WTP estimates that account only for the effects of the improvement in 
air quality on illness may disregard important effects such as reduced material damages and 
improved visibility. Finally, key parameters are often difficult to measure. For example, a re-
duction in the time spent outdoors is an effective and widely observed measure for individuals 
to defend themselves against air pollution-related health problems (Bresnahan, Dickie and 
Gerking 1997). The costs associated with these behavioral adjustments are typically un-
observed. However, the unmeasured impact of poor air quality on daily life may represent a 
significant component of the value of clean air. Thus, these costs have to measured with other 
methods, above all with stated preference methods (e.g. Mansfield, Johnson and Van Houtven 
2006). 
The life satisfaction approach is affected by neither of these problems. The effect of a change 
in the public good provision on life satisfaction can be observed even if it entails no reaction 
in the consumption of a private good, be it because the private good is not an essential input in 
producing a utility-yielding good or because adjustment costs prohibit adjustments in defense 
                                                 
13 Exemplary applications are Gerking and Stanley (1986) and Dickie and Gerking (1991). Both studies estimate 
the WTP for tropospheric ozone control in St. Louis, Missouri, and the Los Angeles metropolitan area, respec-
tively. Further, both studies treat medical expenses as the private good that together with clean air prevents ill-
ness. Gerking and Stanley (1986) estimate an annual WTP of between $18 and $25 (in 1980 U.S. dollars) for a 
30% reduction in ozone. These WTP estimates are relatively modest because due to the relatively clean air in St. 
Louis, the contemplated reductions are small. According to Dickie and Gerking (1991), individuals living in high 
ozone areas of Los Angeles are willing to pay over $170 (in 1985 U.S. dollars) annually for an environment in 
which ozone concentrations never exceed the U.S. federal standard of 12 pphm. 
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expenditures. Further, the direct effects of the private good and the public good as well as the 
utility costs of averting behavior are all reflected in life satisfaction. 
Perceived versus objective level of public good provision. A problem common to all methods 
based on revealed preferences is that consumption and relocation decisions are based on per-
ceived rather than objective (dis-)amenity levels. In case people’s perceptions and objective 
measures do not correspond sufficiently, the estimates may be severely biased. This can be 
well demonstrated for the case of natural hazard risks. Brookshire et al. (1985) and Troy and 
Romm (2004) show that disclosure of information on natural hazard risks importantly influ-
ences price gradients in hedonic market analyses. Brookshire et al. (1985) compare the price 
gradients for earthquake safety in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas before and after 
the Alquist-Priolo Act was passed in 1974 which provided the society with information con-
cerning relative earthquake-associated risk by designating areas of elevated relative risk. 
Similarly, Troy and Romm (2004) compare price gradients on non-floodplain areas before and 
after the 1998 California Natural Hazard Disclosure Law. Both studies find no price differen-
tial between risky and safe areas before the laws have been passed, but large and significant 
price differentials thereafter. These results imply that estimates based on the hedonic method 
are severely biased downwards when individuals do not have access to objective information 
on risks. Theoretically, the direction of the bias when people lack statistical knowledge is not 
determined. Research on the availability heuristic suggests that people consider risks to be 
significant if they can easily think of instances in which those risks came to fruition 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982). Incidents of natural disasters may then cause people to 
exaggerate objective risks or, on the other hand, result in subjective risk perceptions that are 
unrelated to objective risks. The multi-facetted interactions between incidents of natural 
disasters and risk perception are documented in several hedonic market analyses. Driscoll, 
Dietz and Alwang (1994) and Bin and Polasky (2004) estimate larger price discounts in he-
donic property price functions for houses located within a floodplain in the aftermath of a 
flood than before the flood occurred. In contrast, analyzing the same area as Brookshire et al. 
(1985), Beron et al. (1997) find that the price gradient for earthquake fell after the 1989 Loma 
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Prieta Earthquake, indicating that consumers had initially overestimated the earthquake 
hazard.14 
The same caveat applies, to some extent, to the life satisfaction approach. This is the case if 
the perceived risk itself is the main source of utility loss. For example, if the fear associated 
with terrorism risks were the most important effect of terrorism, distorted risk perceptions 
could bias the result. This is not to say that terrorism risks may not have larger consequences 
than statistically comparable risks because of an additional fear or dread factor (Becker, G. S. 
and Rubinstein 2004). Both the life satisfaction approach and revealed preference methods 
would rightly capture such a broad risk assessment as a source of disutility. However, the life 
satisfaction approach and the revealed preference methods cannot measure fear effects which 
are totally unrelated to the underlying objective risk. The problem of revealed preferences 
methods is that individuals’ behavior in private markets always reflects expected future risks 
(even if expectations are based on current or past risks). In contrast, in most applications of the 
life satisfaction approach, the utility consequences of risks are primarily identified on the basis 
of actual events, i.e. when the risk materializes. The life satisfaction approach is, therefore, 
less affected by distorted risk perceptions. A related strength of the life satisfaction approach 
is that it can capture indirect effects which leave no behavioral trace. For example, whereas 
noise nuisance affects utility directly and results in corresponding defense expenditures or re-
location decisions, exposure to air pollution can damage health through a process unnoticed by 
the people, but which nevertheless lowers life satisfaction. Smith and Huang (1995) present 
evidence that is compatible with the hypothesis that health effects of air pollution are incom-
pletely capitalized in housing markets. Benefit estimates for improvements in air quality in 
four U.S. cities based on dose-response functions and on Viscusi’s (1993) summary value of 
mortality risk (mostly based on revealed preference methods!) are around four times higher 
                                                 
14 Similar findings have been documented for hazardous waste sites. Kohlhase (1991) finds a positive relationship 
between the distance of a house to the next hazardous waste site and its price, but only after the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) placed the site on the National Priorities List. To sites on the EPA list, a pre-
liminary risk assessment is applied. Later the EPA releases an in depth Remedial Investigation. Gayer, Hamilton 
and Viscusi (2000; 2002) compare house price gradients before and after the release of the Remedial Investiga-
tion. According to their results, the negative effect on housing prices decreases (in absolute terms) after the re-
lease of the Remedial Investigation. The authors conjecture that the investigation provides risk information that 
lowers initially alarmist perceptions of the risk. The evidence suggests that prior perceptions are based on the 
national averages of risk levels at designated areas. Because the studied sites have below average risk levels, the 
investigation lowers risk perceptions. Further, according to several studies, risk perceptions are importantly influ-
enced by newspaper publicity of a site (e.g. Gayer, Hamilton and Viscusi 2000; 2002; McCluskey and Rausser 
2001). 
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than benefit estimates based on hedonic property studies. If people recognize the health effects 
of air pollution, these effects would be reflected in property prices in addition to a wide range 
of additional effects of air pollution. The life satisfaction approach captures health effects ir-
respective of whether people are aware of the causes or not. 
Decision versus experienced utility. The standard methods, stated preference and revealed 
preference methods, are also challenged by the systematic divergence of the two concepts of 
utility, decision and experience utility (e.g. Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin 1997; Kahneman 
and Thaler 2006), or of “wanting” and “liking” (e.g. Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 2005). 
As welfare measures based on revealed preference methods and stated preference methods are 
measures of decision utility, they may be biased estimates of the hedonic experience of the 
decision as evaluated ex post by the individuals themselves. In the case of revealed preference 
methods, decisions in markets for private goods may not accurately reveal people’s hedonic 
experience from the consumption of public goods. As Rabin (1998, p. 33) points out, “[t]he 
realization that decision and experienced utility may be systematically different cuts to the 
core […] of our methods of research, requiring us to formulate ways of inferring and eliciting 
preferences that go beyond a ‘revealed preference’ method […] through such methods as self 
reports of satisfaction […].” In the same vein, respondents to contingent valuation questions 
may not be able to make accurate predictions of the hedonic consequences of their (hypotheti-
cal) choice. In both, hypothetical and real markets, individuals may mispredict their future 
feelings due to a combination of incorrect intuitive theories about the determinants of happi-
ness, incorrect believes regarding the speed and degree of adaptation, a difference in saliency 
of various aspects between the moment of prediction and the moment of experience and a fo-
cusing illusion (for a discussion of these effects in the specific context of contingent valuation 
surveys, see Loewenstein and Schkade 1999; Kahneman and Sugden 2005). If people under-
estimate future utility streams derived from intangible goods such as good health relative to 
utility streams from disposable income (Frey and Stutzer 2004a), WTP estimates based on the 
standard approaches fall short of the experienced utility consequences of the evaluated change 
in public good provision. Moreover, these deviations and discrepancies are most likely in 
complex decisions with long-term trade-offs (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 2005), i.e. 
nearly all decisions of policy relevance. 
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2.4 Applications and identification issues 
The preceding discussion suggests that the life satisfaction approach obviates several of the 
problems inherent in the standard methods. Its application instead of, or complementary to, the 
traditional methods therefore seems promising. The life satisfaction approach can be used to 
value a wide range of different public goods and bads, negative and positive externalities. 
However, as the following literature review illustrates, it has hitherto mainly been used to 
value externalities in the environmental realm. The literature review also highlights methodo-
logical differences between the applications. The differences have important implications re-
garding the identification of effects of the public goods on life satisfaction. Three identifica-
tion issues are discussed in the following: the problem of omitted variables, compensating 
variation in private markets and the choice of spatial units across which the effects are identi-
fied. In a brief outlook on the three applications in the following chapters, we discuss how the 
applications relate to each other and how they address the three identification issues. 
2.4.1 Previous literature 
The goods with a public character that have been valued with the life satisfaction approach can 
be grouped into four broad categories: climatic conditions, air pollution, noise nuisance and 
crime.15 The major results of the studies are summarized in table 3. The table depicts the coef-
ficients for the public goods of interest and, for comparative purposes, the WTP for a marginal 
improvement in the public good provision and the elasticity between the public good and in-
come. Only a few studies report one or both of these figures. Whenever possible, they have 
been calculated using the regression results and the information provided in the descriptive 
                                                 
15 Several research areas are closely related to the valuing of public goods with data on subjective well-being. 
However, because they all differ in at least one important respect, they are not discussed here. First, several pa-
pers investigate the effect of perceived public good provision on life satisfaction such as concerns about ozone 
pollution and species extinction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Gowdy 2007) and perceived noise and air pollution 
exposure (Rehdanz and Maddison 2007). Second, subjective well-being data are used to monetize all kinds of 
intangible goods, life events and circumstances such as marriage, divorce, widowhood, social relationships, 
health, unemployment and having a black skin (e.g. Clark and Oswald 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004b; 
Powdthavee 2007). Though these “goods” are not normally bought in markets, they have neither public good 
character (with associated free-rider problems) nor are they publicly provided. This method has also been pro-
posed for calculating compensatory damages for the grief of dependents of a victim (Posner and Sunstein 2005) 
and for disability (Oswald and Powdthavee 2006, taking into account adaptation) in the context of tort-law. 
Third, another strand of literature assesses the life satisfaction consequences of voluntary contributions to public 
goods such as purchasing environmentally-friendly products, conserving water and contributing to environmental 
groups (Videras and Owen 2006), of volunteering (Meier and Stutzer 2007) and of informal care-giving (Van den 
Berg and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2007). Finally, close in spirit is a paper by Kimball et al. (2006) estimating the short-
run happiness consequences of natural disasters with high-frequency data. 
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statistics. The figures are only calculated for those public goods that have a significant impact 
on reported subjective well-being. Finally, they are calculated for the sample means of the 
relevant variables. In order to understand how to read the table, consider the first result re-
ported in table 3, the results for the mean temperature in the hottest month. According to the 
study of Rehdanz and Maddison (2005), higher mean temperatures in the hottest month have a 
statistically significant negative effect on people’s happiness. A person would be willing to 
pay up to $1,258 annually on average (corresponding to 7.50% of the average income; the 
MWTP is expressed in 2004 U.S. dollars) for a decrease of the mean temperature in the hottest 
month by 1˚C. Alternatively, if the mean temperature in the hottest month were to increase by 
1%, income would have to increase by 1.56% to offset the utility loss. 
Table 3. Major results of studies using the life satisfaction approach  
Studies, variables, coefficients and standard errors MWTP Elasticity 
Climate    
 Study: Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005a)    
 Dependent variable: 4-point happiness scale    
 Regression coefficients:    
  Mean temperature hottest month -0.018 $1,258 (7.50%) 1.56% 
   (0.009) (for -1˚C) (for +1%) 
  Mean temperature coldest month 0.014 $968 (5.78%) 0.15% 
   (0.005) (for +1˚C) (for -1%) 
  Mean precipitation wettest month 4.E-4   
   (2.E-4)   
  Mean precipitation driest month 0.001   
   (0.001)   
Air pollution    
 Study: Welsch, 2002    
 Dependent variable: 4-point happiness scale    
 Regression coefficients:    
  SO2 concentration 0.001   
   (0.001)   
  NO2 concentration -0.004 $89 (0.69%) 0.39% 
   (0.002) (for -1 μg/m3) (for +1%) 
  TSP concentration 0.001   
   (0.001)   
 To be continued. 
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Table 3, part 2  
Studies, variables, coefficients and standard errors MWTP Elasticity 
 Dependent variable: ln(4-point happiness scale)   
 Regression coefficients:    
  ln(SO2 concentration) 0.017   
   (0.012)   
  ln(NO2 concentration) -0.450 $156 (1.22%) 0.53% 
   (0.025) (for -1 μg/m3) (for +1%) 
  ln(TSP concentration) -0.009   
   (0.025)   
 Study: Welsch, 2006b)    
 Dependent variable: ln(4-point life satisfaction scale)   
 Regression coefficients:    
  ln(NO2 concentration) -0.085   
   (0.053)   
  ln(TSP concentration) 0.003   
   (0.039)   
  ln(lead concentration) -0.020 $2,303 (8.28%) 0.10% 
   (0.008) (for -0.1 μg/m3) (for +1%) 
 Dependent variable: ln(4-point life satisfaction scale)   
 Regression coefficients:    
  ln(NO2 concentration) -0.057 $171 (0.61%) 0.27% 
   (0.025) (for -1 μg/m3) (for +1%) 
  ln(lead concentration) -0.012 $1,294 (4.65%) 0.06% 
   (0.005) (for –0.1 μg/m3) (for +1%) 
 Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005    
 Dependent variable: 3-point subjective well-being scale   
 Regression coefficient:    
  SOx emissions -0.003 $156 (0.66%) 0.32% 
   (0.001) (for -1 kg p.c.) (for +1%) 
Noise     
 Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005    
 Dependent variable: 10-point life satisfaction scale   
 Regression coefficient:    
  ln(Kosten units) -0.024   
   (0.025)   
 To be continued. 
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Table 3, part 3  
Studies, variables, coefficients and standard errors MWTP Elasticity 
 Dependent variable: 10-point life satisfaction scale   
 Regression coefficient:    
  ln(Kosten units) -0.039c) n.a.  0.05% 
   (0.012)   
Crime     
 Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005    
 Dependent variable: 3-point subjective well-being scale   
 Regression coefficients:    
  ln(serious assaults per 100,000 people) -0.029 $27 (0.11%) 0.32% 
   (0.017) (for -1 assault) (for +1%) 
General notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. MWTPs and elasticities are estimated for mean values of the 
relevant variables. All MWTPs are in 2004 U.S. dollars. 
Specific notes: a) Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) model the relationship between GDP p.c. and happiness as a 
quadratic function; both coefficients of the function are used although the one for the squared term is not 
statistically significant; b) Specifications with and without a variable for TSP concentration reported in Welsch 
(2006) are shown here; c) This coefficient is the product of the partial correlation between life satisfaction and 
perceived noise (α) and the partial correlation of perceived noise and ln(Kosten units) (β); the standard error is 
estimated on the basis of Sobel’s (1982) first-order approximation, (α2σβ2 + β2σα2)0.5. 
Source: Results reported in studies and own calculations. 
Climatic conditions. In a pioneer study, Frijters and Van Praag (1998) estimate the effect of 
several climate variables on life satisfaction for Russia in 1993 and 1994. They combine cross-
section data for around 4,500 individuals with detailed information on the climatic conditions 
on the basis of 35 Russian climate regions. Unfortunately, several problems make it impossi-
ble to draw any firm conclusions. First, the regression includes several climate variables in the 
interaction terms without also including the direct effects of these variables. Therefore, several 
coefficients may be biased and difficult to interpret. Second, the study does not provide infor-
mation on the mean values of the variables. Hence, no WTP can be estimated. Further, because 
most climate variables (also) appear in interaction terms and because mean values are not 
known, it is not possible to calculate elasticities. Third, the authors report the WTP for three 
variables in percent of income. However, these WTP estimates include the effect of the climate 
variables on income (estimated in separate hedonic wage regressions) weighted by the mar-
ginal effect of income. As the regression controls for income and, hence, is able to recover the 
full effect of climate on well-being, the indirect effect through income is double counted. Fi-
nally, although the climate variables are merged to the individual observations on the basis of 
climate regions, standard errors are (presumably) not adjusted for clustering on the regional 
level. Ignoring clustering produces standard errors that are biased downward (Moulton 1990). 
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No better verdict can be reached for two recent studies on the effect of intra-country climate 
variations on life satisfaction. For a cross-section of around 1,500 individuals in Ireland in 
2001, Brereton, Clinch and Ferreira (2006) and Ferreira, Moro and Clinch (2006) estimate the 
effect of climate and a wide range of potentially interesting public goods on life satisfaction. 
In addition to five climate variables, Brereton, Clinch and Ferreira (2006) include 10 variables 
capturing aspects of the location of residence, access to services and urban amenities and dis-
amenities, and Ferreira, Moro and Clinch (2006) include 13 variables for locational aspects, 
access to services and urban amenities and disamenities as well as two environmental var-
iables. These aggregate data are merged to the individual data on a highly disaggregated level. 
The problem, however, is that the results completely lack robustness. A comparison of the two 
studies reveals that the sign and significance of the coefficients are extremely sensitive to the 
specification: Four of the five coefficients of the climate variables included in both studies 
change sign, and none retains sign and significance across the two studies. Similarly, two 
coefficients of the five locational variables included in both studies change sign and, again, 
none retains sign and significance across both studies. 
Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) analyze the effects of climatic conditions on happiness on a 
global scale in a cross-section of 67 countries with observations from the years 1972 to 2000.16 
As shown in table 3, climatic conditions are captured by four variables: mean temperatures in 
the hottest and in the coldest month and mean precipitation in the wettest and driest month, 
respectively. The results suggest that people prefer higher mean temperatures in the coldest 
month and lower temperatures in the hottest month. The precipitation variables are indi-
vidually and jointly insignificant. The authors use the regression results to calculate the change 
in real GDP per capita necessary to hold happiness constant at its current levels in the face of 
predicted changes in climate. According to their results, predicted climate changes decrease 
happiness in most countries. Only a few countries in high latitudes such as Canada, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden as well as some Eastern European countries such as Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and the Ukraine are predicted to gain. Of course, these calculations are sensitive to 
the climate change predictions. 
                                                 
16 Their sample includes 185 observations, i.e. around 2.8 observations per country on average. In order not to 
inflate the significance of the results and in order not to give countries with more observations undue weight, they 
use sample weights and adjust the standard errors for clustering on the country level. 
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Air pollution. Three studies assess the effect of air pollution on subjective well-being. In a 
cross section of 54 countries with observations from the early and mid 1990s, Welsch (2002) 
estimates the effect of four air pollutants and two water pollutants on happiness.17 In a linear 
specification, only NO2 and phosphorus pollution have the expected negative sign, which is 
significant for NO2. The other pollutant coefficients are positive and insignificant. The same 
pattern of results emerges if the pollutants are included individually; it is therefore not caused 
by multicollinearity among the pollutants. In the double-log models, the coefficients for all 
pollutants except for SO2 are negative, but in most cases insignificant (see table 3). The 
MWTP for a reduction of one μg/m3 NO2 amounts to between $89 and $156 (in 2004 U.S. 
dollars).18 The negative effect of NO2 is only partially corroborated in a repeated cross-section 
analysis for 10 European countries in the years 1990 to 1997 (Welsch 2006). In a regression of 
happiness on NO2 and lead concentration, both pollutants have a statistically significant nega-
tive effect, whether they are separately or jointly included. However, as can be seen from table 
3, the negative effect of NO2 falls below conventional levels of significance if TSP is included 
as an additional pollutant. In contrast to the cross-county analysis (Welsch 2002), multicol-
linearity between pollution variables seems to be a problem in the repeated cross-section anal-
ysis (Welsch 2006). The implicit MWTP for NO2 calculated with the significant coefficient 
lies in the range of the MWTP estimates found in the cross-section analysis. 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005a) also use repeated cross-section analysis to investigate the 
effect of air pollution among a number of other factors. The analysis spans 23 years and 12 
countries, 11 European countries and the United States. They find that sulfur oxides (SOx) 
emissions have an adverse effect on subjective well-being that is significant. Moreover, in-
teraction terms suggest that the adverse effect is larger (in absolute terms) for the young, a 
result that is compatible with the hypothesis that negative effects of a bad environment are 
more strongly felt by the young. Unfortunately, their indicator of “pollution” is highly prob-
                                                 
17 In a recent paper, Welsch (2007) extends the analysis in a conceptually interesting way. Replicating one of the 
earlier results, he regresses happiness on NO2 concentration and GDP per capita and calculates the marginal 
monetary benefits of pollution abatement. Furthermore, he estimates a production function for per capita GDP in 
which air pollution plays the role of a “quasi-input” in addition to physical capital per capita and the number of 
scientists and engineers per capita as a measure for human capital. In this way, the marginal product of pollution 
– which is equal to the marginal cost of abatement in this framework – can be discovered. By equating the mar-
ginal benefits and costs of abatement, optimal abatement rates can be calculated. 
18 Welsch (2002) asserts that his air pollution data are measured in kilotons. However, according to later editions 
of the data used by Welsch (2002), pollution is measured in μg/m3 (see Yale Center for Environmental Law and 
Policy 2002). 
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lematic. At the country level, emissions and pollution concentration are only weakly corre-
lated. For example, only 14% of the Danish sulfur emissions remain in Denmark. For larger 
countries the fraction is higher, but below 50% for all European countries (Eliassen and 
Saltbones 1983). 
Noise nuisance. Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) investigate the effect of airport noise nuisance 
on life satisfaction in a cross-section sample of 1,400 persons living in the area around Am-
sterdam Airport (Schiphol). High-resolution noise data are added to the individual-level data; 
noise is measured in Kosten units (named after a Dutch professor). The measure of objective 
noise nuisance has a negative effect on life satisfaction. However, this effect is not statistically 
significant. This result even holds for individuals living in houses without noise insulation (the 
first coefficient of the study reported in table 3). Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) conjecture 
that life satisfaction is influenced by perceived rather than objective noise levels. Further, the 
intervening variable perceived noise depends not only on objective noise levels but also on 
characteristics of the household and the house such as family size, the presence of a balcony or 
garden etc. Therefore, they estimate in two separate regressions the effect of objective noise 
levels on perceived noise and the effect of perceived noise on life satisfaction. Objective noise 
is indeed a significant predictor of perceived noise and perceived noise of life satisfaction. 
Thus, they calculate the effect of objective noise levels on life satisfaction as the product of 
these two effects (second coefficient of the study reported in table 3). 
Crime. The study of Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) includes an indicator for the crime level 
in a country and year. It is the natural logarithm of the number of serious assaults per 100,000 
persons. As expected, the crime rate has a negative and statistically significant effect on life 
satisfaction (see table 3). 
Overall, the literature review suggests that the level of public good provision is reflected in 
self-reported subjective well-being and that data on subjective well-being can thus be used to 
value public good. Further, the results summarized in table 3 indicate that the life satisfaction 
approach can provide important insights into many different areas. From a methodological 
perspective, the studies differ along two dimensions: A first dimension is the structure of the 
individual level data used. Most studies use single cross-sections. Exceptions are Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2005a) and Welsch (2006). A second dimension is the degree of spatial resolu-
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tion of the public good variables. While Welsch (2006), Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005a), 
Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) and Welsch (2006) use variables at the country (or country-
year) level, Frijters and Van Praag (1998), Van Praag and Baarsma (2005), Brereton, Clinch 
and Ferreira (2006) and Ferreira, Moro and Clinch (2006) use high-resolution data. Both dif-
ferences have important implications for the identification of effects of public goods on sub-
jective well-being. 
2.4.2 Identification of utility consequences 
In the following, three identification issues are discussed: the problem of omitted variables, 
compensating variation in private markets and the choice of spatial units across which the ef-
fects are identified. It is important to note that two of these issues, the omitted variable prob-
lem and the degree of spatial resolution, are not restricted to the life satisfaction approach but 
apply equally to revealed preference methods. 
Omitted variables. The life satisfaction approach is not immune to possible spurious correla-
tions that are the result of omitted variables. As a concrete example consider air pollution. 
Imagine that people in polluted areas report on average a lower life satisfaction than their 
counterparts in areas with clean air. Obviously, the regions differ from each other in various 
ways other than the level of air pollution which are likely to influence the life satisfaction of 
their residents. Differences in air pollution reflect either different natural or economic condi-
tions such as climate, population density, urbanization and the economic structure or different 
policy choices. A failure to control for the differences in conditions may bias the estimates in 
either direction. The notion of choice implies that a failure to include all dimensions of the 
relevant trade-off biases the estimates downwards. Improvements in air quality often come at a 
cost. If these costs are not controlled for, only the net benefit of clean air can be recovered. 
There are three ways of addressing this problem. First, the problem can be mitigated by using 
data with panel structure, since the problem of omitted variable is especially severe in cross-
section analyses. That cross-section analyses are susceptible to spurious correlations is well 
illustrated by the fact that six out of ten coefficients for the variables included in the studies of 
Brereton, Clinch and Ferreira (2006) and Ferreira, Moro and Clinch (2006) change their sign 
across different specifications. Data with panel structure allow researchers to control for time-
invariant region- or country-specific differences in life satisfaction as well for area-indepen-
 45
dent variations over time. Still, there may be time-variant regional effects that are correlated 
with life satisfaction and the variable of concern. This is particularly likely if the changes in 
public good provision are themselves endogenous. For example, a change in air pollution indi-
cates that either conditions or policies have changed as well. Therefore, a second key issue is 
to control for potentially collinear variables. However, the lack of adequate indicators often 
limits this procedure. The third, and often the only, way to address endogeneity and simul-
taneity problems is to instrument the variance in the public goods provision. 
Compensating variation. For a large number of potentially omitted variables, fixed effects, 
time-varying control variables and instruments are effective remedies. However, one particular 
group of potentially omitted variables requires further discussion: compensations in private 
markets, above all in the housing and the labor markets. According to the premise of the he-
donic method, individuals exposed to public bads or negative externalities are compensated in 
these private markets. The markets compensate individuals for the costs of self-protection 
measures, for the costs of locally financed public measures as well as for any direct utility 
costs associated with these measures, for higher risk premiums for insuring themselves against 
damages as well as for all non-insurable and non-avertable losses. Similarly, public goods are 
thought to be bought in these hedonic markets. Therefore, this compensating variation has a 
countervailing effect on life satisfaction. The countervailing effect of the compensating varia-
tion has led to some confusion in the literature as to what part of the utility effects can be 
identified with the life satisfaction approach and to confusion on the relationship between the 
life satisfaction approach and the hedonic method (for opposite positions, see e.g. Van Praag 
and Baarsma 2005; Brereton, Clinch and Ferreira 2006). 
In the standard hedonic method framework all public goods and bads are capitalized in rents 
and wages. In the standard framework, individuals are assumed to have an indirect utility 
function, v(·), with the amenity a, household income, m(a), and rental costs, r(a), per unit of 
housing, h, as arguments (with δv/δa > 0, δv/δm > 0 and δv/δr < 0). In the market equilibrium, 
wages and rents must adjust to equalize utility across locations (see e.g. Roback 1982). This 
does not mean that the positive effect of a public good would not affect residents’ well-being. 
It is just that the positive effect is equally distributed among the residents of different loca-
tions. Otherwise, some individuals would have an incentive to move. Hence we have v(a, 
m(a), r(a)) = k in all locations. By totally differentiating and rearranging we obtain: 
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(1) dv/da = δv/δa + δv/δm · dm/da + δv/δr · dr/da = 0. 
Defining the implicit price for the amenity reflected in the labor and housing markets, pa, as pa 
= h · dr/da - dm/da and using Roy’s (1947) identity, h = -(δv/δr)/(δv/δm), one can write: 
(2) pa* = h · dr/da - dm/da = (δv/δa)/(δv/δm). 
Thus, in equilibrium, the implicit price for the amenity equals the MWTP. This is the underly-
ing assumption of the hedonic method. If the equilibrium condition holds, individuals’ MWTP 
for the amenity can be inferred from the observable demand for residential housing as well as 
from rent and wage gradients. As discussed in section 2.3.2, various restrictions, moving and 
transactions costs as well as cognitive biases are likely to prevent complete equalization in 
reality. Moreover, landowners (and employees with firm-specific investments) only have a 
costly exit option from locations that are negatively affected by a public bad or an externality. 
If the labor and housing markets are not in equilibrium, utility is not equalized across locations 
with different amenity levels, i.e. dv/da > 0, and the observed implicit price falls short of indi-
viduals’ MWTP: 
(3) pa = h · dr/da - dm/da = (δv/δa)/(δv/δm) – (dv/da)/(δv/δm) < (δv/δa)/(δv/δm). 
As explained in section 2.1, the life satisfaction approach does not rely on observed behavior 
but regresses life satisfaction, as an empirical approximation for the underlying latent variable 
utility, on the amenity level, income and other covariates. The coefficients for the public good 
and for income are interpreted as the marginal utilities of the public good and income, respec-
tively, and the MWTP is calculated as the ratio of the marginal utilities. Brereton, Clinch and 
Ferreira (2006) assert that the life satisfaction approach and the hedonic method are substitutes 
because both methods yield exactly the same results if labor and housing markets are in equi-
librium, but only the life satisfaction approach yields the theoretically correct result if the 
markets are not in equilibrium. However, this conclusion is wrong. In a regression of life satis-
faction on the amenity level, the coefficient for the amenity level corresponds to the term 
dv/da in equation 1. As can be seen, the coefficient equals the marginal utility if and only if 
either wages and rents are held constant or if the amenity is not capitalized in private markets, 
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i.e. if dm/da = dr/da = 0.19 In general, rental costs are not in the set of explanatory variables in 
micro-econometric life satisfaction functions.20 Thus, the coefficient for the amenity captures 
only the residual effect that is not capitalized in the housing market, i.e. dv/da = δv/δa + δv/δr 
· dr/da (< δv/δa). This same conclusion is drawn by Van Praag and Baarsma (2005). The re-
sidual effect is not capitalized in the housing market either because it is already capitalized in 
the labor market or because the housing market is not in equilibrium. The residual effect can 
be monetized with the marginal utility of income as shown in equation 4: 
(4)  (dv/da)/(δv/δm) = [δv/δa + δv/δr · dr/da]/(δv/δm). 
The sum of the implicit hedonic price in equation 3 plus the residual shadow benefit in equa-
tion 4 yields the correct MWTP for the amenity. Hence, the two methods are complements. 
The life satisfaction approach is applied to the best advantage when there is no, or only little, 
compensation in the housing market. In these situations, the hedonic method breaks down. In 
contrast, the life satisfaction approach works well. 
It is tempting to see compensations in the housing market as the reason behind the difficulty of 
Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) to find a (statistically significant) negative effect of noise nuis-
ance on life satisfaction. After all, the effect is identified in a relatively small urban area where 
transaction and moving costs are low. However, contrary to expectations, Van Praag and 
Baarsma (2005) find no negative effect of noise nuisance on housing prices.21 The problem of 
countervailing compensating variation is probably less severe if the effects on life satisfaction 
are identified across large distances where the assumption of unhindered mobility becomes 
untenable as in cross-country analyses. 
                                                 
19 If amenities are capitalized in private markets and life satisfaction is regressed only on the amenity level but 
neither wages nor rents, a mis-specified model of the form εββ ++= av 10 ~~  instead of the true population model 
εββββ ++++= rmav 3210  is estimated. The coefficient 1~β  is a biased estimate of 1β  and amounts to 
2
3
2
211 )(/))(()(/))(()
~( ∑∑∑∑ −−+−−+= aaraaaamaaE iiiiii ββββ , which corresponds to dv/da in equa-
tion 1. 
20 Even if housing rents are available in the data, it may not be advisable to include them in life satisfaction 
regression because it is not possible to control for all relevant observed and unobserved housing characteristics. 
21 This can be explained by an over-regulated housing market and by the fact that Shiphol Airport has the obliga-
tion to insulate houses in the most exposed residential quarters at no cost to the population. Hence, noise nuisance 
is not compensated but rather removed to a large extent. 
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So far, the analysis refers to cross-section analyses. In order to see how compensating varia-
tion affects the identification of utility effects in repeated cross-section and panel analyses, it 
is helpful to differentiate between two types of public goods. The first type of public goods, or 
rather public bads, are risks, i.e. public bads occurring with a certain probability. The second 
type is a residual category of all other public goods. In the case of risks, compensating varia-
tion in the housing market is based on expected risks. If the underlying probabilities are stable, 
the compensating variation is captured by the region-specific effects. By the same token, all 
utility costs of insurance, protection measures and self-protection measures are reflected in the 
fixed-effects. In applications of the life satisfaction approach with repeated cross-section or 
panel data, the effect of risks are identified on the basis of actual events, i.e. if the risk mate-
rializes. Therefore, the full utility losses or, more precisely, the full non-insurable and non-
avertable losses can be recovered. In this situation, the hedonic method and the life satisfaction 
approach are substitutes. However, this is not the case for public goods for which it is not 
meaningful to differentiate between expected and materialized risk. Assuming that not all fu-
ture changes in the public good provision are expected and capitalized in the housing market, 
utility will be equalized across regions at every point in time but not necessarily across time.22 
The changes over time, however, are captured in the year fixed effects. Thus, even with re-
peated cross-section and panel data, only the residual effect can be captured. Of course, com-
pensation is most likely to be minor in a panel setting in which annual intra- and interregional 
fluctuations are studied. In this context, the residual effect may capture a great part of the 
overall utility effects of the public good considered. Nevertheless, conceptually, it is still a 
residual effect and the two methods remain complements. 
Spatial resolution. A critical element of the analysis is the choice of spatial units or regions 
across which changes in life satisfaction are identified. Two separate problems are associated 
with this choice. First, the geographical extension of the externality has to be established. 
Second, one has to decide at what level of spatial disaggregation data on public goods are 
collected and merged to the individual-level data. 
For externalities that are entirely physical in nature, in particular externalities in the environ-
mental realm, the determination of the geographical boundaries poses no problem on the con-
                                                 
22 It is important to note that while future changes in amenities may be capitalized into sales prices, they are not 
expected to be capitalized into current rents (see Taylor 2003). 
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ceptual level. For example, the concentration of air pollutants can be measured at each loca-
tion and the geographical extension of a flood disaster can be accurately assessed. However, 
respondents’ exact place of residence is usually not known, either because the information has 
not been collected or because it is not disclosed for privacy reasons. Therefore, data on the 
public good and data on life satisfaction have to be matched on the basis of administrative 
boundaries. The choice of the level at which the data are merged influences the identification 
of utility effects. For example, if all individuals affected by a flood disaster are expected to 
suffer similar losses, i.e. if the externality can be adequately described by an indicator func-
tion, the average treatment effect of the flood is underestimated whenever the administrative 
boundaries do not match the geographical extension of the flood perfectly. Some respondents 
are wrongly assigned to the reference group, i.e. categorized as not being affected even though 
they live in the flooded area, others are wrongly counted among the victims. Because the 
treatment group is usually much smaller compared to the reference group, the second type of 
error carries more weight. In general, therefore, it is better to err on the side of setting the 
boundaries too narrow. This conclusion does not necessarily apply if people living near a ma-
jor river in the center of the flooded area are hit more severely than people living near tribu-
taries at the periphery of the flooded area, i.e. if the externality is better described by a general 
function of distance from the center. In this case, the direction of the bias is not determined. Of 
course, this problem could be averted by modeling the function of distance or by using de-
tailed data on the severity of the flood at each location. Objective measures at each location 
are usually possible for externalities such as air pollution and noise nuisance. Aggregating this 
information on the level of administrative units thus introduces an additional measurement 
error. This measurement error increases with the size of the chosen units. As it is well known, 
such a measurement error entails an attenuation bias. As discussed in section 2.4.1, Welsch 
(2002; 2006) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005a) investigate the effect of air pollution on 
subjective well-being with country-level data. Because of the huge variation in the air quality 
within countries, country-level data are a very imprecise measure of individuals’ exposure to 
air pollution. Thus, the coefficients for the pollutants are likely to be biased towards zero. 
In contrast to externalities of a physical nature, drawing the boundaries of the externality is far 
more difficult for social externalities, like externalities of education, cultural amenities, crime 
or terrorism. Terrorism, for example, is explicitly “conceived to have far-reaching psychologi-
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cal repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target” (Hoffman, B. 1998, p. 38; Wilkinson 
2000, p. 12, among others). Again, the estimated effect will therefore crucially depend on the 
spatial unit chosen. Suppose, for example, a bomb explodes in the crowded centre of a small 
Northern Irish town and kills a large number of civilians. This terrorist incidence can affect 
people’s well-being in very different ways. It could be taken as an indication of a new wave of 
terrorist attacks all over the British Isles and the atrocity could shock people everywhere alike. 
In that case, it is quite likely that the life satisfaction is depressed everywhere in Great Britain 
and in Northern Ireland to the same extent. The effect of the incident on individuals’ well-be-
ing then cannot be identified across these two regions. If, on the other hand, only people in 
Northern Ireland are affected by an incident taking place in Northern Ireland and no spillovers 
occur, the average decrease in life satisfaction due to terrorism can be fully identified. In many 
cases, reality is characterized by an intermediate case, whereby individuals living in Great 
Britain (or any other region not immediately affected by an event) are also affected, but to a 
lesser degree. Only the difference from the average impact, which the event has in the two 
regions, can be identified. These simple examples should convince the reader that an accurate 
definition of the region across which the utility loss is identified is essential. There is no gen-
eral solution to this problem. The choice must be guided by knowledge of the actual situation. 
Moreover, if possible, the sensitivity of the results to alternative definitions of the regions 
should be assessed. 
Summary of identification issues. The preceding discussion of the three identification issues 
makes clear that in most situations, a combination of data with panel structure and high-reso-
lution data on the public goods is the most promising approach to identify the full utility con-
sequences. To our knowledge, in none of the previous applications both features of the data 
are simultaneously present. However, all applications in the following chapters will be based 
on this combination. In addition, the life satisfaction approach is best applied to situations 
where compensation in the housing market is unlikely or to the evaluation of public goods 
where it is sensible to differentiate between expected and materialized risks. If such a dif-
ferentiation is not sensible and compensation is likely, the life satisfaction approach should be 
supplemented with a hedonic housing study. 
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2.4.3 Outlook on own applications 
In the following three chapters, the life satisfaction approach is used to assess the effects of air 
pollution, flood disasters and terrorism. In public debate and the political process, these public 
bads rank among the most important and permanent issues. Further, they can be expected to 
remain top priorities in the near future. Thus, the relevance of the three public goods makes an 
assessment of the utility consequences for the affected population important in its own right. 
The weight of these public bads in the public debate and political process also suggests that 
they may indeed significantly reduce the well-being of the affected population (see chapter 1 
and the introductory sections of the following chapters for evidence on the relevance and po-
tential effects of the three public bads). This makes it more likely that the consequences can be 
statistically detected in the life satisfaction data. Arguably, the life satisfaction approach with 
currently available subjective well-being data is ill-equipped to assess minor impacts of sec-
ondary public goods. Despite their shared importance, the nature of the three public bads 
greatly differs. Hence, the applications also illustrates that the life satisfaction approach can be 
applied to a wide variety of questions and issues. 
All three applications address the identification issues discussed in the preceding section. In all 
applications, we use data with a panel structure and are thus able to control for region- and 
time-specific omitted variables. We also try to control for potential time-variant regional ef-
fects that are correlated with life satisfaction and the public good variables. For example, in 
the case of terrorism, unemployment among young men and a general lack of opportunities 
during an economic downturn could further the recruitment of terrorist groups and simulta-
neously depress life satisfaction in the affected regions. In all applications, therefore, we check 
the robustness of the results to the inclusion of fundamental macro-economic variables. Si-
multaneity problems are even more acute in the case of air pollution (see e.g. Chay and 
Greenstone 2005; Bayer, Keohane and Timmins 2006). While technical progress and air qual-
ity regulations are important reasons for improvements in air quality, local economic down-
turns and declining industrial production are other likely candidates. These temporally and 
spatially coincident developments have a countervailing effect on life satisfaction. To avoid 
this potential source of bias, we construct a novel instrument exploiting the natural experiment 
created by the mandated scrubber installation at power plants, with wind directions dividing 
regions into treatment and control groups. 
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As with the simultaneity problem, the issue of compensating variation in the housing market is 
most likely to be important in our application of the life satisfaction approach to air pollution 
in Germany. The effect of air pollution is identified at a spatially highly disaggregated level, 
the level of German Kreise. At this level of disaggregation, migration costs can be assumed to 
be comparably low. Further, by international standards, the German housing market is rela-
tively loosely regulated (Hoffmann and Kurz 2002). Therefore, the life satisfaction approach is 
supplemented by a hedonic housing analysis. In contrast, in the case of terrorism, the effects 
on life satisfaction are identified on the basis of larger geographical areas. This makes migra-
tion and, hence, compensation in the housing market a less pressing issue. Nevertheless, evi-
dence presented in chapter 5 shows that people do migrate in response to terrorist activity. 
Thus, some compensating variation in the housing market cannot be ruled out completely. As 
discussed in section 2.3.2, compensations in the housing market are no concern in the applica-
tion to flood disasters. Price differentials in the housing market are based on the expected risk 
of floods, the effect on life satisfaction is identified when this risk comes to fruition. 
All applications are based on existing survey data. Therefore, in none of the applications re-
spondents’ exact location of residence is known. In order to minimize measurement errors and 
a wrong assignment of respondents into the treatment group rather than into the control group, 
spatially highly disaggregated data are used in the applications to air pollution and flood di-
sasters. In the former case, the pollution data are aggregated on the level of German Kreise. 
The GSOEP, the data source on which the application is based, is not available on a higher 
spatial disaggregation for users working outside the DIW in Berlin. Similarly, in the case of 
flood disasters, the survey and the flood data are matched on the lowest geographical level that 
ensures a consistent definition across countries and over time. For Europe, this is the middle 
level of the official statistical units of the EU, the NUTS II regions, for the United States it is 
the county level. In the case of terrorism, choosing the right spatial resolution involves the 
additional difficulty of correctly determining the geographical extension of the public bad. The 
choice depends on the nature of the conflicts in these countries. For both, France and the Brit-
ish Isles, it seems reasonable to distinguish three regions. The pattern of terrorist activity is 
relatively homogenous within but different across these regions. In the case of France, the re-
gions are Ile-de-France (which includes Paris), Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (including Cor-
sica) and the rest of France. Many terrorist incidents are clearly confined to Paris. The city was 
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plagued by attacks on foreign ambassadors, other diplomats and government officials, as well 
as the headquarters or domestic branches of firms. Similarly, most attacks of the Front de 
Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) were perpetrated in Corsica rather than in conti-
nental France. In the case of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, the three re-
gions are Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. The pattern of terrorist 
activity clearly differs across these regions. Even though republican groups carried the conflict 
to Great Britain, Northern Ireland experienced violence on a much larger scale. Loyalist 
groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), its splinter group the Loyalist Volunteer 
Force (ULF) and the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) limited their activity largely to 
Northern Ireland. In contrast to France, London has no special position with respect to terrorist 
activity (at least in case of terrorist activity related to the Northern Ireland conflict). For exam-
ple, the attacks with the highest death toll recorded in a single day occurred in Birmingham 
rather than in London (Birmingham pub bombings of 1974). In order to test the sensitivity of 
the results to the choice of spatial resolution, the analysis is replicated with data on a smaller 
scale. 
One further methodological difference between the applications requires discussion. The ap-
plication to flood disasters is based on the Euro-Barometer Survey Series (EB) and the U.S. 
General Social Survey (GSS) and the application to terrorism is based on the EB. Both surveys 
interview a cross-section sample each year. In contrast, the GSOEP is a panel at the individual 
level. Moreover, the GSOEP contains a wealth of information on respondents unparalleled by 
the EB. Both features of the GSOEP allow us to address endogeneity and omitted variable 
problems which are particularly relevant in connection with estimating the effect of income on 
life satisfaction. 
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As soon as I escaped from the oppressive atmosphere of the city, and from 
the stink of the smoky chimneys, which, being stirred, pour forth, along 
with a cloud of ashes, all the poisonous fumes they’ve accumulated in 
their interiors, I perceived at once change in my feelings. 
Seneca, epistle CIV 
3. Application to air pollution 
3.1 Introduction 
The introductory quote by Seneca demonstrates that urban air pollution was already a menace 
in first century Rome. Yet it was the twentieth century that witnessed both the worst air qual-
ity and massive improvements. Air pollution could be literally seen and felt, causing the first 
manmade climate change (a drop in temperature caused by sulfur particles bouncing back 
sunlight), occasionally forcing motorists to turn headlights on or leave their cars because of 
impaired visibility, damaging historic buildings (e.g. Time 1967; Economist 2006), and, most 
importantly, increasing morbidity and mortality (see references below). In response, many 
countries enacted air quality regulations such as the Clean Air Act in the United States char-
acterized by some scholars as the most significant laws aimed at advancing environmental 
quality, safety and health (Portney 1990), these regulations brought about considerable im-
provements in air quality. However, the pollution situation does not look bright in all countries 
nor for all pollutants. This raises the questions of how important air quality is for the affected 
population and, consequently, about realized and potential benefits of air quality regulations. 
Traditionally, the benefits of clean air have been mostly assessed with the hedonic method 
(see Smith, V. K. and Huang 1995 for a meta-analysis). However, as discussed in section 
2.3.2, migration costs and market disequilibria, individuals’ partial ignorance of the effects of 
air pollution and the divergence of decision and experienced utility all suggest that effects of 
air pollution experienced by the affected population are incompletely capitalized in private 
markets. Section 2.4.2 shows that the life satisfaction approach can capture the residual effect 
of air pollution for which people are not already compensated in the housing market. If all 
effects of air pollution are correctly perceived and the equilibrium condition holds, air pollu-
tion should not be systematically related to life satisfaction. Thus, the life satisfaction ap-
proach also allows us to directly test the fundamental assumptions of the hedonic method and 
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to assess the importance of deviations from these assumptions. This chapter has two major 
objectives. First, we estimate the effect of SO2 concentration on life satisfaction and housing 
rents for Germany, a country with a large variation in pollution, both across space and over 
time. Second, using the results of the life satisfaction regressions and of the hedonic housing 
regression, we calculate the total WTP for improvements in air quality as the sum of the esti-
mates based on the two different methods. A comparison of the estimates based on the two 
different methods also reveals what part of the total effect is capitalized in private markets. 
We concentrate on SO2 pollution for three reasons. First, for a long time, SO2 was one of the 
major pollutants in industrialized countries and the primary focus of many regulations. 
Second, the main emitters of SO2 are large stationary sources. Taken together, these charac-
teristics give rise to a large variation in SO2 concentrations, both across regions and across 
time. Third, SO2 contributes to the formation of acid rain, impairs visibility and, most impor-
tantly, causes adverse health effects. Consequences of SO2 exposure found in controlled labo-
ratory studies are bronchoconstriction, decrements in respiratory functions, mucus secretion, 
alterations in pulmonary defenses and airway inflammation with consequent coughing, 
wheezing, shortness of breath and chest tightness (Sheppard et al. 1980; Sandstrom et al. 
1989; Smith, E. G., Haines and Stone 1994). According to epidemiological studies, high SO2 
concentrations result in increased morbidity and premature mortality due to cardiovascular and 
respiratory diseases (Schwartz, J. and Dockery 1992; Wong et al. 1999). 
3.2 Air pollution: Data, pattern and instrument 
The Umweltbundesamt (German federal environmental agency; hereafter UBA for short) pro-
vides data on the annual mean SO2 concentration measured at the monitors belonging to the 
monitoring networks of the 16 Landesumweltämter (state environmental agencies) and the 
UBA for the years 1985 to 2003. We have SO2 data from 553 monitors or, in individual years, 
between 196 monitors in 1985 and 416 monitors in 1994. Panel A in figure 1 depicts the loca-
tion of the monitors used for 1985. In order to estimate the SO2 concentration at all other loca-
tions, we use a geographic information system (GIS) to interpolate the monitor readings on a 
grid with cell size of 1 km2 covering the whole area of Germany. We estimate the value of cell 
i of the grid as the weighted average over the readings at the 9 nearest monitors j using the 
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inverse cubed distance (Dij-3) as weights (method of inverse distance weighting). Specifically, 
grid values are estimated according to equation 5: 
(5) ∑∑
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The parameters have been suggested by the UBA, but interpolated values are similar for 
slightly different parameters. The interpolated mean SO2 concentration for 1985 is shown in 
panel B of figure 1. In order to match the pollution data with the survey data, we aggregate the 
interpolated values on the level of German Kreise and kreisfreie Städte (roughly correspond-
ing to U.S. counties); annual mean SO2 concentrations are estimated using polygon data de-
scribing the boundaries of these administrative units.23 The mean SO2 concentration per 
county is depicted in panel C of figure 1 for the year 1985 and in panel A of figure 3 for the 
years 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000. 
Figure 1. Air quality monitors and mean annual SO2 concentration, 
interpolated and aggregated at county level, 1985 
A. Monitors B. Interpolated C. Aggregated 
  
Legend:  ≤ 20 μg/m3,  20 - 40 μg/m3,  40 - 60 μg/m3,  60 - 80 μg/m3,  80 - 100 
μg/m3,  100 - 125 μg/m3,  125 - 150 μg/m3 and  > 150 μg/m3. 
Sources: UBA, own estimates. 
The pattern and evolution of SO2 pollution reveals two striking features. First, in the mid-
1980s, pollution was highly concentrated at three hotspots. The three hotspots are the Ruhrge-
                                                 
23 In 1994, population per county was between 31,800 in Klingenthal and 2,170,000 in West Berlin with a median 
of 131,400. Following reunification, several counties in the former GDR were merged. Therefore, the number of 
counties fell from 543 in 1993 to 439 in 2001. The polygon data used for aggregation describe the boundaries of 
the 445 counties existing in 1996. Therefore, we assign the same SO2 concentration to several counties in earlier 
years and calculate area-weighted averages for later years. 
 57
biet in the west, Nordhessen in the centre and the area around Leipzig in the east, by then all 
important industrial centers and coal mining areas. Second, air quality improved dramatically 
between 1985 and 1990 in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and after 1990 in the for-
mer German Democratic Republic (GDR). In large part, these improvements reflect the effect 
of air quality regulations. As a result of an amendment to the Grossfeuerungsanlagenverord-
nung (large combustion plant ordinance) enacted in 1983, fossil fuel fired power plants had to 
be retrofitted with flue gas desulfurization, switch to low sulfur fuel or were subjected to early 
closure. Time limits were in the range between three and nine years from 1986 on and differed 
according to the capacity of a power plant and its actual emissions. With the Einigungsvertrag 
(unification treaty) signed in 1990, power plants in the former GDR were subjected to the 
same regulations. However, the pattern and evolution of SO2 pollution also points at the po-
tential simultaneity of local economic activity and pollution. Since 1980, the Ruhrgebiet has 
been undergoing structural change. New jobs in the service sector compensate only partially 
for job losses in the industrial sector. Similarly, the area around Leipzig is still recovering 
from the collapse of industrial production after reunification. 
Failure to control for this simultaneity would bias the pollution coefficients in the life satisfac-
tion and hedonic rent regression towards zero or may even lead to perverse results. To address 
this potential source of bias, we develop a novel instrument that exploits the facts that SO2 is 
primarily emitted by large stationary sources and that regulations required retrofitting of 
power plants, coupled with information on the geography of power plants and wind directions. 
We use the changes in SO2 concentration caused by the large combustion plant ordinance and 
the consequent retrofitting of power plants as an instrument for SO2 pollution. The changes in 
SO2 concentration are estimated using a kind of difference-in-difference analysis. Thereby, 
desulfurization at power plants constitutes the treatment and counties are assigned to control 
and treatment groups according to prevailing wind directions at power plants. The improve-
ment in air quality caused by flue gas desulfurization is estimated as the difference in the pre- 
and post-desulfurization difference in pollution concentrations between upwind and downwind 
counties or, alternatively, as the pre- and post-desulfurization difference in the difference be-
tween upwind and downwind concentrations. The identifying assumption in later stages of the 
analysis is that there exists no systematic difference in the effect of retrofitting of power plants 
on reported life satisfaction and rents between upwind and downwind counties except through 
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the effect on pollution. From the point of view of individual regions, the installation of scrub-
bers at large power plants (the single most important reason for the improvement in air qual-
ity) amounts to a natural experiment. Although the statutory provisions are the result of a po-
litical choice at the national level, they disproportionately benefit downwind regions compared 
to upwind regions.24 
The actual analysis departs from this idealized difference-in-difference setting in two respects. 
First, as we consider simultaneously all power plants and all counties, the treatment is a 
weighted average of desulfurization at all plants with pre-desulfurization emissions of the 
plants and a function of the distance between particular plants and counties as weights. 
Second, only very few counties are completely untreated or completely treated and thus en-
tirely in the control or treatment group. Depending on the frequency distribution of wind di-
rections, they lie more or less often upwind or downwind of a power plant. In what follows, 
we explain more precisely the construction of the instrument. For details about data and data 
sources, we refer to the appendix to chapter 3 in the section 3.6. 
A key role in our analysis play estimates of annual SO2 emissions (before desulfurization) for 
the largest power plants, information on when plants installed scrubbers, wind directions at the 
plants as well as direction and distance vectors between counties and plants. For 303 fossil 
fuel fired generating units, i.e. all units active between 1985 and 2003 with an electricity ca-
pacity of 100 MW and more, we have information on the launching year, the refit (desulfuri-
zation) year, the year the unit was shut down, capacity, fuel and fuel efficiency. The data are 
from the UBA, information published by the operating companies and the technical literature, 
a survey mailed to operating companies and statutory provisions. We georeference power 
plants using a route planer. The locations of the power plants are depicted in panel A of figure 
2. With emission factors published in the literature and the plants’ characteristics, annual SO2 
emissions can be estimated. Frequencies of wind directions in 12 30-degree sectors measured 
at 43 wind stations describe the wind situation at the power plants. From an originally larger 
sample of wind stations, we use for each plant the closest wind station. The stations are shown 
in panel B of figure 2. The predominant wind direction is west-southwest. At all power plants, 
                                                 
24 It is worth noting that the costs of the regulation such as increased electricity prices and secondary benefits 
such as jobs created in the environmental industry are equally spatially distributed (or at least orthogonal to wind 
directions). Further, the statutory provisions were enacted before the period considered. Therefore, the actual 
installation of scrubbers does not reflect a shift in political power from upwind to downwind regions. 
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some wind directions clearly prevail, thus distinguishing counties into windward and leeward 
counties. In order to relate the data at the plant level with the pollution data at the county level, 
we calculate the Euclidean distance and direction between every power plant and every 
county. 
Figure 2. Locations of fossil fuel fired power 
plants and wind stations 
A. Power plants B. Wind stations 
Sources: UBA, information published by operating 
companies, technical literature, route planner and Traup 
and Kruse (1996). 
We can use these data to explain SO2 concentrations at the county level and calculate fitted 
values and counterfactual pollution levels of a hypothetical situation without retrofitting of 
power plants. The difference between the counterfactual and the fitted values measures the 
improvement in air quality caused by the installation of scrubbers at power plants. The differ-
ence is our instrument for SO2 pollution in later stages of the analysis. 
The SO2 concentration in county c at time t, Pct, can be explained by the product of a dummy 
variable indicating whether power plant j is active at time t, 1(active)jt, estimated annual emis-
sions at plant j before desulfurization, Ej, the average separation efficiency of scrubber that is 
to be estimated, β2, a dummy variable indicating whether plant j has a scrubber installed at 
time t, 1(scrubber)jt, a distance decay function, f(Dcj), and the frequency the county c lies 
downwind of plant j, g(Rcj), summed over all power plants as well as county and time specific 
fixed effects, χc and τt, respectively. Equations 6a and 6b summarize the specification: 
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(6a) Pct = β0 + β1 1(active) jt ⋅ E j ⋅ (1− β2 ⋅1(scrubber) jt ) ⋅ f (Dcj ) ⋅ g(Rcj )
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In equation 6b, the second term on the right hand side denotes the sum of uncleaned SO2 emis-
sions, i.e. emissions before flue gas desulfurization, from all power plants weighted by a dis-
tance decay function and the frequency distribution of wind directions (hereafter ‘weighted 
sum of uncleaned SO2 emissions’ for short), the third term denotes the sum of retained SO2 
emissions. We use two different functions to model the distance decay. In a first and simple 
variant, the emissions of all power plants within a distance of 450 km get a weight of one, all 
other emissions get zero weight; 450 km lies in the range of mean transport distances docu-
mented in the literature. In a second variant, the distance decay is modeled as an exponential 
curve with an implied characteristic distance decay distance of 480 km, f(Dcj) = e-2.1E-6⋅Dcj, as 
suggested by field studies (Schwartz, S. E. 1989; Summers and Fricke 1989). Table 4 presents 
the results, column I the results for the first distance decay function, column II for the second. 
Table 4. Effect of fossil fuel fired power plants and flue gas desulfurization on SO2 concen-
tration 
Dependent Variable I II 
SO2 (μg/m3) concentration Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Emissions from power plants     
Weighted sum of uncleaned SO2 emissions 3.7E-06** 9.10 1.4E-05** 17.64 
Weighted sum of retained SO2 emissions -4.2E-06** -35.90 -9.9E-06** -36.46 
County specific effects Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
Number of observations  8,455 8,455
Prob > F  0.000 0.000
R2  0.663 0.672
 Coefficient St. Err. Coefficient St. Err.
Estimated separation efficiency -1.156** 0.128 -0.686** 0.042
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) ** is significant at the 99% level. (3) Standard errors for the separation efficiency 
are estimates using the delta method. 
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As expected, the sum of uncleaned SO2 emissions at power plants increases, and the sum of 
retained emission decreases, measured air pollution. Using the coefficient for the uncleaned 
and the retained emissions, we estimate separation efficiencies of 116% and 69%, respec-
tively; standard errors are estimated using the delta method. In a first plausibility test of the 
results, actual separation efficiencies serve as a benchmark. Statutory provisions in Germany 
require a separation efficiency of 60% at the smallest units and more efficient scrubbers at 
larger units; separation efficiency at the largest power plants lies typically in the range of 90% 
to 99%. While the separation efficiency estimated with the first model is not statistically sig-
nificantly different from actual values, the separation efficiency estimated with the second 
model is marginally below actual values. Second, a visual comparison of the actual pollution 
levels (Pct) and the fitted values ( ˆ P ct ) based on the first model for the four years shown in pan-
els A and B of figure 3 as well as the R2 reveal a satisfactory goodness-of-fit. We are now in a 
position to estimate counterfactual pollution levels for a hypothetical situation without instal-
lation of scrubber at power plants ( ctP
~ ) and the difference between the counterfactual and pre-
dicted pollution levels ( ˜ P ct − ˆ P ct ). This difference is an estimate of the causal effect of flue gas 
desulfurization and is our instrument for SO2 pollution. The counterfactual pollution levels 
and the instrument based on the first model are shown in panel C and D of figure 3. 
Figure 3. Actual, predicted and counterfactual SO2 concentration and difference between 
predicted and counterfactual concentration; 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000 
 A. Actual pollution B. Predicted C. Counterfactual D. Difference, C-B 
1985 
 
 To be continued. 
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Figure 3, part 2 
 A. Actual pollution B. Predicted C. Counterfactual D. Difference, C-B 
1990 
 
1995 
 
2000 
 
Legend:  ≤ 20 μg/m3,  20 - 40 μg/m3,  40 - 60 μg/m3,  60 - 80 μg/m3,  80 - 100 μg/m3,  100 - 125 
μg/m3,  125 - 150 μg/m3 and  > 150 μg/m3. 
Sources: UBA, own estimates. 
3.3 Effects on life satisfaction 
3.3.1 Data and empirical strategy 
In order to examine the impact of air pollution on life satisfaction and housing rents, we use 
the GSOEP containing information on both, individual life satisfaction and rents. The GSOEP 
is a nationally representative panel that closely follows a large number of households and in-
dividuals since 1984. Following the fall of the Berlin wall, the panel was extended to include 
residents of the former GDR. The baseline life satisfaction regressions are based on a panel for 
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the period 1985-2003 consisting of 33,864 individuals who remain in the panel on average for 
6.7 years.  
As already mentioned in section 2.2.2, the GSOEP elicits individual life satisfaction with the 
following question: “How satisfied are you at present with your life, all things considered?” 
The responses run from 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). The mean re-
ported life satisfaction in our sample is 7.07 (std. dev. 1.75). 
Apart from the pollution data, another important explanatory variable is post-government 
household income as a measure of disposable income. Its coefficient is later used for moneti-
zation. The variable is the sum of total household income from labor earnings (including bo-
nuses etc.), asset flows, private retirement income, public and private transfers and social se-
curity pensions minus total household taxes. Except estimates of tax burden, which are based 
on tax calculation routines, all other components are actually received incomes as declared in 
the survey of the subsequent year. Thus, income information for households exiting the panel 
in the following year is not available. Further, the information is missing for East Germany in 
the year 1990. 
Estimating the effect of income on life satisfaction is afflicted with serious problems of en-
dogeneity and omitted variables. Happy people earn more and time-varying factors may lead 
to both greater satisfaction and higher income (e.g. Clark, Frijters and Shields 2007; Gardner 
and Oswald 2007). A related problem is that costs of income generation such as working 
hours, stress, health risks etc. are inherently difficult to control for. Omission of such factors 
induces downward biased estimates. To address these problems, we instrument income with a 
predictor of household income and with job tenure of the main income earner, or if the re-
spondent is the main income earner, job tenure of the secondary income earner. Our predictor 
of household income is similar in spirit to the one used by Luttmer (2005). We predict labor 
earnings for around 5,000 industry · occupation cells by regressing log labor earnings on a full 
set of industry and occupation dummies, for each year, and for West and East Germany, sepa-
rately. The exponential of the fitted values of these regressions are the predicted earnings for 
individuals in each industry · occupation in a particular region and year. Summing over all 
household members, we get a prediction of household income. Therefore, increases in pre-
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dicted household income reflect industry and/or occupation wide factors but not exceptional 
personal efforts by one of the household members. 
Based on theoretical considerations and convention, we include household income in its natu-
ral logarithm (see Layard, Mayaraz and Nickell 2006 for a study on the functional form be-
tween income and life satisfaction) and control for the square root of household size in order 
to capture the effect of household size on equivalence income. 
Following the previous literature, we include the most commonly used observable time-vary-
ing predictors of life satisfaction (Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields 2004; Stutzer and Frey 
2004; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005). These are age (or rather age squared), disability status, marital 
and partnership status, labor force status, occupational position, type of employment contract 
and city or district size. We add own job tenure and average weekly working hours to this list 
because our instruments for household income might only be valid conditional on these two 
variables. For example, in bargaining collective work agreements, unions may accept industry 
wide income reductions in return for a shorter workweek, thereby reducing both income and 
effort cost. Dummies for individuals participating in the survey for the first and second time, 
respectively, serve as a proxy for interviewing experience and panel learning effects 
(D'Ambrosio and Frick 2004). In order to control for the secular upward trend in life satisfac-
tion in post-reunification years in East Germany documented by Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and 
Shields (2004), we include state specific time trends along with a full set of state and year 
fixed effects.25 Finally, a fixed effect model is appropriate as fixed personality traits are impor-
tant predictors of life satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004). The equation to be 
estimated in the second stage is thus 
(7) LSicst = β0 + β1Pcst + β2ln(micst) + β3Zicst + β4trends + σs + τt + ιi + εicst, 
where LSicst is the life satisfaction of respondent i living in county c in state s at time t, Pcst 
pollution at county level, micst respondent’s household income, Zicst a vector of personal char-
                                                 
25 Due to German data protection laws, we are not allowed to have the regional data on our local computer but are 
obliged to use the remote access to the GSOEP, SOEPremote. Because of memory restrictions at the DIW, the 
host of SOEPremote, we cannot estimate models with county specific effects. However, we observe only around 
10% of respondents in more than one county. If we restrict our sample to the individuals who do not move across 
county boundaries, the results are very similar. For all individuals who remain within the county boundaries, 
county specific effects are captured by the individual specific fixed effects. Therefore, the results are not driven 
by unobserved county characteristics. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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acteristics, trends state specific time trends, σs, τt and ιi state, year and individual fixed effects, 
respectively, and εicst an error term. Generally, we estimate equation 7 by instrumental var-
iables, using the estimated effect of flue gas desulfurization as an instrument for SO2 pollution 
and job tenure of the main or secondary income earner and the predictor of household income 
as instruments for income. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on county and 
year level. Equation 7 is estimated by ordinary least squares. As discussed in section 2.2.3 and 
as can be seen in chapters 4 and 5, assuming ordinality or cardinality of life satisfaction scores 
makes little difference. 
3.3.2 Basic results 
Table 5 reports the basic life satisfaction regressions in full with the results for all control var-
iables. The effects of the control variables contain no surprises and correspond to results doc-
umented in the literature (Frijters, Haisken-DeNew and Shields 2004; Stutzer and Frey 2004; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005). Of all personal characteristics, being unemployed exerts the largest 
(negative) effect on life satisfaction. This is a well-documented finding in the previous litera-
ture (see e.g. Clark and Oswald 1994; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). The control var-
iables are included in all regressions but, for the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimates 
in the subsequent tables. 
The variables of interest are SO2 concentration and household income. Both have the expected 
sign and are statistically significant. We will discuss the size of the effect extensively in sec-
tion 3.5 in which we monetize the effect. The raw coefficients are difficult to interpret and 
cannot be readily compared to the earlier estimates of pollution on life satisfaction reported in 
section 2.4.1, except with respect to sign and significance. Welsch (2002) finds essentially no 
effect of SO2 concentration on happiness in his cross-section of 54 countries, both in terms of 
size and significance. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005a) find a negative and statistically sig-
nificant effect of SO2 emissions in their repeated cross-section of 12 countries and 23 years, 
but there is no general method to convert emissions into pollution levels. Finally, Welsch 
(2006) only considers other pollutants. 
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Table 5. Basic results: Effect of SO2 pollution on life satisfaction, Germany 1985-2003 
A. Second stage regression                   
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI 
  Life satisfaction Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
Pollution                   
  SO2 (μg/m3) -0.005 ** -6.95 -0.010 * -2.38 -0.006 (*) -1.80 -0.004 ** -6.45 -0.010 ** -2.56 -0.006 (*) -1.91 
HH income                   
  ln(post govt. income) 0.140 ** 14.94 0.138 ** 14.62 0.139 ** 14.81 0.484 ** 8.94 0.482 ** 8.90 0.484 ** 8.93 
  HH size1/2 -0.167 ** -7.82 -0.168 ** -7.85 -0.167 ** -7.82 -0.379 ** -9.69 -0.380 ** -9.69 -0.379 ** -9.68 
Personal characteristics                   
  Age2 -9E-5 ** -2.67 -9E-5 ** -2.77 -9E-5 ** -2.70 -8E-5 * -2.55 -9E-5 ** -2.68 -8E-5 ** -2.59 
  Not disabled Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Disabled -0.225 ** -11.03 -0.227 ** -11.13 -0.226 ** -11.08 -0.228 ** -11.14 -0.231 ** -11.25 -0.229 ** -11.20 
  Single, no partner Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Single, with partner 0.163 ** 7.19 0.162 ** 7.14 0.163 ** 7.19 0.168 ** 7.37 0.166 ** 7.31 0.167 ** 7.36 
  Married 0.245 ** 9.99 0.246 ** 10.01 0.245 ** 9.98 0.236 ** 9.59 0.237 ** 9.62 0.236 ** 9.59 
  Separated, no partner -0.319 ** -6.55 -0.319 ** -6.54 -0.319 ** -6.55 -0.282 ** -5.72 -0.282 ** -5.72 -0.282 ** -5.72 
  Separated, with partner 0.098  1.24 0.097  1.23 0.098  1.24 0.103  1.30 0.101  1.29 0.102  1.30 
  Divorced, no partner -0.032  -0.81 -0.032  -0.82 -0.032  -0.81 -0.006  -0.16 -0.007  -0.17 -0.006  -0.16 
  Divorced, with partner 0.318 ** 7.47 0.318 ** 7.48 0.318 ** 7.47 0.311 ** 7.31 0.311 ** 7.33 0.311 ** 7.31 
  Widowed, no partner -0.230 ** -4.95 -0.228 ** -4.90 -0.230 ** -4.93 0.252 ** 5.40 -0.250 ** -5.34 -0.251 ** -5.37 
  Widowed, with partner 0.338 ** 3.78 0.338 ** 3.77 0.338 ** 3.78 -0.283 ** -3.17 0.283 ** 3.17 0.283 ** 3.17 
  Spouse in home country -0.110  -1.23 -0.112  -1.25 -0.110  -1.24 -0.098  -1.07 -0.100  -1.10 -0.098  -1.08 
  No children in HH Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Children in HH 0.053 ** 3.94 0.053 ** 3.96 0.053 ** 3.94 0.094 ** 6.34 0.095 ** 6.35 0.094 ** 6.34 
  German citizen Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  EU citizen -0.184 * -2.03 -0.182 * -2.02 -0.183 * -2.03 -0.185 * -2.03 -0.182 * -2.01 -0.184 * -2.03 
  Non EU foreigner -0.049  -0.94 -0.045  -0.87 -0.048  -0.92 -0.052  -0.99 -0.048  -0.91 -0.050  -0.97 
To be continued. 
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Table 5, part 2 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
  Not working Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Retired 0.194 ** 8.70 0.193 ** 8.62 0.194 ** 8.68 0.193 ** 8.60 0.191 ** 8.52 0.192 ** 8.58 
  In education 0.257 ** 9.32 0.254 ** 9.21 0.256 ** 9.31 0.249 ** 8.86 0.246 ** 8.74 0.248 ** 8.83 
  Maternity leave 0.164 ** 5.58 0.165 ** 5.63 0.164 ** 5.59 0.158 ** 5.36 0.160 ** 5.42 0.159 ** 5.38 
  Military, community service -0.027  -0.56 -0.028  -0.60 -0.027  -0.57 -0.026  -0.54 -0.028  -0.59 -0.027  -0.56 
  Unemployed -0.443 ** -19.70 -0.443 ** -16.69 -0.443 ** -19.70 -0.454 ** -20.02 -0.454 ** -20.01 -0.454 ** -20.02 
  Sometimes working 0.046  1.30 0.048  1.37 0.046  1.32 0.031  0.87 0.034  0.95 0.032  0.89 
  Full-time employment 0.179 ** 7.25 0.182 ** 7.32 0.180 ** 7.24 0.119 ** 4.54 0.122 ** 4.65 0.120 ** 4.56 
  Part-time employment 0.037 (*) 1.67 0.039 (*) 1.74 0.038 (*) 1.68 0.001  0.03 0.003  0.12 0.001  0.06 
  Vocational training 0.134 * 2.37 0.135 * 2.39 0.134 * 2.37 0.070  1.22 0.071  1.25 0.070  1.23 
  Other employment 0.012  0.34 0.013  0.36 0.012  0.34 -0.003  -0.09 -0.002  -0.06 -0.003  -0.08 
  Blue collar worker Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Trainee 0.144 ** 2.81 0.142 ** 2.77 0.144 ** 2.80 0.176 ** 3.41 0.174 ** 3.37 0.175 ** 3.40 
  Public service employee -0.043  -1.22 -0.040  -1.16 -0.042  -1.21 -0.035  -1.00 -0.032  -0.92 -0.034  -0.97 
  White collar worker 0.015  1.06 0.015  1.04 0.015  1.06 0.012  0.82 0.011  0.80 0.012  0.81 
  Managerial position 0.112 ** 5.29 0.114 ** 5.37 0.112 ** 5.31 0.086 ** 3.97 0.088 ** 4.08 0.087 ** 4.00 
  Temporary employment -0.063 ** -3.38 -0.063 ** -3.39 -0.063 ** -3.38 -0.051 ** -2.74 -0.052 ** -2.75 -0.051 ** -2.74 
  Permanent employment 0.056 ** 4.95 0.057 ** 5.03 0.057 ** 4.96 0.056 ** 4.87 0.057 ** 4.96 0.056 ** 4.89 
  Job tenure -0.004 ** -5.04 -0.004 ** -5.17 -0.004 ** -5.04 -0.004 ** -5.75 -0.005 ** -5.92 -0.004 ** -5.78 
  Actual working hours 1E-4 ** 2.73 1E-4 ** 2.63 1E-4 ** 2.70 6E-5  1.61 6E-5  1.49 6E-5  1.57 
  First interview 0.203 ** 12.62 0.212 ** 12.01 0.205 ** 11.94 0.190 ** 11.67 0.201 ** 11.30 0.194 ** 11.16 
  Second interview 0.061 ** 4.25 0.077 ** 3.99 0.065 ** 3.66 0.058 ** 4.05 0.077 ** 4.01 0.064 ** 3.63 
  Third and later interviews Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
To be continued. 
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Table 5, part 3 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
City, district size                   
  Less than 2,000 Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Less than 20,000 -0.006  -0.21 -0.006  -0.21 -0.006  -0.21 -0.008  -0.31 -0.008  -0.31 -0.008  -0.31 
  Less than 100,000 0.033  1.13 0.035  1.20 0.034  1.15 0.029  0.99 0.032  1.07 0.030  1.01 
  Less than 500,000 -0.012  -0.38 -0.009  -0.28 -0.011  -0.36 -0.004  -0.13 -4E-4  -0.01 -0.003  -0.09 
  Over 500,000 -0.051  -1.40 -0.048  -1.31 -0.050  -1.37 -0.047  -1.27 -0.044  -1.18 -0.046  -1.24 
State specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
R2 within   0.037   0.036   0.037   0.028   0.028   0.029
R2 between   0.066   0.066   0.066   0.086   0.086   0.086
R2 overall   0.057   0.056   0.057   0.063   0.062   0.063
B. First stage regressions                   
Dependent Variable                   
  SO2 (μg/m3)                   
Excluded instruments                   
  Predicted ΔSO2    -0.200 ** -13.66 -0.217 ** -19.32    -0.200 ** -13.64 -0.217 ** -19.31 
  ln(predicted HH income)             0.012  1.08 0.012  1.09 
  Tenure income earner             -0.012 * -2.48 -0.011 * -2.39 
Included instruments    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
To be continued. 
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Table 5, part 4 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
Dependent Variable                   
  ln(post govt. income)                   
Excluded instruments                   
  Predicted ΔSO2             -3E-4  -1.12 -1E-4  -0.67 
  ln(predicted HH income)          0.026 ** 37.09 0.026 ** 37.06 0.026 ** 37.05 
  Tenure income earner          0.005 ** 27.66 0.005 ** 27.75 0.005 ** 27.75 
Included instruments          Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 227,789 227,789 227,789 227,789 227,789 227,789
Number of individuals 33,864 33,864 33,864 33,864 33,864 33,864
Avg. no. of obs. per individual 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
Number of clusters 7,413 7,413 7,413 7,413 7,413 7,413
Shea's partial R2 for SO2      0.025   0.043      0.025   0.043
Bound et al. partial R2      0.025   0.043      0.025   0.043
F-test exc. instruments (p-value)      0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000
Shea's partial R2 for log income            0.028   0.028   0.028
Bound et al. partial R2            0.028   0.028   0.028
F-test exc. instruments (p-value)            0.000   0.000   0.000
Anderson LR statistic (p-value)      0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
Hansen's J statistic (p-value)      -   -   0.254   0.311   0.271
Notes: (1) OLS and IV estimates with individual fixed effects; SO2 concentration is instrumented with the effect of flue gas desulfurization at power plants estimated 
with a distance decay modeled as an indicator function in specifications II and V and modeled with an exponential function in specifications III and VI; household 
income is instrumented with the sum of predicted incomes of the household members and job tenure of household of the primary/secondary wage earner in 
specifications IV, V and VI. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on county and year level. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*)
at the 90% level. 
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The conventional estimates of SO2 effects on life satisfaction (columns I and IV of table 5), 
i.e. the estimates not based on pollution instruments, are smaller in absolute terms compared to 
the estimates in which pollution is instrumented. If we use estimates of the causal effect of 
flue gas desulfurization based on an indicator distance decay function as an instrument (col-
umns II and V), the effect of SO2 on life satisfaction more than doubles; if we use estimates 
based on the exponential distance decay function as an instrument, the effect increases by ap-
proximately one third. The finding that the instrumental variables estimates are larger in ab-
solute terms than the conventional estimate suggests that improvements in air quality are ac-
companied by negative developments. While the conventional estimate captures only the net 
effect between changes in pollution and the countervailing factors, the instrumental variable 
estimates capture the whole effect of changes in pollution. However, given the (generically) 
large standard errors of instrumental variable estimates, the difference between the instru-
mental variable estimates and the conventional estimate is not significant in a statistical sense. 
The difference becomes more pronounced for the estimates in which income is instrumented 
(columns IV to VI) because, in absolute terms, the conventional estimate of the effect of SO2 
slightly decreases and the estimates based on instrumental variables slightly increase (all 
changes are around 7%). These changes are difficult to interpret in terms of omitted variable 
biases and none of the changes is statistically significant. 
Regarding the effect of log household income on life satisfaction, the conventional estimates 
(columns I to III) are slightly above the results reported by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 
(2004) and, as far as different econometric models allow for a comparison, below the results 
reported in Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005). The effect of instrumenting household income (columns 
IV to VI) suggests that the OLS estimates are indeed biased. The estimated effect of log 
household income on life satisfaction more than triples, a change of similar magnitude as the 
one reported by Luttmer (2005). The coefficients for income are stable across specifications. 
Turning to the first stage regressions, we see that the instruments have the expected effect on 
the endogenous variables for which they are intended: the estimated effect of flue gas desul-
furization negatively affects SO2 concentration. Predicted household income and job tenure of 
the main or secondary income earner both have a positive impact on household income. Our 
pollution instruments have no effect on income (conditional on the other variables), which 
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suggests that the instrument is indeed orthogonal to local economic activity. For unknown rea-
sons, job tenure is weakly negatively associated with SO2 concentration. 
It is important to sound a note of caution regarding the interpretation of the statistical signifi-
cance in the first stage regressions. Two instruments, the estimated effect of flue gas desulfuri-
zation and predicted household income, are estimated regressors in the first stage regressions 
and, thus, standard errors are underestimated and t-statistics inflated. However, under general 
conditions, the parameters in the first stage regressions are consistently estimated (Murphy 
and Topel 1985). Therefore, the second stage regressions are not afflicted by the problem of 
estimated regressors. 
In all cases, the statistical tests suggest that the instruments are relevant. Shea’s (1997) partial 
R2s are nearly identical to standard R2s (Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995), the Anderson canoni-
cal correlations likelihood-ratio tests reject the null of underidentification and F-tests indicate 
joint significance of the excluded instruments. Further, none of the Hansen’s (1982) J-statistics 
rejects the null that the instruments are satisfying the orthogonality condition. 
3.3.3 Robustness tests 
Despite the efforts to instrument pollution, one might worry that levels of SO2 concentration 
reflect local economic activity or air quality more generally. In a second set of regressions, we 
therefore include annual unemployment rates at county level and annual mean concentration 
of TSP as additional controls. Table 6 presents the results; the models presented in particular 
columns are identical to the models in the corresponding column of table 5, except for the two 
additional control variables. 
Overall, the results are robust to the inclusion of local unemployment rate and TSP concentra-
tion. The coefficient of SO2 instrumented with the effect of flue gas desulfurization estimated 
based on an indicator distance decay function slightly increases. In all models, standard errors 
of the coefficients of SO2 increase, pushing the coefficient of SO2 instrumented with estimates 
based on the exponential distance decay function presented in column III below conventional 
significance levels. The conventional pollution estimates are at least as robust as the instru-
mental variable estimates. The robustness of the conventional estimates contrasts somewhat
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Table 6. Robustness check: Effect of SO2 pollution on life satisfaction controlling for TSP and unemployment rate 
A. Second stage regression                   
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI 
  Life satisfaction Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
Pollution                   
  SO2 (μg/m3) -0.005** -6.87 -0.011 * -2.22 -0.006  -1.54 -0.004 ** -6.35 -0.012 * -2.39 -0.006 (*) -1.65 
  TSP (μg/m3) -0.001 (*) -1.67 1E-5  0.01 -0.001  -0.97 -0.001 (*) -1.68 2E-4  0.21 -0.001  -0.83 
Unemployment rate -0.012** -3.49 -0.016 ** -3.52 -0.013 ** -3.18 -0.011 ** -3.11 -0.015 ** -3.35 -0.012 ** -2.94 
HH income                   
  ln(post govt. income) 0.139** 14.90 0.137 ** 14.47 0.139 ** 14.75 0.482 ** 8.90 0.481 ** 8.87 0.482 ** 8.90 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City, district size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
R2 within   0.037   0.036   0.037   0.029   0.027   0.029
R2 between   0.066   0.066   0.066   0.086   0.086   0.086
R2 overall   0.057   0.055   0.057   0.063   0.062   0.063
B. First stage regressions                   
Dependent Variable                   
  SO2 (μg/m3)                   
Excluded instruments                   
  Predicted ΔSO2    -0.169 ** -11.94 -0.191 ** -17.22    -0.169 ** 11.92 0.191 ** 17.21 
  ln(predicted HH income)             0.013  1.19 0.013  1.15 
  Tenure income earner             -0.010 * -2.21 -0.010 * -2.13 
TSP and unemployment rate                   
  TSP (μg/m3)    0.129 ** 10.52 0.120 ** 9.66    0.129 ** 10.53 0.120 ** 9.67 
  Unemployment rate    -0.489 ** -5.32 -0.487 ** -5.34    -0.487 ** -5.30 -0.485 ** -5.33 
To be continued. 
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Table 6, part 2 
 I II III IV V VI 
 Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
Included instruments  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Dependent Variable                   
  ln(post govt. income)                   
Excluded instruments                   
  Predicted ΔSO2             2E-4  0.98 -1E-4  -0.59 
  ln(predicted HH income)          0.026 ** 37.06 0.026 ** 37.02 0.026 ** 37.01 
  Tenure income earner          0.005 ** 27.71 0.005 ** 27.79 0.005 ** 27.79 
TSP and unemployment rate                   
  TSP (μg/m3)          1E-4  0.79 -6E-5  -0.48 -6E-5  -0.42 
  Unemployment rate          -0.004 ** -3.72 -0.003 ** -3.04 -0.003 ** -3.10 
Included instruments          Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  227,789  227,789  227,789  227,789  227,789  227,789
Number of individuals  33,864  33,864  33,864  33,864  33,864  33,864
Avg. no. of obs. per individual  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7  6.7
Number of clusters  7,413  7,413  7,413  7,413  7,413  7,413
Shea's partial R2 for SO2      0.018   0.034      0.018   0.034
Bound et al. partial R2      0.018   0.034      0.018   0.034
F-test exc. instruments (p-value)      0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000
Shea's partial R2 for log income            0.027   0.027   0.027
Bound et al. partial R2            0.027   0.027   0.027
F-test exc. instruments (p-value)      0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000
Anderson LR statistic (p-value)      0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
Hansen's J statistic (p-value)      -   -   0.192   0.254   0.207
Notes: (1) OLS and IV estimates with individual fixed effects; SO2 concentration is instrumented with the effect of flue gas desulfurization at power plants estimated 
with a distance decay modeled as an indicator function in specifications II and V and modeled with an exponential function in specifications III and VI; household 
income is instrumented with the sum of predicted incomes of the household members and job tenure of household of the primary/secondary wage earner in 
specifications IV, V and VI. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on county and year level. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*)
at the 90% level. 
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with the picture that emerges from the difference in the magnitude of conventional and in-
strumented pollution effects (or rather our interpretation thereof). The ultimate source of con-
cern is a potential correlation between pollution and unobservable characteristics, but local 
economic activity as captured by local unemployment seems not to bias conventional esti-
mates. 
The results in table 6 imply that TSP concentration is only weakly associated with life satis-
faction. However, we do not dwell on these estimates as they may be afflicted by similar si-
multaneity problems as we conjecture in the case of conventional SO2 estimates. Local unem-
ployment rates have large negative effects even though we control for respondents’ own em-
ployment status, a result that is consistent with earlier findings (Di Tella, MacCulloch and 
Oswald 2001; 2003). The results in the first stage regressions are as expected: TSP and SO2 
concentrations are positively associated, unemployment rates and SO2 concentrations nega-
tively. 
Although unemployment rate and general air pollution drop from the list of potential candi-
dates, there may be other (unobserved) predictors of life satisfaction that are correlated with 
SO2 pollution. Therefore, we interact SO2 with dummy variables for sub-groups of the popu-
lation that are expected to suffer disproportionately from exposure to SO2 pollution. In this 
way, the relatively insensitive group controls for other simultaneous and spatially coincident 
shocks. We consider two such pollution-sensitive groups: environmentally conscious or con-
cerned individuals and individuals who are at risk with regard to adverse health effects from 
air pollution. The only variable in the GSOEP for environmental attitudes available in all years 
asks respondents whether they worry about environmental protection. Possible answers are 
“very concerned”, “somewhat concerned” and “not concerned”. Table 7 tabulates the number 
of observations in each category against deciles of SO2 concentration. The number of very 
concerned people increases with pollution levels and the number of unconcerned people de-
creases. Of course, for environmental concerns to be a channel through which air pollution 
affects life satisfaction, such a positive relationship between objective and perceived environ-
mental degradation is a necessary condition. Although only a few Germans characterize them-
selves as unconcerned, there are still 1,561 observations in the least populated cell (10th decile 
of SO2 concentration · unconcerned respondents). The distribution of answers and pollution 
levels thus allows an implementation of the proposed empirical test. 
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Table 7. SO2 pollution and environmental concerns, Germany 1985-2003 
SO2 deciles Environmental concerns 
 Very concerned Somewhat concerned Not Concerned Total 
 1st 5,261 13,864 3,464 22,589
 2nd 5,338 13,590 3,240 22,168
 3rd 6,074 14,146 2,909 23,129
 4th 6,593 13,734 2,717 23,044
 5th 7,765 12,452 2,199 22,416
 6th 9,187 11,698 1,652 22,537
 7th 10,765 10,567 1,471 22,803
 8th 11,617 9,629 1,566 22,812
 9th 11,387 9,592 1,548 22,527
 10th 10,834 10,194 1,561 22,589
Total 84,821 119,466 22,327 226,614
   
Hospitalization and disability status are the only health variables in the GSOEP available in all 
years. These variables are not suitable for capturing pollution related health effects. Further, 
on a conceptual level, we are interested in identifying individuals belonging to a risk group 
rather than actually ill ones. In an auxiliary logit regression, we regress a dummy variable in-
dicating persons suffering from chronic illnesses on a set of 24 sex · age category dummies 
and 24 corresponding interaction terms with SO2 concentration. The dependent variable is the 
binary response to the question whether respondents suffered at least one year or chronically 
from specific complaints or illnesses, asked in the early waves of the GSOEP; this variable 
comes closest to representing respiratory and cardiovascular diseases caused by pollution. 
Using the estimated coefficients, we predict hypothetical probabilities of illnesses upon expo-
sure to high and low pollution levels. We then classify individuals with a predicted difference 
in the probability of illness between high and low pollution situations that lies in the highest 
quartile as belonging to the high risk groups, and individuals with a predicted difference in the 
probability of illness that lies in the third quartile as belonging to the risk group. Table 8 re-
ports the average effects of SO2 concentration on the life satisfaction in the various sub-
groups. 
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Table 8. Interaction effects: Effect of SO2 pollution on life satisfaction for different groups 
Dependent Variable I II 
  Life satisfaction Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Pollution and interaction terms       
  SO2 (μg/m3) -0.001  -0.61 -0.004**  -5.28 
  SO2 · somewhat concerned -0.004**  -5.74    
  SO2 · very concerned -0.005**  -5.89    
  SO2 · risk group    -0.002**  -3.00 
  SO2 · high risk group    -0.002**  -3.62 
Environmentally concerned people and risk groups       
  Not concerned at all Reference group    
  Somewhat concerned -0.053**  -3.38    
  Very concerned -0.085**  -4.85    
  Not in risk group    Reference group 
  Risk group    0.017  1.37 
  High risk group    0.071**  4.82 
HH income       
  ln(post govt. income) 0.139**  16.78 0.140**  14.94 
  HH size1/2 -0.172**  -9.28 -0.165**  -7.74 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes 
City, district size Yes Yes 
State specific effects Yes Yes 
State specific time trends Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes 
Individual specific effects Yes Yes 
Number of observations   226,614   227,789 
Number of individuals   33,807   33,864 
Avg. no. of obs. per individual   6.7   6.7 
Number of clusters   7,410   7,413 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000 
R2 within   0.038   0.037 
R2 between   0.008   0.065 
R2 overall   0.004   0.055 
Marginal effect of SO2 for M.E.  St. Err. M.E.  St. Err. 
  Not concerned at all -0.0005  0.0008    
  Somewhat concerned -0.0048**  0.0007    
  Very concerned -0.0050**  0.0007    
  Not in risk group    -0.0039**  0.0007 
  Risk group    -0.0054**  0.0008 
  High risk group    -0.0061**  0.0008 
Notes: (1) OLS with individual fixed effects. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on county and year  
level. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at the 90% level. 
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The effect of air pollution on life satisfaction is monotonically increasing in the degree to 
which individuals are concerned about the environment and in the degree they are expected to 
suffer adverse health consequences from pollution exposure (see bottom rows of table 8). 
However, the 95% confidence intervals of the point estimates overlap except for unconcerned 
individuals for whom we find no effect of air pollution. 
To sum up our results: First and most importantly, we find negative effects of SO2 concentra-
tion on life satisfaction. The magnitude of the effect is larger for the instrumental variables 
estimates than for the conventional estimates. This difference suggests that pollution is ac-
companied by factors with a countervailing effect on life satisfaction. Even though an obvious 
candidate is local economic activity, it is not local unemployment but rather some other unob-
served factor. The effects are robust to the inclusion of local unemployment rate and TSP con-
centration. Finally, differential effects for different groups of respondents imply that it is in-
deed air pollution that affects life satisfaction and not other simultaneous and spatially coinci-
dent shocks. 
3.4 Effect on housing rents 
3.4.1 Data and empirical strategy 
In order to calculate the total WTP for air quality, we supplement the results of the life satis-
faction approach with housing hedonics for the same period and geographical area.26 The fol-
lowing hedonic housing analysis is also based on the GSOEP. Household identifiers and in-
formation on moving dates of households allow us to build a panel at the dwelling level. The 
hedonic housing regressions are based on a panel for the period 1985-2003 consisting of 
17,291 housing units with an average length in the panel of 3.7 years. 
In contrast to the majority of hedonic market studies, we use rental prices instead of house 
prices, a deviation that seems justified in the present case for several reasons, in addition to 
data availability. First, as the life satisfaction approach, hedonic rent regressions yield WTP 
estimates in the form of (annually) recurring payments. Hence, in summing and comparing 
                                                 
26 The standard hedonic framework assumes that individuals are compensated in the housing and the labor market 
for exposure to air pollution. However, as in previous studies, we find no effect of air quality on wages (e.g. Chay 
and Greenstone 2005; Bayer, Keohane and Timmins 2006). Thus, we only report the hedonic housing regres-
sions. 
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estimates based on the two approaches, no assumptions on individuals’ discount rates are nec-
essary. Second, expected changes in air quality are capitalized into sales prices but not into 
current rents. Given that we have a panel with annual data and the major air quality regulation 
were enacted before our sample period, capitalized expectations would bias our estimates 
downwards or make it impossible to establish an effect of pollution on house prices. Third, in 
contrast to other countries, Germany has a well-developed, and relatively loosely regulated, 
market for rental housing. Nearly 60% of the households live in rented dwellings (compared to 
around 30% in the United States). Rents for vacant dwellings can be freely negotiated between 
landlords and potential tenants. There are some restrictions on evicting sitting tenants and a 
ceiling on rent increases for sitting tenants (up to 30% in a three-year period), but this ceiling 
is generally not binding (Hoffmann and Kurz 2002). An exception are subsidized dwellings, 
which are subject to comparatively strict regulation. 
As a rule, hedonic housing regressions include a large number of time-invariant housing char-
acteristics. With panel data, these characteristics can be captured by dwelling specific fixed 
effects (see e.g. Mendelsohn 1992; Gayer, Hamilton and Viscusi 2002 for repeat sale models). 
In accordance with the life satisfaction regressions, we control for state specific time trends 
and year effects.27 Economic theory provides no a priori reason to prefer one functional form 
for the hedonic price function over others (Rosen, S. 1974). However, in general, when var-
iables are omitted or replaced by proxies, simple forms outperform more flexible ones 
(Cropper, Deck and McConnell 1988). Therefore, we estimate semi-log hedonic rent regres-
sions as specified in equation 8: 
(8) ln(Ricst) = β0 + β1Pcst + β2trends + τt + οi + εicst, 
where Ricst is the rent of dwelling i in county c and state s at time t, Pcst SO2 pollution, trends 
state specific time trends, τt and οi time and dwelling specific fixed effects, and εicst the error 
term. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering on county and year level. 
We exclude from our sample owner-occupied houses, even though the GSOEP provides 
owner estimates of rents. It might well be that owners may just convert their estimates of the 
house price into a rent estimate, with associated problems of capitalized expectations and sys-
                                                 
27 State specific fixed factors are captured by the dwelling fixed effects. 
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tematic biases in owners’ appraisals (Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez 1986). We further ex-
clude subsidized dwellings because of the stricter regulations and, for obvious reasons, insti-
tutional households such as nursing homes and barracks as well as dwellings with an unknown 
ownership status. 
3.4.2 Results 
Table 9 presents the hedonic housing regressions in the same sequence as the life satisfaction 
results, i.e. column I presents the conventional estimates, and columns II and III the instru-
mental variable estimates (with the estimated effect of flue gas desulfurization based on an 
indicator and on an exponential distance decay function, respectively, as instruments); col-
umns IV to VI show the corresponding results with TSP concentration and unemployment as 
additional control variables. 
Pollution has a negative effect on housing rents. However, the results for the instrumental var-
iable estimates do not allow us to draw any firm conclusions. The conventional estimate lies 
between the instrumental variable estimates. Therefore, it is not clear whether the conventional 
estimate is biased in one or the other direction. Further, the instrumental variable estimates are 
not robust to the inclusion of TSP concentration and local unemployment. The first estimate 
halves in size, the second completely collapses. Given the difference in the magnitude and the 
lacking robustness of the instrumental variable estimates, we do not favor one estimate over 
the others. Thus, the two instrumental variable estimates reported in columns II and III delimit 
the lower and upper bounds. Of course, one can also see the zero-effect implied by the result 
in column IV as an alternative upper bound. In the latter case, the conclusion that the housing 
market inadequately reflects the benefits of clean air is even stronger. According to our results, 
TSP concentration has a negative effect on housing rents and, contrary to prior expectations, 
local unemployment a positive effect. 
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Table 9. Hedonic housing regression: Effect of SO2 pollution on monthly rents, Germany 1985-2003 
A. Second stage regression                   
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI 
  ln(monthly rent), 2002 euro Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value Coef. z-value
Pollution                   
  SO2 (μg/m3) -0.009 ** -9.36 -0.010 ** -4.98 -0.003 (*) -1.80 -0.008 ** -8.71 -0.005 * -2.09 0.002  1.36 
  TSP (μg/m3)          -0.002 ** -5.49 -0.003 ** -5.66 -0.004 ** -7.57 
Unemployment rate          0.058 ** 15.01 0.060 ** 15.10 0.065 ** 15.69 
State specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dwelling specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Prob > F   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000
R2 within   0.527   0.527   0.514   0.546   0.542   0.512
R2 between   0.000   0.000   0.016   0.005   0.015   0.037
R2 overall   0.001   0.002   0.008   0.001   0.007   0.026
B. First stage regressions                   
Dependent Variable                   
  SO2 (μg/m3)                   
Excluded instrument                   
  Predicted ΔSO2    -0.322 ** -12.81 -0.283 ** -16.56    -0.278 ** -11.48 -0.251 ** -15.17 
Included instruments    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations  64,651  64,651  64,651  64,651  64,651  64,651
Number of dwellings  17,291  17,291  17,291  17,291  17,291  17,291
Avg. no. of obs. per individual  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.7
Number of clusters  7,109  7,109  7,109  7,109  7,109  7,109
Shea's partial R2 for SO2      0.032   0.040      0.024   0.032
Bound et al. partial R2      0.032   0.040      0.024   0.032
F-test exc. instruments (p-value)      0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000
Anderson LR statistic (p-value)      0.000   0.000      0.000   0.000
Notes: (1) OLS and IV estimates with individual fixed effects; SO2 concentration is instrumented with the effect of flue gas desulfurization at power plants estimated 
with a distance decay modeled as an indicator function in specifications II and V and modeled with an exponential function in specifications III and VI. (2) Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on county and year level. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at the 90% level.
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3.5 Implicit willingness-to-pay 
With the estimated coefficients of the micro-econometric life satisfaction functions for air 
pollution ( ˆ β 1) and household income ( 2βˆ ), we can calculate the hypothetical WTP for im-
provements in air quality or implicit utility-constant trade-offs between pollution and income. 
We measure the WTP by the compensating surplus (CS). The CS is the decrease in income 
necessary to hold utility constant if air quality improves. In other words, the CS is the solution 
to the following expression: 
(9) v(mi0; Pi0) = v(mi0 - CS; Pi1), 
where v(·) is the utility function, mi0 is the (initial) household income, Pi0 the initial level of air 
pollution and Pi1 the level after a hypothetical reduction. Given the specification of the micro-
econometric life satisfaction functions expressed in equation 7, the CS for an improvement in 
air quality from Pi0 to Pi1, ΔPi, is defined as follows: 
(10) ))ˆˆexp(1( 1210 ii PmCS Δ⋅⋅−= −ββ . 
Based on equation 10, the WTP can be calculated for marginal and inframarginal changes in 
air quality. We will add these estimates to the price gradients in order to calculate the total 
WTP for improvements in air quality. 
In order to increase the comparability of the results of the life satisfaction approach and the 
hedonic method, we calculate the WTP for the households contained in the intersection of the 
two samples with average household income of € 21,462 and average rental costs of € 3,871 
(in 2002 €). For both approaches, MWTP is expressed as annual household payments and is, 
therefore, directly comparable. The estimates are based on the coefficients reported in columns 
IV to VI of table 5 for the life satisfaction approach and on the coefficients in columns I to III 
of table 9 for the hedonic method. Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1,000 repetitions. 
Table 10 presents the results. As usual, the conventional estimates are followed by two in-
strumental variable estimates (with the estimated effect of flue gas desulfurization based on an 
indicator distance decay function and based on an exponential distance decay function, re-
spectively).
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Table 10. WTP estimates for a reduction in air pollution 
Average household income:  € 21,462       
Average housing rent:  € 3,871       
 
Compensating surplus  Life satisfaction approach estimates Hedonic method estimates 
  Conventional Instrumental variable  Conventional Instrumental variable 
-1 μg/m3 SO2         
   In euro   € 195**  € 458**  € 275*   € 35**  € 38**  € 10** 
   (€ 21)  (€ 157)  (€ 115)   (€ 1)  (€ 4)  (€ 3) 
   In percent of income   0.9%**  2.1%**  1.3%*   0.2%**  0.2%**  0.05%** 
   (0.1%)  (0.7%)  (0.5%)   (0.005%)  (0.02%)  (0.02%) 
-48 μg/m3 SO2         
   In euro   € 7,590**  € 13,828*  € 9,893**   € 1,693**  € 1,830  € 471** 
   (€ 966)  (€ 2,741)  (€ 3,057)   (€ 49)  (€ 176)  (€ 151) 
   In percent of income   35.4%**  64.5%**  46.2%**   7.9%**  8.5%  2.2%** 
   (4.5%)  (12.8%)  (14.2%)   (0.2%)  (0.8%)  (0.7%) 
 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1,000 repetitions. (2) ** is significant at the 99% level, and * at the 95% level. 
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We start the discussion with the MWTP for a reduction in SO2 concentration of 1 μg/m3. The 
results for the life satisfaction approach lie in the range of € 195 to € 458 or, in percent of 
household income, in the range of 0.9% to 2.1%. The implicit prices for clean air reflected in 
the housing market are much smaller and lie between € 10 and € 35 (or between 0.05% and 
0.2% of household income). By summing the estimates from the two methods, we get total 
MWTP estimates in the range of € 230 and € 496 (1.1% and 2.3% of household income, re-
spectively). Further, the results in table 10 suggest that only between 3.5% and 15.2% of the 
total effects of air quality are capitalized in the housing market. This seems to be a very low 
proportion. At the same time, MWTP estimates based on the life satisfaction approach seem 
rather high. Potential reasons for these related findings are discussed below. 
In order to asses the validity of our own hedonic price estimates, table 11 presents 34 esti-
mates of MWTP for 6 cities reported in 5 different studies. In light of the large literature using 
the hedonic method to value air quality, the number of studies may seem relatively small. 
However, none of the other studies we could locate can be considered because they either in-
vestigate the effect of TSP concentration (see Smith, V. K. and Huang 1995 for a meta-analy-
sis) and other pollutants or because SO2 pollution is measured in units for which no generally 
accepted conversion factor to μg/m3 exists (see e.g. Ridker and Henning 1967). 
Table 11 reveals a large variation in MWTP estimates. The median of all estimates is € 201, 
the mean € 483. If we concentrate our attention on the positive and statistically significant im-
plicit marginal prices, median and mean coincide at € 487. With a real interest rate of around 
2% per annum, a lump-sum payment of € 487 equals an annual CS of € 10 paid in perpetuity, 
i.e. the lowest MWTP based on the hedonic method in table 10. With a real interest rate of 
around 8% per annum, it equals an annual CS of € 38, the highest MWTP in table 10. Hence, 
our MWTP estimates based on the hedonic method are broadly comparable to the estimates 
published in the literature. 
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Table 11. MWTP estimates reported in the literature 
City Period MWTP for decrease of 1 µg/m3 SO2 Source 
  Reported  In 2002€  
Boston, MA, US 1971 -$39(n.s.) -$184Li and Brown (1980) 
  $109(n.s.) $514  
  $121(n.s.) $570  
Chicago, IL, US 1964-1967 -$22  -$131Atkinson and Crocker (1987) 
 1974-1976 $27(n.s.) $39Zabel and Kiel (2000) 
 1977-1979 $12  $18  
 1981-1983 $51(n.s.) $75  
 1985-1987 $139  $203  
 1989-1991 $51(n.s.) $74  
 1989-1990 $327  $490Chattopadhyay (1999) 
  $325  $487  
  $384  $575  
  $203  $304  
  $369  $554  
  $204(n.s.) $305  
Denver, CO, US 1974-1976 $9(n.s.) $13Zabel and Kiel (2000) 
 1977-1979 $339(n.s.) $495  
 1981-1983 -$120(n.s.) -$175  
 1985-1987 $4,843(n.s.) $7,074  
 1989-1991 $248(n.s.) $363  
Philadelphia, PA, US 1974-1976 $15  $22  
 1977-1979 $94(n.s.) $137  
 1981-1983 -$8(n.s.) -$11  
 1985-1987 -$3(n.s.) -$5  
 1989-1991 $63  $92  
Washington, DC, US 1974-1976 -$24(n.s.) -$35  
 1977-1979 -$14  -$20  
 1981-1983 $22(n.s.) $32  
 1985-1987 $149  $218  
 1989-1991 $136  $198  
Seoul, KR 1993 $901  $1,055Kim, Phipps and Anselin (2003)
  $892  $1,044  
  $886  $1,037  
   $864  $1,012  
Median of all estimates   $201  
Median of sign. and positive est.   $487  
Average of all estimates   $483  
Average of sign. and positive est.   $487  
Note: (n.s.) is not significant. 
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We also calculate the WTP for an inframarginal improvement in air quality of 48 μg/m3, cor-
responding to the average total decrease in SO2 concentration between 1985 and 2003 for the 
households in the West German sample and between 1991 and 2003 for the households in East 
German sample. Estimates based on the life satisfaction approach are between € 7,590 and € 
13,828 or between 34.4% and 64.4% of annual household income. Implicit prices for clean air 
in the housing market are between € 471 and € 1,830 or between 2.2% and 7.9%. Total WTP 
estimates amount to between € 9,283 and € 15,658 (43.3% and 73.0% of annual household 
income, respectively). These results would imply that only between 4.5% and 18.2% of the 
effect of air pollution are reflected in the housing rents. 
The comparably low implicit price for clean air in the housing market (relative to the overall 
effect) and the large absolute size of the life satisfaction approach estimates require discussion. 
The first finding can be explained by factors that result in an incomplete capitalization of the 
experienced effects of air pollution in housing markets such as mobility costs, biased risk per-
ceptions and divergence of decision and experienced utility. Section 2.3.2 discusses these 
factors in detail and provides evidence to support their relevance. To recapitulate, the WTP 
estimates for clean air based on house price data but allowing for mobility costs of Polnisky 
and Rubinfeld (1977) and Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2006) are around three times higher 
than conventional estimates. Similarly, Smith and Huang (1995) show that benefit estimates 
for improvement in air quality based on dose-response functions and on a summary value of 
mortality risk are around 4 times higher than benefit estimates based on hedonic studies. Of 
course, a mis-perception of the effects of air pollution may not be the only reason for this dis-
crepancy. But a reduction in mortality risk is only one of the benefits of clean air. Reductions 
in morbidity risk, in material damages and improved visibility are others. Thus the discrep-
ancy reported by Smith and Huang (1995) is likely to understate the actual degree of “under-
capitalization”. It is important to note that both reasons may be simultaneously present and 
contribute to an incomplete reflection of the benefits of clean air in private markets. Further, 
incomplete capitalization can possibly be explained by the divergence of decision and expe-
rienced utility. For example, when looking for an apartment, other housing characteristics may 
be more salient than regional air quality. If people underestimate future utility streams derived 
from intangible goods such as good health relative to utility streams derived from disposable 
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income (Frey and Stutzer 2004a), we would expect that the experienced utility losses from air 
pollution are inadequately reflected in housing rents. 
A more prosaic reason for the low implicit price relative to the residual shadow benefit esti-
mated with the life satisfaction approach is related to a crucial element of the life satisfaction 
approach, the estimation of the marginal utility of income. This same reason could also ex-
plain the high absolute estimates based on the life satisfaction approach. For two reasons, the 
(short-run) marginal utility of income may be underestimated in micro-econometric life satis-
faction functions. First, instrumenting income is inherently difficult and our efforts may fall 
short of completely resolving the problems of endogeneity of income and omitted costs of in-
come generation. Second, a growing body of literature demonstrates that relative motives play 
an important role. Individuals evaluate their income situation relative to the income of refer-
ence groups, own past income and income aspirations (see section 2.1 for references). If 
people adapt to changes in income, the long-run marginal utility of income understates the 
short-run utility consequences of income changes. Even if one can argue in favor of using the 
long-run marginal utility for policy evaluation (e.g. Kahneman and Thaler 1991; Loewenstein 
and Schkade 1999; Kahneman and Sugden 2005), (unexpected) adaptation can explain why 
WTP estimates based on the life satisfaction approach seem unreasonably high from a decision 
utility perspective. The realization of the importance of relative concerns has implications for 
all non-market valuation methods and may well speak in favor of the use of the life satisfac-
tion approach instead of standard approaches. For example, Frank (2000) shows that positional 
concerns bias hedonic market estimates downward. Although the problems of estimating the 
marginal utility of income are discussed in the context of air pollution, they equally apply to 
the other applications in the next two chapters and to the life satisfaction approach in general. 
Investigating the relationship between income and life satisfaction is a fast growing area of 
research (see Clark, Frijters and Shields 2007 for a review). Therefore, better estimates of 
marginal utility of income will come forward. However, the problems of estimating the mar-
ginal utility of income correctly may also speak in favor of abandoning the practice of valuing 
public goods in monetary terms. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 6.1.3. 
As we have seen, the problems associated with estimating the effect of income may make it 
difficult to give precise benefit estimates in monetary terms and to exactly establish the degree 
of incompleteness in the capitalization of the benefits in the housing market. However, in the 
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present case, at least two unambiguous conclusions can be drawn. First, the negative relation-
ship between air pollution and life satisfaction indicates that individuals are not fully compen-
sated in markets. Thus, while the life satisfaction approach may overstate benefits of clean air, 
the hedonic method clearly understates these benefits. Our results suggest that the difference 
may be large. Second, the evaluation of the large combustion plant ordinance in Germany is 
unambiguous. Whatever WTP estimate is chosen, the costs of flue gas desulfurization are 
dwarfed. Rough estimates of the private compliance costs (not social costs; see Hazilla and 
Kopp 1990) for Western Germany range between €35 and €180 per year and household.28 
3.6 Appendix to chapter 3 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the data on German power plants and wind 
directions used to estimate the causal effect of flue gas desulfurization on annual mean SO2 
concentrations at county level. 
Power plants 
The data for fossil fuel fired generating units with an electricity capacity of 100 MW and more 
are from several sources, namely the UBA, information published by the operating companies 
and the technical literature, a survey mailed to operating companies and statutory provisions. 
To a list of 396 generating units provided by the UBA, we add 56 units and then reduce the 
number of units to 390 by combining all units with identical location and characteristics. Of 
theses 390 units, 7 units have a capacity of less than 100 MW, 351 were active in the period 
1985 to 2003 and 303 units were active and are neither nuclear or hydroelectric power plants. 
The UBA list contains information on the plant name, operator and/or owner, zip code of 
contact address (which does not necessarily correspond to the plant’s location), the launching 
year, the year the plant was shut down, capacity and fuel. We complement the data with the 
location, the year of refit (desulfurization), fuel efficiency and estimates of annual SO2 emis-
sions. 
                                                 
28 Schaerer and Haug (1990) put the cost of installation of scrubbers at West German power plants at DM 14.2 
billion (1988 DM). Doubling this value to account for operation costs, assuming a real long-term interest rate of 
5% and dividing by 27,793,000 households (living in Germany in 1989), gives an estimate of € 36 per household 
and year. Another estimate of desulfurization at power plants provided by Schaerer and Haug (1990) is DM 
0.0075 per kWh of electricity produced. In 1989, West German power plants produced 452.39 billion kWh of 
electricity. The costs per household and year are therefore € 87. Finally, Schulz’ (1985) most pessimistic cost 
estimate is DM 9 per household and month (1985 DM assumed) or € 179 per household and year. It is important 
to note that these estimates say nothing about the distribution of the costs. 
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Location: If possible, we establish the exact address using information published by the oper-
ating companies and in the technical literature, or a route planner. Otherwise, the centroid of 
the zip-code is assumed to be a plant’s location. We georeference the addresses with a route 
planner. 
Year of refit: Published information and responses to our survey of operating companies al-
lows us to determine the year scrubbers were installed for 224 units (61%). For the other units 
the year can be approximated on the basis of statutory provisions, the launching year, the year 
the plant was shut down and the capacity. 
Fuel efficiency (ηj): Published information and survey responses provide information on the 
fuel efficiency of 196 units (54%). For the other units fuel efficiency is predicted based on the 
following regression (t-values in parentheses): 
ηj = 9.6E-4·start yearj +9.9E-5·capacityj -0.035·1(lignite)j +0.008·1(sub-bituminous coal)j+  
 (3.76) (6.98) (-1.25) (0.27) 
 0.054·1(natural gas)j -0.042·1(HEL)j +0.079·1(HS)j-0.103·1(uranium)j +0.185·1(hydro)j 
 (1.98) (-1.56) (2.32) (-2.73) (4.03) 
 -0.053·1(mixed fuel)j -0.027·1(desox)j +0.056·1(denox)j -1.589 
 (-1.72) (-3.37) (5.39) (-3.13) 
R2 = 0.727, Prob > F = 0.000 
Emissions: In order to estimate annual SO2 emissions, we use emission factors, EF, from a 
time shortly before scrubbers were installed (Bakkum et al. 1987). Emission factors are de-
fined as the industry wide average ratio between the emission rate and the actual load differ-
entiated according to fuel and capacity. Assuming full utilization of capacities, the annual 
emission at plant j, Ej, can be estimated as 
Ej = EF(fuel, capacity)·capacityj·ηj-1·time period (31,536,000 seconds). 
This calculation overstates emissions because the assumption of constant full utilization is not 
plausible but as we lack data on utilization rates, we cannot estimate the emissions more accu-
rately. Moreover, the procedure allows us to capture the important differences in emissions 
between fuels and plant sizes. 
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Wind stations 
Frequencies of wind directions in 12 30-degree sectors measured at wind stations are pub-
lished in Traup and Kruse (1996). The wind atlas contains data on 107 wind stations of which 
12 are not representative for a larger area. For each power plant the wind station closest to the 
plant is used to describe the wind situation at the plant, restricting the number of wind stations 
to 43. The frequency distributions are based on measurement series of at least 5 years, in most 
cases 15 years and in some cases more than 15 years in the period between 1976 and 1995. 
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Well, before the flood I was happy. 
Victim of the Bufallo Creek flood, West Virginia, in 1872, cited in Erikson (1976, p. 223) 
4. Application to flood disasters 
4.1 Introduction 
Regarding natural disasters, the last years have often been described as anni horribili. The 
tsunami in the Indian Ocean, Hurricane “Katrina” on the U.S. Gulf Coast and the Pakistan 
earthquake are the most prominent catastrophes of the recent past. In Europe, floods rank 
highest among natural disasters. During the past two decades, several extreme floods have 
occurred in Central European rivers (including the Rhine, Danube, Odra, and Wisla), culmi-
nating in the disastrous August 2002 flood in the Elbe River basin and parts of the Danube 
basin. Likewise, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) calls flooding 
“America’s #1 Natural Hazard” (FEMA 2004). And more is to be expected! Climate-induced 
changes in the timing of runoff for several European river basins and small Alpine catchments 
increase the risk of winter floods (Schröter et al. 2005). Dramatic increases in flood frequency 
and intensity are also likely in parts of the United States (e.g. Gleick 1999). Questions regard-
ing the financing of flood protection and prevention strategies are likely to rise in significance 
on the political agenda. Therefore, it is important to assess the utility losses caused by natural 
disasters. Moreover, the increase in risk raises the question to what extent risk transfer mech-
anisms such as (mandatory) catastrophe insurance can mitigate the effects of disasters. The 
higher the non-insurable psychic costs are, the less relief such a system will provide. 
This chapter has two major objectives. First, we use the life satisfaction approach to measure 
the utility consequences caused by flood hazards for 17 OECD countries between 1973 and 
2004. The analysis comprises 127 major flood events and spatial data on flood hazard distri-
bution. Both variables exhibit large variation across countries and regions. Second, in an ex-
plorative analysis, we investigate whether and to what extent risk transfer mechanisms miti-
gate the adverse effects of flood disasters. 
Before presenting the analysis, it might be helpful to shortly reflect on how flood disasters can 
affect individual life satisfaction. Two broad categories of flood effects can be distinguished: 
financial or property losses and psychic costs. The most important effects of the first category 
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are property damages. Additionally, reconstruction efforts affect government budgets and have 
tax consequences for the individuals. With regard to the psychic costs, three different effects 
are discussed in the literature. First, there is the grief of the bereaved and, more generally, al-
truistic sympathy with the victims. Both are likely to be a function of distance and those in 
affected regions are more likely to know people directly affected (Kimball et al. 2006). 
Second, flood victims may suffer from individual trauma or from some combination of anx-
iety, depression, insomnia, apathy and bad nerves. Third, there may be what Erikson (1976, 
pp. 153-154) calls collective trauma: “[…] a blow to the basic tissues of social life that dam-
ages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality”, 
“[…] the realization that the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and 
that an important part of the self has disappeared.” 
4.2 Flood hazards: Data and pattern 
As explained in section 2.4.3, we match the flood data to the survey data on the lowest geo-
graphical level that ensures a consistent definition across countries and over time. For Euro-
pean countries this is the middle level of the official territorial units for statistics of the EU, the 
NUTS II. The definition of the NUTS regions is based on actual administrative boundaries or 
institutional divisions in the EU member states. Therefore, the size of the regions slightly dif-
fers across countries. For the United States, the data are matched on the level of counties.  
We use two different variables for flood hazards. The first captures actual flood events, the 
second contains spatial information on the flood exposure of the regions. The data on flood 
events are from the most comprehensive data set on disasters, the EM-DAT of the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). In order to be included in EM-DAT, a 
disaster has to fulfill one of the following criteria: 10 or more people reported killed, 100 
people reported affected, declaration of a state of emergency or call for international assis-
tance. Hence, flood events that occurred in thinly populated areas are not included in the data-
base and in the analysis. Based on this database we create a dummy variable that takes on the 
value 1 for all respondents living in a region hit by a flood disaster in the 12 month preceding 
the interview and 0 otherwise. We have a total of 127 floods in our sample, 56 in 11 European 
countries and 71 in the United States. Of the 473 regions in our sample, 369 regions experi-
enced no flood at all in the period considered, 88 experienced 1 flood, 12 experienced 2 
floods, and 4 experienced 3 floods. In Europe, around 9% of all regions were afflicted by a 
flood event in the sample period, in the United States around 17% of the counties. Figure 4 
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depicts the number of flood events per region divided by the number of years each region is in 
the sample. 
Figure 4. Number of floods per annum 
A. Europe, 1973-1998 
 
B. United States, 1993-2004 
 
Legend:  
Source: EM-DAT, Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), own 
estimates.  
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The data on flood hazard areas is based on a study by the World Bank and Columbia Univer-
sity (Dilley et al. 2005) that identifies global natural disaster hotspots. Data on historical flood 
disasters from 1985 to 2003 collected by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory are georeferenced 
and then combined in a grid with cell size of 1º · 1º. Depending on the number of georefer-
enced floods, cells have values between 0 and 10. Using these grid data and polygon data de-
scribing the boundaries of the regions in our sample, we calculate the mean value of the grid 
cells within each region. The GIS data have some limitations. First, the data identify regions 
affected by floods and not the exact flooded areas. Second, data on events in the early 1990s 
are missing or of low spatial quality. However, the GIS data is the best (publicly) available 
data on flood hazard areas at such an aggregated level that has been collected and processed 
with a uniform method. The maps in figure 5 present the regional mean flood exposure for 
Europe and the United States. 
Figure 5. Flood hazard distribution, regional mean values 
A. Europe 
 
 To be continued. 
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Figure 5, part 2 
B. United States 
 
Legend:  
Source: Dilley et al. (2005), own estimates. 
The mean flood exposure of the European countries in the sample is 2.05; the mean flood ex-
posure for the counties of the United States in our sample is 5.10. Table 12 provides descrip-
tive statistics of our two flood variables at the national level. 
Table 12. Flood disasters and flood hazard distribution in 16 European 
countries and the United States, 1973-2004 
Country No. of regional flood disasters Hazard distribution 
 Total Per annum Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Austria 0 0.00 0.00 3.909 2.465 
Belgium 2 0.09 0.02 5.879 1.990 
Denmark 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 
Finland 0 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 
France 15 0.69 0.04 4.363 3.581 
Germany 11 0.66 0.06 5.368 3.591 
Greece 1 0.07 0.02 1.238 1.588 
Ireland 1 0.05 0.03 0.684 1.209 
Italy 14 0.58 0.04 2.983 3.329 
Luxembourg 1 0.05 0.00 7.587 0.493 
Norway 0 0.00 0.00 0.061 0.140 
Portugal 1 0.09 0.03 3.645 1.875 
Spain 3 0.28 0.05 1.153 1.904 
 To be continued. 
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Table 12, part 2 
Sweden 0 0.00 0.00 0.013 0.112 
The Netherlands 0 0.00 0.00 3.032 1.795 
United Kingdom 4 0.19 0.03 5.505 3.741 
USA 71 16.65 0.09 4.843 0.500 
Notes: (1) The actual number of floods per country is smaller. Some flood events are double 
counted as they have affected more than one region within a country. (2) The standard 
deviation for the number of flood disasters is calculated using the annual number of floods per 
region in a country. (3) The mean and standard deviation of the flood hazard distribution is 
calculated by using a polygon GIS-layer representing national boundaries. 
4.3 Effects on life satisfaction 
4.3.1 Data and empirical strategy 
The individual-level data with information on respondents’ subjective well-being and house-
hold income come from the EB for the 16 European countries and from the GSS for the 
United States. The EB interviews a cross-section sample of Europeans each year. The coun-
tries have been contained in the sample since the year of EU accession. For the United King-
dom, the first year (1973) is not considered because the regional variable is too coarse, for 
Spain no observations are available until 1986, and Norway is included in the sample in the 
years 1990 to 1995 even though it is not a member state. For all countries except Norway, the 
sample includes observations until 1998. Like the EB, the GSS is an annual cross-sectional 
survey of a nationally representative sample. Although it started in 1972, data on the county 
level have only been available since 1993. The last year in our sample is 2004. 
For Europe, we exclude respondents below age 15; in the GSS the minimum age is 18. This 
leaves us with 328,610 observations for Europe and with 13,138 observations for the United 
States. In both datasets, missing income information contributes most to reducing the sample 
size. The number of observations for country-years varies between 152 for Luxembourg in 
1988 and 6,014 for Germany in 1992; for region-years the number of observations varies be-
tween 1 and 1,455. In general, the number of observations per year is smaller for the counties 
in the United States than in the European regions. While there are 36 county-year combina-
tions with only 1 observation in the United States, there are only 4 region-year combinations 
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with only 1 observation in Europe.29 The median number of observations per region and year 
is 42, the mean is 89. 
The variables capturing subjective well-being are similar in the two datasets, but not identical. 
In the EB, the variable is the categorical response to the following question: “On the whole, 
are you very satisfied [4], fairly satisfied [3], not very satisfied [2], or not at all satisfied [1] 
with the life you lead?” The question was asked in all years between 1973 and 1998, with the 
exception of the years 1974 and 1996. In the GSS the question reads “Taken all together, how 
would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very [4] happy, [3] pretty 
happy, or [2] not too happy?” While “life satisfaction” and “happiness” might be located at 
different points along the cognition-affect dimension capturing slightly different aspects of 
subjective well-being (see section 2.2.1), they are highly correlated and findings based on the 
two measures are similar (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005a). In combining the two datasets, we 
follow Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005a). We simply add a first, lowest, category that is as-
sumed to be empty to the happiness variable in the GSS. This resembles the actual distribution 
in the EB with only 7.2% of the answers in the bottom category. As an alternative method, we 
also collapse the two lowest categories in the EB. The findings are nearly identical for both 
methods. 
Both datasets contain information on respondents’ household income. In the EB, respondents 
are assigned into between 6 and 12 classes of household income. The class size and number of 
classes varies considerably between countries and surveys. Therefore, we translate the original 
income class information into a number, which represents the mid-point of the respective class 
interval. These values are converted into 2004 U.S. dollars. Because the highest income class 
is open-ended, respondents who fall into this income class are excluded. In the GSS, the origi-
nally grouped income data are already translated into real income in 2004 U.S. dollars (see 
                                                 
29 The 36 county-year combinations in the United States are Pima, AZ, in 1993, Sacramento, CA, in 2004, San 
Francisco, CA, in 2004, Ventura, CA, in 2004, Jefferson, CO, in 2004, Hillsborough, FL, in 2004, Palm Beach, 
FL, in 2002, Pasco, FL, in 2004, De Kalb, GA, in 2002, DuPage, IL, in 2002, Henderson, KY, in 2002, Essex, 
MA, in 2002, Norfolk, MA, in 2004, Carroll, MD, in 2002, Montgomery, MD, in 2004, Prince George’s, MD, in 
2002, Baltimore city, MD, in 2002, Bay, MI, in 1998, Saginaw, MI, in 2000, Burke, NC, in 1994, Bergen, NJ, in 
2004, Camden, NJ, in 2002, Hudson, NJ, in 2004, Monmouth, NJ, in 2002 and 2004, Passaic, NJ, in 2002, Union, 
NJ, in 1993 and 2004, Montgomery, PA, in 2002, Philadelphia, PA, in 1993, Jefferson, TN, in 2004, Bexar, TX, 
in 2004, Galveston, TX, in 1996, Chesterfield, VA, in 2002, Henrico, VA, in 2002, Hopewell, VA, in 2002. The 
4 region-year combinations in Europe are Basse-Normandie, France, in 1983 and 1988, Poitou-Charentes, 
France, in 1988, Canaries, Spain, in 1986. The region-year combination with the highest number of observations 
is Jylland, Denmark, in 1992. 
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Ligon 1994). In order to capture the effect of household size on equivalence income, the 
square root of household size is included in the estimation equations. Further, we include a set 
of personal characteristics, including sex, age, marital status, number of children, employment 
status and type of community in which the respondent lives.30 Repeated cross-section models 
are specified in combination with the variable on flood events, single cross-section models for 
the variable on flood hazard distribution. In the repeated cross-section analysis, the life satis-
faction of individual i living in region r at time t, LSirt, is explained by the occurrence of a 
flood disaster in region r in the month of or in the 12 months preceding the interview, Fr(t-1,t], 
the natural logarithm of the individual’s household income, ln(mirt), a vector of personal char-
acteristics, Zirt, as well as region and time specific effects, ρr and τt. The specification is sum-
marized in equation 11: 
(11) LSirt = β0 + β1Fr(t-1,t] + β2ln(mirt) + β3Zirt + ρr + τt + εirt. 
The specification for the cross-section analysis is similar except for the flood hazard variable, 
which is now the regional mean of the flood hazard distribution, Hr, and for the omission of 
the region specific effects, which cannot be included. The specification becomes thus: 
(12) LSirt = β0 + β1Hr + β2ln(mirt) + β3Zirt + τt + εirt. 
We estimate equations 11 and 12 by least square and, because of the ordinal nature of the de-
pendent variable, by ordered probit regressions. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively 
very similar for the two estimation approaches. For ease of interpretation, results from least 
square regressions are presented. However, the CSs reported below are calculated on estimates 
on both kinds of regressions. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of 
regions and years in the repeated cross-section analysis and at the level of regions in the cross-
section analysis. 
The coefficient for actual events, β1 in equation 11, captures all non-insured costs of flood 
disasters (see discussion in section 2.4.2). Therefore, we expect this coefficient to be negative. 
                                                 
30 Note that respondents’ education is not included in the vector of personal characteristics. Education is highly 
correlated with lifetime income and, therefore, likely to take away explanatory power from the income variable. 
Further, in order to translate the utility losses caused by flood disasters into monetary terms, the effect of income 
on life satisfaction per se rather than the effect of within-education variation in income is needed. However, the 
results are similar if income is controlled for. 
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The coefficient for flood exposure, β1 in equation 12, on the other hand, captures all costs of 
flood exposure for which individuals are not compensated in the housing market. While theo-
retically it could be zero, we expect it to be negative. 
4.3.2 Basic results 
The main results are presented in table 13. Columns I to III contain the results of the repeated 
cross-sections, the columns IV to VI the results of the cross-sections. The results for the con-
trol variables are similar to earlier findings in happiness research in general and estimates 
based on the EB and the GSS in particular (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005a). 
Both actual events and the level of exposure to flood hazard have a negative effect on life sat-
isfaction that is statistically significant. On average, a person living in a region that has been 
affected by a flood disaster, reports a 0.036 point lower life satisfaction on the 4-point scale 
compared to the reference group. As can be seen from columns II and III of table 13, we find 
in both sub-samples, the European and the American sub-sample, a negative effect of flood 
events on life satisfaction. Not surprisingly, given the small sample size of the American sub-
sample, in the case of the United States the coefficient is not statistically significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels of significance and the coefficient for the whole sample is 
strongly influenced by the European sub-sample. The estimate for the United States is smaller 
in absolute terms compared to the estimates for the whole sample and for Europe. Turning to 
the cross-sectional estimates, we see that the increase of a region’s flood exposure by 1 unit on 
the 10-point scale lowers life satisfaction on average by 0.02 points. A one standard deviation 
increase in flood exposure results in a loss of life satisfaction by 0.061 points. The magnitude 
of the effect of flood exposure on life satisfaction for the United States is only around 17% the 
magnitude of the effect for the whole sample and for Europe. 
Income has a positive effect on individuals’ life satisfaction that is statistically highly signifi-
cant. In the repeated cross-section analysis, the partial correlation between income and subjec-
tive well-being is 0.180 for the whole sample. This implies that reported subjective well-being 
increases by 0.125 on average if household income is doubled. Regarding the size of the dif-
ferent coefficients across different models, two aspects are noteworthy: First, in Europe, the 
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Table 13. Basic results: Effect of flood hazards on life satisfaction, 16 European countries and the United States, 1973-2004 
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI 
  Life satisfaction All countries Europe United States All countries Europe United States 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Flood hazards                   
  Flood events -0.036 ** -2.65 -0.037 ** -2.59 -0.025  -0.94          
  Flood distribution          -0.020 * -2.46 -0.021 * -2.55 -0.003 (*) -1.97 
HH income                   
  ln(HH income) 0.180 ** 50.57 0.189 ** 48.32 0.084 ** 12.29 0.308 ** 14.87 0.328 ** 14.96 0.084 ** 12.12 
  HH size1/2 -0.082 ** 17.59 -0.086 ** -17.55 -0.032 (*) -1.90 -0.215 ** -7.66 -0.226 ** -7.59 -0.033 * -2.15 
Personal characteristics                   
  Male Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Female 0.042 ** 13.34 0.042 ** 13.08 0.027 * 2.48 0.033 ** 3.91 0.033 ** 3.74 0.028 * 2.50 
  Age -0.019 ** -35.06 -0.019 ** -34.23 -0.012 ** -5.06 -0.021 ** -20.00 -0.021 ** -19.67 -0.012 ** -5.00 
  Age2 2E-4 ** 36.49 2E-4 ** 35.75 1E-4 ** 5.46 2E-4 ** 22.59 2E-4 ** 22.00 2E-4 ** 5.28 
  Single Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Married 0.079 ** 18.53 0.074 ** 17.18 0.251 ** 13.27 0.067 ** 5.53 0.065 ** 5.21 0.259 ** 14.36 
  Separated -0.225 ** -17.14 -0.231 ** 16.26 -0.112 ** -3.70 -0.200 ** -11.07 -0.209 ** -11.01 -0.116 ** -3.54 
  Divorced -0.146 ** -18.02 -0.153 ** -17.04 -0.023  -1.10 -0.109 ** -7.67 -0.110 ** -6.61 -0.018  -0.98 
  Widowed -0.097 ** -15.16 -0.096 ** -14.56 -0.072 ** -2.60 -0.099 ** -11.17 -0.095 ** -10.27 -0.066 ** -2.41 
  No children in HH Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  One child -0.003  -0.55 0.01  0.12 -0.076 ** -4.03 0.010  1.42 0.014 (*) 1.85 -0.081 ** -4.19 
  Two children 0.011 (*) 1.79 0.012 (*) 1.69 -0.038 * -2.10 0.071 ** 6.12 0.078 ** 5.65 -0.039 * -2.19 
  Three children 0.014  1.42 0.013  1.07 -0.036 (*) -1.75 0.124 ** 7.41 0.144 ** 6.90 -0.037 (*) -1.76 
  Four and more children -0.014  -0.99 -0.036 (*) -1.80 -0.050 * -2.15 0.130 ** 5.76 0.169 ** 4.89 -0.053 * -2.36 
  Employed or self-employed Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Other occupation 0.050 ** 4.12 0.072 ** 5.44 -0.122 ** -4.22 0.159 ** 6.67 0.199 ** 7.67 -0.122 ** -4.16 
  Housekeeping 0.005  1.32 0.007  1.62 -0.016  -0.81 0.048 ** 3.13 0.051 ** 3.31 -0.013  -0.67 
To be continued. 
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Table 13, part 2 
 I II III IV V VI 
 All countries Europe United States All countries Europe United States 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
  Retired 0.015 ** 2.66 0.015 ** 2.71 0.005  0.19 0.010  0.74 0.009  0.69 0.001  0.03 
  In education 0.114 ** 17.25 0.116 ** 17.10 0.030  0.83 0.136 ** 8.40 0.144 ** 8.24 0.042  1.21 
  Unemployed -0.316 ** -37.74 -0.315 ** -37.14 -0.183 ** -4.87 -0.266 ** -11.37 -0.261 ** -10.97 -0.194 ** -5.31 
  Living in rural area Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Living in a small town -0.030 ** -7.58 -0.031 ** -7.79 -0.001  -0.01 -0.050 ** -3.76 -0.053 ** -3.96 0.010  0.41 
  Living in a big town -0.081 ** -15.66 -0.082 ** -15.87 0.001  0.01 -0.129 ** -4.44 -0.132 ** -4.47 -0.056 * -2.27 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 341,748 328,610 13,138 341,748 328,610 13,138
Number of clusters 3,854 2,569 1,285 478 172 306
Prob > F   n.a.   0.000   n.a.   0.000   0.000   0.000
R2   0.186   0.186   0.121   0.100   0.102   0.098
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on level of regions and years (repeated cross-section) and on the level of regions (cross-section). 
(3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at the 90% level. 
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coefficient for income is around 70% higher in the cross-sectional compared to the combined 
cross-section and time-series analysis. As we will see below, this difference is driven by cross-
country differences. Once we control for nation specific effects, the effect of income in the 
cross-sectional analysis becomes very similar to the effect in the combined cross-section and 
time-series analysis. Second, the effect of income in the United States is around 44% of the 
estimate for Europe. It is, however, similar in the cross-section and the combined cross-section 
and time-series analysis. The coefficients for the flood variables as well as the coefficient for 
income are smaller in the American sample than the European sample. As the coefficients for 
the flood variables and for income exert countervailing effects on implicit WTP, the overall 
effect of the differences between Europe and the United States is open. Anticipating the re-
sults, implicit WTP in percent of household income for the United States is around 50% higher 
than in Europe. 
4.3.3 Robustness tests 
We perform two robustness tests. First, increased occurrence of flood disasters often afflicts 
European regions that experienced structural change and economic decline. Therefore, we in-
clude variables capturing the state of the regional economy, namely growth rates of GDP per 
capita and the unemployment rate. Because we need regional data for a large number of coun-
tries and years, the availability of other control variables is severely restricted. 
It is important to note that a decrease in the coefficient could be interpreted in two different 
ways. We can conclude that either the correlation between floods and life satisfaction is spu-
rious or, alternatively, that the macro-economic variables are intervening variables and part of 
the causal effect of floods on life satisfaction operates through contemporary macroeconomic 
shocks. As flood disasters have been shown to negatively affect economic conditions (see 
Tavares 2004; Raschky 2007), both interpretations are plausible. Second, as region-specific 
effects cannot be controlled for in the cross-section analysis, we purge the data from nation 
specific effects and focus on the within-country variation. Table 14 depicts the results of the 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Table 14. Robustness check: Effect of flood hazards on life satisfaction controlling for macro-economic variables and country effects 
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
  Life satisfaction All countries Europe United States All countries Europe United States All countries Europe 
Flood                 
  Flood events -0.037 ** -0.038 ** -0.014            
 (-2.69)  (-2.67)  (-0.50)            
  Flood distribution       -0.020 * -0.021 * -0.003 (*) 0.001  0.001  
       (-2.49)  (-2.59)  (-1.96)  (0.19)  (0.24)  
Macro-economic variables                 
  GDP per capita growth 0.139 (*) 0.127 (*) 0.723 ** -0.021  -0.020  0.715 ** 0.218 * 0.207 * 
 (1.80)  (1.64)  (3.23)  (-0.11)  (-0.10)  (3.30)  (2.31)  (2.16)  
  Unemployment growth -0.009  -0.016  -0.037  -0.125  -0.169  0.043  0.029  0.028  
 (-0.19)  (-0.27)  (-0.90)  (-1.10)  (-1.21)  (1.04)  (0.40)  (0.30)  
HH income                 
  ln(HH income) 0.183 ** 0.194 ** 0.083 ** 0.314 ** 0.336 ** 0.082 ** 0.183 ** 0.195 ** 
 (50.86)  (48.63)  (12.13)  (14.63)  (14.94)  (11.49)  (25.05)  (22.86)  
  HH size1/2 -0.085 ** -0.090 ** -0.030 (*) -0.224 ** -0.237 ** -0.030 * -0.086 ** -0.091 ** 
 (-17.82)  (-17.85)  -1.78  (-8.15)  (-8.17)  -2.01  (-13.48)  (-13.17)  
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 
Country specific effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 315,317 302,321 12,996 315,317 302,321 12,996 315,317 302,321 
Number of clusters 3,652 2,388 1,264 472 172 300 472 172 
Prob > F n.a. 0.000 n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a. n.a. 
R2 0.188 0.189 0.121 0.103 0.105 0.098 0.180 0.182 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) t-values are parentheses. (3) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on level of regions and years (repeated cross-section) and on the 
level of regions (cross-section). (4) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at the 90% level.
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The coefficients for the flood variables are robust to the inclusion of the macro-economic var-
iables. Hence, the partial correlation is neither spuriously caused by the simultaneity of eco-
nomic decline and increased exposure to flood disasters, nor are economic growth shocks an 
important channel through which flood disasters affect life satisfaction. An exception is the 
estimate for the effect of flood disasters in the United States. The effects approximately 
halves, once business cycle effects are controlled for. If the growth rate of the GDP per capita 
at the county level is replaced by the disaster adjusted growth rate of GDP per capita at the 
state level, the coefficient remains robust (coefficient: -0.024; t-value: -0.88). Therefore, we 
tend to interpret the GDP per capita growth rate as an intervening variable. As can be seen 
from the columns VII and VIII of table 14, the negative effect of the variable capturing flood 
exposure is not robust to the inclusion of nation specific fixed-effects: If country dummies are 
included, the coefficient collapses. A possible explanation for this result could be that the ef-
fect is mainly identified by between country variation on the level of flood exposure, rather 
than by within country variation. In Europe, the average within country variance is 4.5, where-
as the between country variance is 16.4. Another reason could be, of course, that individuals 
are fully compensated on housing markets for exposure of flooding (see the discussion in sec-
tion 2.4.2). Therefore, in the remainder of the chapter, we focus on the flood event rather than 
the flood hazard distribution variable. 
4.4 Implicit willingness-to-pay 
As in chapter 3, section 3.5, we can now use the estimated coefficients for flood events and 
income to calculate the implicit WTP for a reduction of flood hazard. We calculate the implicit 
WTP for (i) the prevention of one sure flood disaster and (ii) a reduction of the probability of a 
flood disaster from 2.7% to 0%, i.e. a reduction of the risk of flooding by its mean. The esti-
mates are based on the results for the whole sample presented in table 13, column 1 (and the 
corresponding ordered probit estimates). Table 15 depicts the results. 
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Table 15. WTP estimates for a reduction in the risk of flooding 
Average annual household income  $19,475
Compensating surplus Absolute In percent 
Basis: least square estimations (table 13, column I)   
  Prevention of a sure event in region $3,525 18.1% 
 ($1,203) (6.2%) 
  Decrease of annual flood probability by its mean of 0.027 $105 0.5% 
 ($39) (0.2%) 
Basis: ordered probit estimations   
  Prevention of a sure event in region $3,363 17.3% 
 ($1,178) (6%) 
  Decrease of annual flood probability by its mean of 0.027 $99 0.5% 
 ($38) (0.2%) 
Notes: (1) CS estimates are in 2004 U.S. dollars. (2) Standard errors estimated with the delta method are 
parentheses. 
The average WTP for the prevention of one sure event in the region of residence is $3,525 or 
18.1% of an average household income ($3,363 or 17.3% using the coefficients from the or-
dered probit estimates. For a reduction of the probability of flooding by its average, i.e. a re-
duction of the probability by 2.7%, an individual would be willing to pay $105 or about 0.5% 
of her annual household income ($99 or about 0.5% for the ordered probit estimates). 
In order to assess the validity of our results, we compare our results to measures derived from 
hedonic market studies (convergent validity). Several case studies for U.S. cities estimate the 
price discount for houses located in 100-year floodplains, i.e. floodplains with an annual 
chance of flooding of at least 1%. These price discounts reflect the present value of expected 
future property damages and further losses caused by flood events. The price discounts can, 
therefore, be compared to an annual CS paid in perpetuity for a reduction in the probability of 
flooding by 1%. The CS is $38.85; the equivalent surplus would be only marginally higher, 
namely $38.93. Assuming an annual interest rate of a) 1%, b) 3% and c) 5%, the correspond-
ing present values of the CS amount to a) $3,885, b) $1,295 and c) $777. 
A comparison to the figures presented in table 16 reveals that the estimates based on the life 
satisfaction approach are lower than the one based on the hedonic market approach. There are 
at least three reasons for this discrepancy. First, the price discounts presented in table 16, are 
price discounts for properties located in a floodplain with an annual risk of flooding of at least 
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Table 16. Price discounts in hedonic market studies for houses located in 100-year floodplains in the United States 
Region and period ∆ Price Average house price  Relative Source 
 Reported In 2004 US$ Reported In 2004 US$ a) ∆ Price  
Oakland, NJ; 1970 $0 $0 $30,269 $147,259 b) 0% Zimmermann (1979) 
Pequannock, NJ; 1970 $0 $0 $28,302 $137,689 b) 0% Zimmermann (1979) 
Pompton Lakes, NJ; 1970 $0 $0 $30,212 $146,982 b) 0% Zimmermann (1979) 
St. Louis, MO; 1969-1970 $684 $3,328 $15,015 $73,048  5% Mark (1980) 
Baton Rouge, LA; 1982-1984 $4,800 $8,295 $75,000 $129,612 b) 6% Shilling et al. (1985) 
Monroe, LA; 1985 $4,597 $8,073 $65,000 $114,143 d) 7% MacDonald et al. (1987) 
LaCrosse, WI; 1982-1984 $6,049 $11,001 $50,178 $91,259 b) 12% Donnelly (1989) 
Monroe, LA; 1988 $7,334 $11,712 $65,000 $103,802 d) 11% MacDonald et al. (1990) 
Fargo, ND, Moorhead, MN; 1995-1998 $8,890 $10,703 $100,139 $120,563 b) 9% Fridgen and Shultz (2004)
Alachua County, FL; 1980-1994e) $1,034 $2,371 $73,115 $167,619 b) 1% Harrison et al. (2001) 
Alachua County, FL; 1994-1999e) $2,893 $6,633 $73,115 $167,619 b) 4% Harrison et al. (2001) 
Pitt County, FL; 1992-1999f) $4,888 $5,133 $129,816 $136,322 b) 4% Bin and Polasky (2004) 
Pitt County, FL; 1999-2002f) $10,825 $11,367 $129,816 $136,322 b) 8% Bin and Polasky (2004) 
California; 1997-1998g) $0 $0 $185,779 $214,343 c) 0% Troy and Romm (2004) 
California; 1998-1999g) $7,998 $9,228 $193,453 $223,197 c) 4% Troy and Romm (2004) 
Average $5,856 $140,652  4%  
Average of positive estimates $7,986 $133,046  6%  
Notes: a) Values are deflated with the CPI for all urban consumers provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. If a hedonic market study covers a period of more than 
one year, the average CPI value of the start and end of the period is chosen. If the study controls for time specific fixed effects or a time trend, the CPI value of the 
start month or year is chosen. b) Average price of house in sample; c) price of an house with average characteristics in the non-flood area; d) price of an average home; 
e) before/after NFI Reform Act of 1994; f) before/after Hurricane Floyd of 1999; g) before/after California Natural Hazard Disclosure Law (AB 1195). 
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1%. Several properties are located in floodplains with a much higher actual risk. Second, as 
discussed in sections 2.4.2, insured property damages are not captured by the life satisfaction 
approach using combined cross-section and time-series data. Third, higher average household 
income in the United States compared to most European countries may explain part of the dis-
crepancy. Price discounts in European housing markets might well be lower. By the same to-
ken, the implicit WTP estimates for the United States based on the life satisfaction approach 
are higher than the estimates for the whole sample. The present value of the CS estimate based 
on the U.S. sample paid in perpetuity amounts to between $2,183 (with real interest rate of 
5%) and $10,913 (with a real interest rate of 1%). However, other arguments would suggest 
the CS calculated with the life satisfaction approach to exceed the one calculated with the he-
donic market approach. First, in absence of information disclosure on the risk of natural di-
sasters, these risks are insufficiently reflected in property prices, as shown by Troy and Romm 
(2004). Second, the life satisfaction approach may also capture negative effects of floods that 
cannot be averted by buying a house outside the flood zone. An example of such effects are 
the detrimental consequences of floods for community life. Although the price discounts 
found in hedonic market studies for the United States are higher than our results for the 17 
OECD countries, the fact that our estimate lies within the range of these price discounts 
strengthens confidence in the validity of our results. 
4.5 Explorative analysis: Effects of risk transfer mechanisms 
The effects of flood disasters on individual well-being also depend on the societal risk transfer 
mechanisms. The two most important risk transfer mechanisms in the area of natural hazards 
are catastrophe insurance and emergency relief or ad-hoc help. For numerous reasons, markets 
for natural hazard insurance either work imperfectly or do not exist at all (see Kunreuther 
2001; Jaffee and Russell 2003). Therefore, various countries have implemented mandatory 
insurance systems in order to correct market imperfections. Insurance payouts and financial 
compensations reduce the burden after a disaster and should thus have a dampening effect on 
the impact of a flood disaster on life satisfaction. 
In an exploratory analysis, we estimate to what extent mandatory insurance systems and emer-
gency relief attenuate negative effects of flood disasters. This question is important for several 
reasons. First, the effects of flood events presented in table 13 are a weighted average of the 
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effects of flood events for which the affected population is (partly) compensated by risk trans-
fer mechanisms and of flood events for which they are not. The following analysis allows us 
to recover the full uncompensated losses. Second, the magnitude of the attenuating effect re-
veals the relative importance of insurable property losses compared to non-insurable psychic 
costs. Third, we argue that the life satisfaction approach could be used to evaluate risk transfer 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms mitigate the adverse effect in case of a catastrophe, but impose 
an extra burden on all those who have to bear the costs. Both effects can, in principle, be 
measured in life satisfaction terms. 
Unfortunately, a direct measure exists only for the existence of a mandatory insurance system. 
Two European countries in our sample, France and Spain, have a comprehensive mandatory 
insurance system. France made catastrophe insurance mandatory in 1981, in Spain it was 
mandatory for the whole period considered here (von Ungern-Sternberg 2004). In the United 
States, we count counties participating in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
among the regions with mandatory insurance. In participating counties, insurance is available 
at a reduced premium to home-owners and mandatory for properties located in flood prone 
areas. 
Data on emergency relief are not available. Therefore, we have to use proxy measures for this 
risk transfer mechanism. Emergency relief and ad-hoc help is operationalized by a dummy 
variable for countries and years with an election at the national level. Public choice theories 
suggest that incumbents have an incentive to provide generous emergency relief in election 
years to secure their re-election. For example, in the very close German election race in 2002, 
the German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder managed to pull ahead his opponent by his decisive 
handling of the disastrous summer floods in eastern Germany and by granting large financial 
assistance to the flood victims (Schwarze, R. and Wagner 2004). Systematic evidence on the 
influence of elections is provided by Garrett and Sobel (2003) in their analysis of the determi-
nants of the generosity of disaster relief by the FEMA in the United States. Table 17 presents 
the estimated coefficients for flood events in regions without risk transfer mechanisms, for the 
direct effects of the risk transfer mechanisms and for the interaction terms of flood events and 
the risk transfer mechanisms for the whole sample and for the sub-samples. 
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Table 17. Interaction effects: Effects of flood hazards on life satisfaction under different risk transfer mechanisms 
Dependent Variable I II III IV V VI 
  Life satisfaction All countries Europe United States All countries Europe United States 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Flood hazards                   
  Flood events -0.044 ** -2.75 -0.043 ** -2.66 -0.064 (*) -1.84 -0.048 * -2.49 -0.048 * -2.45 -0.079  -0.56 
Risk Transfer Mechanisms                   
  Mandatory insurance 0.019  1.29 0.018  1.23 0.087  1.52          
  Election year          0.006  1.23 0.006  1.23 n.a.   
Interaction terms                   
  Flood · mandatory insurance 0.039  1.43 0.036  1.20 0.070  1.40          
  Flood · election year          0.030  1.28 0.029  1.18 0.057  0.40 
HH income                   
  ln(HH income) 0.180 ** 50.58 0.189 ** 48.34 0.084 ** 12.22 0.180 ** 50.61 0.189 ** 48.35 0.084 ** 12.28 
  HH size1/2 -0.082 ** -17.64 -0.086 ** -17.60 -0.032 (*) -1.88 -0.086 ** -17.56 -0.086 ** -17.56 -0.032 (*) -1.89 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 341,748 328,610 13,138 341,748 328,610 13,138
Number of clusters 3,854 2,569 1,285 3,854 2,569 1,285
Prob > F n.a. 0.000 n.a. n.a. 0.000 n.a.
R2 0.186 0.186 0.121 0.186 0.186 0.121
Marginal effect of flood disasters M.E. St. Err. M.E. St. Err. M.E. St. Err. M.E. St. Err. M.E. St. Err. M.E. St. Err.
  With risk transfer mechanisms -0.005  0.022 -0.007  0.025 0.006  0.037 -0.018  0.014 -0.019  0.016 -0.022  0.028
  Without -0.044 ** 0.016 -0.043 ** 0.016 -0.064 (*) 0.035 -0.048 ** 0.019 -0.048 ** 0.019 -0.079  0.141
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on level of regions and years (repeated cross-section) and of regions level (cross-section). (3) 
** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at the 90% level. 
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We desist from interpreting the direct effects of risk transfer mechanisms. The direct effect for 
mandatory insurance is difficult to interpret because in Europe only France changed the re-
gime. In the United States, 16% of the counties in our sample changed their NFIP participation 
status. The positive effect of participation in the NFIP might either be due to federal transfers 
or omitted variables. Obviously, election years are different from other years in other respects 
than the provision of emergency relief. For the effect of risk transfer mechanisms, we find 
neither statistically significant mitigating effects nor can we reject at conventional levels of 
significance the hypothesis that the effect of flood disasters in regions with risk transfer mech-
anisms is zero. Therefore, the results have to be interpreted tentatively. Nevertheless, they are 
illuminating. The effects of floods on life satisfaction in regions without risk transfer-mech-
anisms are persistently larger (in absolute terms) than the effect of floods in all regions. Risk 
transfer mechanisms have large attenuating effects. For example, mandatory insurance comes 
close to fully compensating the effect of a flood event. Consequently, the effects of flood 
events in regions with risk transfer mechanisms are small. As column I in table 17 shows, 
flood disasters lower life satisfaction by 0.044 points in regions without mandatory insurance, 
122% of the overall effect reported in column I of table 13. In contrast, flood disasters that hit 
regions with mandatory flood insurance, decrease reported life satisfaction only by 0.005 
points or by 11% compared to regions without mandatory insurance. The result for the Euro-
pean sub-sample is very similar (see column II of table 17). In the American sub-sample the 
compensation by the NFIP even seems to slightly overcompensate the negative effect of flood 
disasters (column III of table 17). As mandatory flood insurance, relief provided in election 
years mitigates the adverse effects of flood disasters. In the whole sample (column IV of table 
17) flood disasters occurring in non-election years lower life satisfaction by 0.048 points 
(133% of the overall effect), flood disasters occurring in election years by 0.018 points (35% 
the effect in non-election years). Again, the results for the European sub-sample are very sim-
ilar (column V of table 17). The results for the United States are even more pronounced (col-
umn VI of table 17). In the United States, flood disasters in non-election years lower life satis-
faction by 0.080 points (313% of the overall effect), while flood disasters in election years 
lower life satisfaction by only 0.023 points (28% the effect in non-election years). These re-
sults suggest that non-insurable psychic costs are small compared to property damages. Ac-
cording to our point estimates for mandatory flood insurance, they are at most 11%. This cor-
responds to the results of MacDonald, Murdoch and White (1987) and MacDonald et al. 
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(1990) who compare flood insurance premiums to price discounts found in housing markets 
for houses located in floodplains. Further, one can use the effects of flood disasters corrected 
for compensations individuals might have received from risk transfer mechanisms to calculate 
CSs. For a hypothetical reduction in the probability of flooding from 0.01 to 0, individuals in 
countries and years without a system of mandatory flood insurance would be willing to pay 
$47. The (purged) CS for a reduction in the probability of flooding by 0.01 paid in perpetuity 
lies between $946 (using an annual interest rate of 5%) and $4,729 (using an annual interest 
rate of 1%). Compared to the price discounts in the hedonic market studies reported in table 
16, the (purged) CS is still below the average price discount, but the difference is smaller. 
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5. Application to terrorism 
5.1 Introduction 
Most people take it for granted that terrorism is the major plague we are now dealing with in 
the 21st century. On a number of occasions, terrorists succeeded in inflicting massive civilian 
casualties and colossal damage, as in the case of the attacks on the World Trade Towers in 
New York on September 11, 2001, the bombings aboard four commuter trains in Madrid on 
March 11, 2004, and the bombings on the London subway on July 7, 2005. Moreover, because 
of a radicalization of Muslim minorities in many European countries, the threat of terrorism is 
growing (e.g. Economist 2007c). However, although in connection with the proliferation of 
religious terrorism the propensity for spectacular large-scale attacks increased, terrorism is not 
restricted to Islamic militants in general and al-Qaeda in particular. Rather, many countries 
were plagued by terrorist campaigns in the twentieth century. Fighters in anticolonial strug-
gles, ethnic separatist groups, revolutionary left-wing terrorists and their right-wing counter-
parts all tried to harm their opponents in order to force them to yield to their demands or 
overthrow them (see e.g. Hoffman, B. 1998; Wilkinson 2000). 
Two avenues have been pursued in the literature to assess the ramifications and consequences 
of terrorism. First, social scientists generally determine the human costs of terrorism by di-
rectly counting the victims of terrorist activity (e.g. Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999). Second, 
economic scholars usually analyze the effects terrorist acts have on various aspects of the 
economy (for a review see Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer 2007). However, both avenues ignore 
important costs of terrorism. Body counts are inept at grasping repercussion of terrorist activi-
ties beyond the immediate victims and their dependants such as the fear and terror instilled by 
acts of terrorism. Economic consequences exclude, by definition, all non-market values and 
the grief of the victims and the bereaved are disregarded as well as fear and terror. In this 
chapter, we use the life satisfaction approach to estimate the consequences for the individuals 
affected by terrorist activities in France, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
France is the Western European country with the highest number of recorded international 
terrorist incidents in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Similarly, the Northern Ireland 
conflict, beyond doubt one of the most violent conflicts in Europe’s recent history, affected 
not only Northern Ireland but also Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. 
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5.2 Terrorism: Data and pattern 
In order to capture the intensity of the terrorist activity in different regions and years, we use 
two different terrorism indicators: the number of reported terrorist attacks and the number of 
fatalities. For both France and the British Isles, the number of attacks and the number of fatal-
ities refer to one of three regions in a particular year (see section 2.4.3). In the case of France, 
the regions are Ile-de-France (including Paris), Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (including Cor-
sica) and the rest of France. In the case of the British Isles, the regions are the Republic of 
Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain. 
The first indicator of terrorism, the number of terrorist attacks, is constructed on the basis of 
the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (see e.g. Hoffman, B. and 
Hoffman 1995; made publicly available by the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for 
the Prevention of Terrorism on its homepage (www.mipt.org)), the TWEED – Terrorism in 
Western Europe: Event Data-project (see Engene 2007) and statistics on the Security Related 
Incidents in Northern Ireland provided by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI; 
www.psni.police.uk). The fatalities variable is constructed on the basis of the RAND-data and 
a comprehensive list of deaths resulting from the conflict in Northern Ireland; the list has been 
compiled by Sutton (1994) and updated by the Conflict Archive on the Internet 
(www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). 
In the case of France, both the incident variable and the fatalities variable are entirely con-
structed on the basis of the RAND-data. Every reported incident contains a short description 
with – in the majority of cases – the exact location of the incident. This allows us to assign the 
incidents (and fatalities) to a particular region (only 16 incidents cannot be attributed to a re-
gion in the case of the United Kingdom and 11 in the case of France). The RAND-data are 
restricted to international terrorism. However, international terrorism is broadly defined and 
includes attacks by Corsican and Northern Irish separatist groups in France and Great Britain, 
as well as attacks by domestic terrorist groups whenever foreigners are involved. In France, 
for example, several attacks are recorded for which the Action Directe (AD) claimed credit, 
especially in the mid 1980s when the AD tried to ally themselves with the German Rote Armee 
Fraktion (RAF). In the same category fall also some rather bizarre attacks such as attacks on 
international computer firms by the Comité Liquidant ou Détournant les Ordinateurs (Com-
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mittee for Liquidation of Computers, CLODO) or the bombing of gas pipelines by the Comité 
d'Action Viticole (Action Committee of Winegrowers, CAV). But also many state-sponsored 
terrorist activities took place on French territory. An example is the murder of the former Ira-
nian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in 1991 by a hit-squad which, according to the 
French investigating judge, was carried out under the direct orders of the Iranian regime 
(Wilkinson 2000, p. 66). Furthermore, France was plagued with the spillover of Basque terror-
ism into France, the spillover of activities by the Groupe Islamic Armée (GIA) and other inci-
dents related to the Middle East. Although international terrorism plays an important role in 
France and although international terrorism is broadly defined, the RAND-data do not reflect 
the terror situation in France to the whole extent. For the years in our sample, the TWEED-
data, focusing on domestic terrorism, record 2,463 incidents; the RAND-data, in contrasts, 
record only 506 incidents. Because the TWEED-data contain no information on the geo-
graphical location of an incident, in the case of France, the RAND-data cannot be supple-
mented with the TWEED-data. For France, the following analysis rests on the assumption that 
either it is mainly the international terrorist attacks that have negative effects on life satisfac-
tion (probably because they are more severe) or that international terrorist attacks reflect the 
pattern and evolution of terrorism more generally. The former conjecture is supported by the 
fact that international attacks are indeed more often fatal than domestic attacks. Although the 
RAND-data contain fewer incidents compared to the TWEED-data, more fatalities are re-
corded (147 in the RAND-data compared to 111 in the TWEED-data). The latter conjecture is 
supported by a relatively high correlation between the RAND-data and the TWEED-data. The 
correlation coefficient for the number of incidents is 0.67, the correlation coefficient for the 
number of fatalities is 0.80. Figures 6 and 7 depict the annual number of attacks and the an-
nual number of fatalities, respectively, for Paris, the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur and 
the rest of France separately. 
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In Paris and the rest of France, the number of attacks is decreasing over the whole period; in 
the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur the number of attacks peaks in the second half of the 
1980s. Compared to the other regions, Paris experienced around the fourfold number of ter-
rorist attacks. 
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The number of fatalities is decreasing in all three regions of France, in the rest of France espe-
cially since the mid-1980s; again, most deaths occurred in Paris. 
 
The RAND-data are also an important building block in constructing the terrorism variables 
for the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. A large fraction of reported incidents in 
Great Britain are related to the Northern Ireland conflict, the “Troubles”, and were committed 
by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and to a lesser extent by the Irish National 
Liberation Army (INLA). In 1972, the PIRA moved their bombing campaign to Great Britain. 
The first of many sporadic, but mostly spectacular, PIRA attacks was a bomb planted at Al-
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dershot military barracks killing seven and wounding five, two of whom subsequently died. A 
comparison of the RAND-data to the comprehensive list of fatalities compiled by Sutton 
(1994) shows that most attacks related to the Troubles that have been perpetrated in Great 
Britain are recorded in the RAND-data: 87% of the persons killed in Great Britain and re-
corded on Sutton’s (1994) list can also be found in the RAND-data. Moreover, the fraction of 
87% even underestimates the congruence for fatal attacks because, in contrast to the RAND-
data, Sutton’s (1994) list also contains terrorists who died in premature bomb explosions, po-
litical activists that died in hunger strikes and people who died in the aftermath of an attack. 
As an example, the RAND-data record a bomb attack on March 27th, 1976, in a crowded exhi-
bition hall in London that injured over 80 persons but killed no one, at least not immediately; 
Sutton’s (1994) list, on the other hand, contains a woman who died on April 17th, 1976, three 
weeks after being injured in a bomb attack on an exhibition hall in London. Without question, 
both observations relate to the same event. Thus, the RAND-data adequately capture Northern 
Irish terrorism in Great Britain. The same seems to be the case for the low-scale campaign of 
Welsh separatist groups such as the Meibion Glyndwr. While we are confident about the com-
pleteness of the RAND-data for Great Britain, the RAND-data are clearly deficient for North-
ern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Only 3% of the persons on Sutton’s (1994) list killed 
in Northern Ireland and only 13% of the persons on Sutton’s (1994) list killed in the Republic 
of Ireland are recorded in the RAND-data. Therefore, for the Republic of Ireland, we supple-
ment the RAND-data with the TWEED-data. The TWEED-data record a good deal of North-
ern Ireland-related acts perpetrated in the Republic. In order to avoid double-counting of acts, 
we exclude all acts that are already recorded in the RAND-data by comparing information on 
the date, perpetrator, target etc. of the acts in the two datasets. The two datasets thus combined 
contain 26% of the persons in Sutton’s (1994) list. Again, the 26% underestimate the true con-
gruence for fatal attacks because a large fraction of persons on Sutton’s (1994) list are victims 
of feuds between paramilitary groups, neutralized informers, abductees, or persons shot in 
armed robberies. For Northern Ireland itself, we use statistics on the number of incidents pro-
vided by the PSNI. Because the RAND-data are essentially useless for Northern Ireland and 
because the PSNI-data contain only the annual number of incidents without further informa-
tion on individual incidents, we completely replace the RAND-data by the PSNI-data for 
Northern Ireland. Figure 8 depicts the annual number of terrorist attacks for the Republic of 
Ireland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
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In the Republic of Ireland, no clear pattern is visible. In Great Britain, the number of attacks 
peaks in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s. Measured in the number of attacks, the 
climax of violence in Northern Ireland was up to 1976 (or, alternatively, 1977). By far the 
most attacks were perpetrated in Northern Ireland; the number of attacks is around 960 times 
higher compared to Ireland and around 80 times higher compared to Great Britain. In Figure 8, 
Notes: For Great Britain, the bars above partition denote attacks not related to the ‘Troubles’.
Source: RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, provided by MIPT 
(www.mipt.org), Sutton (1994) and an updated version of the Sutton index provided by CAIN 
Web Service (www.cain.ulst.ac.uk), and statistics provided by the PSNI (www.psni.police.uk).
Figure 8. Number of terrorist attacks in the U.K. and Ireland, 1975-2002
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the part of the bars for Great Britain above the partitions represents the number of attacks that 
are not related to the Northern Ireland conflict. 
For the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, the variable on the number of fatalities is 
constructed on the basis of the RAND-data and Sutton’s (1994) list. The latter is not restricted 
to terrorism in particular, but includes political violence in general. Though the PIRA was al-
ways the highest taker of life, killing civilians, security forces and prison staff, the UDA and 
UVF were also very active; the interaction between these groups is generally referred to as 
sectarian ‘tit-for-tat’ exchanges (McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 109-110). Feuds, such as the 
ones between the Provisional and Official IRA in 1975 and between the UDA and UVF in 
2000, as well as hunger strikes on the part of imprisoned IRA members in 1981, added to the 
death toll. On the other hand, a considerable number died at the hand of security forces. 
British paratroopers killed 14 demonstrators on the Bloody Sunday of 1972, British intelli-
gence played a part in the Dublin and Monaghan bombing in 1974, and the army’s undercover 
SAS regiment staged ambushes in which IRA members – and innocent bystanders – were 
shot, to name but a few examples. Sutton’s (1994) list is one of the most comprehensive pub-
lished records on the deaths in the Troubles; it excludes only deaths indirectly due to the 
Troubles such as those caused by army vehicles and heart attacks (see Fay, Morrissey and 
Smyth 1999, pp. 125-132, for a comparison of different lists). In combining the RAND-data 
and Sutton’s (1994) list, we use again the detailed information on the attacks in order to avoid 
double-counting of attacks. Deaths from attacks not related to the Northern Ireland conflict are 
limited to Great Britain (part of the bars for Great Britain in Figure 9 above partition) and oc-
cur neither in the Republic of Ireland nor Northern Ireland. The deaths are in large part related 
to spillover terrorism from the Middle East. The annual number of fatalities for the Republic 
of Ireland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland is shown in Figure 9. 
In the Republic of Ireland, the number of fatalities is decreasing; in Great Britain, no clear 
trend is visible, except for a small peak in the second half of the 1980s. Even more pro-
nounced than with the number of attacks, the number of fatalities in Northern Ireland plum-
meted in 1977. Nevertheless, the number of fatalities remained high for the whole period un-
der consideration. This corresponds to the observations of McKittrick and McVea (2001, p. 
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133) that 1977 “was a true turning-point in that violence fell dramatically, and would never 
again rise to the scale experienced in the 1971-76 period.” As with the number of attacks, 
Northern Ireland has the largest death toll, with between around 20 and 75 times the number 
of fatalities compared to Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, respectively. 
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Figure 9. Number of fatalities in the U.K. and Ireland, 1975-2002
Notes: For Great Britain, the bars above partition denote attacks not related to the ‘Troubles’.
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5.3 Effects on life satisfaction 
5.3.1 Data and empirical strategy 
As in chapter 4, the EB is our data source for the individual-level data with information on 
people’s life satisfaction and household income. The sample period runs from 1973 to 2002. 
Observations from south-east France in 1987 and 1990 are excluded because they cannot be 
properly assigned to the different regions. Similarly, observations from the year 1973 are not 
included in the estimations for the British Isles because the Northern Irish sub-sample is in-
cluded in the sample of Great Britain. As in chapter 4, respondents below age 15 are excluded. 
The sample of the baseline regressions contains a total of 100,382 observations for which a 
complete set of data for the main variables is available. The number of observations is 30,244 
for Great Britain, 7,891 for Northern Ireland, 24,185 for the Republic of Ireland, and 38,062 
for France. 
We use the same life satisfaction and income variables as in the European sample of chapter 4. 
We also use a nearly identical set of personal characteristics as control variables. Minor devi-
ations in the set of control variables between the two chapters can be explained by the fact that 
we had to combine two different datasets in chapter 4. Based on the data set described, we 
estimate micro-econometric happiness functions of the following form: 
(13) LSirt = β0 + β1Trt + β2ln(mirt) + β3Zirt + ρr + τt + εirt, 
where, as usual, LSirt is the life satisfaction of an individual i living in region r at time t, Trt, 
the level of terrorist activity, mirt the individual’s household income, Zirt other personal char-
acteristics and ρr and τt region and time fixed effects, respectively. Analogous to previous 
chapters, we use a robust estimator of variance, because random disturbances are potentially 
correlated within groups or clusters, here cross-sectional units for a specific year. We estimate 
equation 13 by least squares and ordered probit regressions but report intermediate results only 
for the former. 
5.3.2 Basic results 
As can be seen from table 18, terrorism negatively affects people’s self-reported life satisfac-
tion in a sizeable and statistically significant way. An increase in one standard deviation in the 
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Table 18. Basic results: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction, U.K., Ireland and France, 1973-2002 
 To be continued. 
 U.K. and Ireland France 
Dependent Variable I II III IV 
Life satisfaction Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Terrorism             
  Incidents -7.6E-5 ** -3.90    -2.2E-3 ** -2.74    
  Fatalities    -6.4E-4 ** -3.45    -5.0E-3 * -2.50 
HH income             
  ln(HH income) 0.168 ** 19.12 0.167 ** 19.03 0.250 ** 20.29 0.250 ** 20.23 
  HH size1/2 -0.095 ** -7.84 -0.094 ** -7.77 -0.160 ** -12.13 -0.160 ** -12.09 
Personal characteristics             
  Male Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Female 0.081 ** 11.82 0.081 ** 11.80 0.033 ** 3.85 0.033 ** 3.87 
  Age -0.016 ** -12.24 -0.016 ** -12.32 -0.022 ** -12.33 -0.022 ** -12.33 
  Age2 2.E-4 ** 14.41 2.E-4 ** 14.48 2.E-4 ** 12.04 2.E-4 ** 12.05 
  Single Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Married 0.079 ** 6.29 0.079 ** 6.31 0.057 ** 4.10 0.057 ** 4.09 
  Living together 0.002  0.09 0.001  0.07 0.022  1.44 0.022  1.44 
  Separated -0.277 ** -9.45 -0.277 ** -9.42 -0.179 ** -4.99 -0.179 ** -5.00 
  Divorced -0.209 ** -8.99 -0.209 ** -8.98 -0.146 ** -6.20 -0.147 ** -6.22 
  Widowed -0.099 ** -5.89 -0.099 ** -5.91 -0.105 ** -4.76 -0.106 ** -4.78 
  No children in HH Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  One child -0.025 (*) -1.74 -0.025 (*) -1.73 0.012  0.64 0.012  0.62 
  Two children -0.016  -0.96 -0.016  -0.97 0.061 * 2.56 0.060 * 2.53 
  Three children -0.023  -0.87 -0.023  -0.88 0.076 * 2.58 0.075 * 2.56 
  Four and more children -0.025  -0.94 -0.025  -0.96 -0.081  -1.21 -0.082  -1.22 
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Table 18, part 2 
 U.K. and Ireland France 
 I II III IV 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
  Employed or self-employed Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Other occupation 0.130 ** 6.85 0.130 ** 6.84 0.239 ** 9.81 0.239 ** 9.82 
  Housekeeping -0.038 ** -3.55 -0.038 ** -3.55 0.061 ** 4.79 0.061 ** 4.78 
  Retired -0.002  -0.16 -0.002  -0.15 0.152 ** 7.17 0.152 ** 7.16 
  Unemployed -0.411 ** -18.83 -0.410 ** -18.80 -0.202 ** -8.35 -0.202 ** -8.35 
  Living in rural area Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group 
  Living in small towns -0.051 ** -5.27 -0.051 ** -5.26 -0.065 ** -5.66 -0.066 ** -5.68 
  Living in a big town -0.120 ** -11.90 -0.120 ** -11.91 -0.078 ** -6.03 -0.078 ** -6.10 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   62,320   62,320   38,062   38,062
Number of clusters   75   75   76   76
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
R2  0.079  0.079   0.074   0.074
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) 
at the 90% level. 
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number of recorded incidents, i.e. an increase of 154.03 incidents in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland and an increase of 5.59 incidents in France, lowers life satisfaction by 0.012 and 0.013 
points, respectively, on the 4-point scale. An increase in one standard deviation in the number 
of recorded fatalities, an increase in the number of fatalities by 14.42 in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland and by 1.78 in France, lowers life satisfaction by 0.009 points in both countries. 
These are large effects, indicating that a reduction of the terrorist threat by one standard devi-
ation is equivalent to between 0.9 and 1.3 percent of the population of France and the British 
Isles moving from, for example, not very satisfied [2] to fairly satisfied [3] with the life they 
lead. Household income has, again, a positive effect on life satisfaction that is highly statisti-
cally significant. The partial correlations between log of income and life satisfaction are com-
parable to the estimates for the European sample (e.g. table 13); it is 0.168 for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland and around 0.250 for France. Thus, when income is doubled, on aver-
age, a 0.116 points higher life satisfaction is reported in the United Kingdom and Ireland, and 
a 0.173 points higher life satisfaction in France. 
For the estimates in table 18, the cross-section variance is based on three regions per country 
(see sections 2.4.3 and 5.2). However, the EB-data allow identification based on a higher res-
olution of the life satisfaction and terrorism data. For the British Isles, 13 regions can be dif-
ferentiated: the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the eight Standard 
Statistical Regions of England and Greater London. For France the data can be disaggregated 
on the level of the 21 régions of continental France (incl. Corsica). Based on this higher reso-
lution data, the coefficient for the number of incidents decreases by 1.4% to -7.5E-5 (t-value: 
-3.90) in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland and by 19.7% to -1.8E-3 (t-value: -2.74) 
in the case of France; the coefficient for the number of fatalities decreases by 1.3% to -6.3E-4 
(t-value: -3.89) in the case of United Kingdom and Ireland and by 25.4% to -3.7E-3 (t-value: 
-1,83) in the case of France.31 Thus, highly disaggregated data persistently yield smaller esti-
mates. This is consistent with the notion that terrorism has important spillovers across regional 
boundaries. 
  
                                                 
31 Note that it is not possible to directly compare the t-values. Because robust standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering on region and year level, we have fewer degrees of freedom in the estimates based on the supra-
regional level. 
 124
5.3.3 Robustness tests and extensions 
We modify the baseline regressions in three respects. On the one hand, these modifications 
allow us to check the validity and plausibility of the results. On the other hand, the modifica-
tions provide further insights regarding the effect of terrorism on life satisfaction. First, we 
analyze the sensitivity of the estimates to the exclusion of individual region-year combina-
tions. Second, we include variables capturing the economic situation, more precisely the 
growth rate of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate, in order to address issues of si-
multaneity. Including these macro-economic variables also allows us to determine whether 
terrorism affects life satisfaction through simultaneous effects on the economy. Third, as a 
further test to rule out a spurious effect of terrorism on life satisfaction, we interact terrorism 
with dummy variables for sub-groups of the population that are expected to suffer dispropor-
tionately from terrorism. In this way, the relatively insensitive group controls for other simul-
taneous and spatially coincident shocks. 
(i) In 1982, an unprecedented number of 66 terrorist attacks took place in Paris, a number 
never reached in subsequent years (see figure 6). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, recorded fa-
talities in the years 1975 and 1976 greatly outnumbered the fatalities of subsequent years (see 
figure 9). In order to investigate whether the negative correlation between terrorism and life 
satisfaction is largely driven by such observations, we repeatedly run the regressions reported 
in table 18 excluding in each round the observations for one region-year combination. For the 
United Kingdom and Ireland, the coefficient for the number of incidents varies between 
-6.2E-5 (t-value: -3.89) and -9.1E-5 (t-value: -4.98). Compared to the point estimate for the 
whole sample, the deviations are below ±20%. The coefficient for the number of fatalities 
varies between -5.0E-4 (t-value: -3.73) and -8.2E-4 (t-value: -3.86) or +22% and -28% com-
pared to the whole sample. The coefficient for the number of incidents in France is less robust: 
it varies between -1.9E-3 (t-value: -3.32), a relative deviation of 14%, and -4.5E-3 (t-value: 
-2.98), a relative deviation of -105%. This lower bound is estimated if the observations for 
Paris in 1982 are excluded, i.e. the region and year with the highest number of attacks in 
France. The coefficient for the number of fatalities in France varies between -3.9E-3 (t-value: 
-1.83) and -6.0E-3 (t-value: -3.19), relative deviations of +30% and -20%. Except for the num-
ber of incidents in France and although there are clearly influential observations, the coeffi-
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cients are thus relatively stable. All estimates of the effect of terrorism on life satisfaction are 
comfortably negative. 
(ii) One might expect the negative correlation between terrorism and life satisfaction to be 
spurious because the state of the economy may be (negatively) correlated with the intensity of 
terrorist campaigns. If a high level of terrorist activity is accompanied by slackening of the 
economy, people may report lower life satisfaction because they fear job losses rather than 
terrorist attacks. Such a negative relationship between economic and terrorist activity is prob-
able and can be due to two different causal processes. One the one hand, bad economic condi-
tions and high levels of unemployment may facilitate the recruitment of rank and file activists. 
On the other hand, terrorism may dampen economic activity. 
McKittrick and McVea (2001, p. 28) presume the first causal relationship for Northern Ireland 
when writing that “[i]t is scarcely a coincidence that some of the areas which featured promi-
nently in the troubles […] were among those where […] high unemployment persisted.” How-
ever, neither micro-level nor macro-level studies find evidence in support of this causal direc-
tion. Analyzing the characteristics of members of Israeli extremists, the Hezbollah, Hamas and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi (2003) find that poverty 
does not increase the propensity to participate in terrorism. If anything, terrorists, including 
suicide bombers, come from the ranks of the better off in society. Opinion polls conducted in 
the West Bank and Gaza strip find little evidence to suggest that deteriorating economy in-
creases support for terrorism. Time-series analyses fail to find a significant relationship be-
tween terrorism and GDP growth in Israel (Berrebi 2003; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). For 
Spain, time-series data for the tourism industry and terrorism indicate that terrorism affects 
tourism, but not the reverse (Enders and Sandler 1991). Finally, according to cross-country 
studies, poverty does not increase terrorism risk as assessed by an international risk agency 
(Abadie 2006) or as reflected in the number of international terrorist attacks (Piazza 2006), nor 
do perpetrators predominantly stem from poor countries (Krueger and Laitin 2003). In sum, 
contrary to popular opinion, the preponderance of evidence suggests that there is no economic 
foundation for terrorism. Moreover, in the case of international terrorism, perpetrators mostly 
stem from abroad. Economic conditions in the target region are therefore unlikely to influence 
the amount of terrorism. 
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The other causal connection is better documented. Over the last few years, economic scholars 
have provided evidence for adverse effects of terrorism on various sectors of the economy and 
on overall economic activity (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; see Frey, Luechinger and 
Stutzer 2007 for a review). Panel data estimates of the determinants of investment and em-
ployment in the Northern Ireland manufacturing sector indicate that variations in the intensity 
of political conflict have a large and significant impact on economic activity (Fielding 2003). 
A 20% increase in the number of fatalities reduced investment in machinery and equipment by 
about 5.6% in equilibrium and construction investment by about 4.5%; the short-term reduc-
tions in investment to a one-period increase in the number of fatalities by one standard-devia-
tion is well over 25%. The effects for employment are less pronounced and are sensitive to the 
data used. 
In order to control for the potential simultaneity between high levels of political violence and 
the slackening of the economy and in order to see whether part of the negative effect of ter-
rorism on life satisfaction works through contemporaneous effects on economic activity, we 
include the growth rate of GDP per capita and the unemployment rate as additional control 
variables in the micro-econometric life satisfaction functions. We are confident that these two 
variables are able to adequately capture the general economic situation; the need for data 
which are regionally disaggregated and date back several decades strongly restricts availability 
of further data. The data for France are only available since 1976. Table 19 presents the re-
sults. 
Coefficients for both indicators of terrorism remain of similar magnitude and statistical signif-
icance when business cycle effects are controlled for. Most coefficients even slightly increase. 
In the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, the coefficient for the number of incidents in-
creases by 5%, the coefficient for the number of fatalities by 19%. In the case of France, the 
coefficient for the number of incidents increases by 9%, an increase of 3% is due to the change 
in the sample, an increase of 6% due to the inclusion of the macro-economic variables. The 
coefficient for the number of fatalities remains constant because the change due to the change 
in the sample and the change due to the inclusion of the macro-economic variables offset each 
other; the former amounts to -4%, the latter to +4%. Thus, neither does the course of the econ-
omy spuriously cause the negative correlation between terrorism and life satisfaction, nor are 
contemporaneous economic effects of terrorism an important channel through which terrorism 
affects life satisfaction. 
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Table 19. Robustness check: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction controlling for macro-economic variables 
 U.K. and Ireland France 
Dependent Variable I II III IV 
Life satisfaction Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Terrorism             
  Incidents -8.0E-5 ** -4.49    -2.4E-3 ** -3.12    
  Fatalities    -7.6E-4 ** -4.07    -5.0E-3 ** -2.64 
Macro-economic variables             
  GDP per capita growth 0.719 * 2.01 0.791 * 2.10 0.378  0.93 0.324  0.80 
  Unemployment rate growth -0.071 (*) -1.71 -0.073 (*) -1.70 -0.041  -0.57 -0.043  -0.59 
HH income             
  ln(HH income) 0.168 ** 18.98 0.168 ** 18.89 0.252 ** 20.89 0.252 ** 20.81 
  HH size1/2 -0.094 ** -7.97 -0.093 ** -7.87 -0.163 ** -12.23 -0.163 ** -12.18 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations   62,320   62,320   34,529   34,529
Number of clusters   75   75   70   70
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
R2  0.080  0.080  0.075  0.075
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. (3) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) 
at the 90% level. 
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The region-specific macro-economic variables have the expected effect on life satisfaction, but 
only in the sample for the British Isles in a statistically significant way. 
(iii) We estimate differentiated effects of terrorism on life satisfaction for different sub-groups 
as an additional means to address potential simultaneity problems. If terrorism is found to af-
fect different groups differently in a way that corresponds to prior expectations, this enhances 
our confidence that the estimated correlations are not caused by simultaneous and spatially 
coincident shocks. Unlike terrorism, these shocks have the same effect on all sub-groups. The 
problem with this approach is to find groups that are likely to suffer disproportionately from 
terrorism. Terrorist attacks kill people indiscriminately and unpredictably. Bombs exploding 
on the Paris metro or wrecking crowded pubs in Birmingham kill people from all walks of life. 
In Northern Ireland, people were killed randomly in so-called “doorstep killings” whereby 
victims were shot on answering the door. Even wider is the circle of the bereaved. Thus, al-
though a majority of the victims of the Northern Ireland conflict were male and young (Fay, 
Morrissey and Smyth 1999, pp. 161-163), we do not find larger effects of terrorism for these 
groups, probably because they are under-represented among the bereaved. 
We identify three sub-groups. First, we hypothesize that respondents living in rural areas are 
less affected than respondents living in towns and cities. Terrorists often strike in cities in or-
der to increase the death toll and secure media attention. In Northern Ireland, some scholars 
distinguish a “rural war” from other types of conflicts. This war was fought between the pro-
tagonists themselves and resulted in a remarkably different profile of victims: “[…] a high 
proportion of casualties were members of the security forces who did not live in the area” 
(Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, p. 143). Therefore, fear, empathy and grief are expected to 
be lower among rural residents. Second, social psychology suggests that religiousness plays an 
outstanding role in the list of factors that help to cope with the threat of terrorism (Peterson 
and Seligman 2003; Fischer et al. 2006). Hence, we expect self-reported agnostics and atheists 
to suffer more from terrorism. Finally, in the case of Northern Ireland, Catholics were at 
greater risk in both absolute and relative terms (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, p. 165). The 
results are reported in table 20. Because the information on the type of living area and reli-
gious denomination is not included in all waves of the EB, table 20 also contains the effect of 
terrorism on life satisfaction for the whole population in the respective sub-sample. 
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Table 20. Interaction effects: Effect of terrorism on life satisfaction for different groups 
Dependent Variable U.K. and Ireland France 
Life satisfaction I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Terrorism                 
  Incidents -8.0E-5 ** -9.8E-5 **     -2.0E-3 * -2.1E-3 *     
 (-3.90)  (-4.05)      (-2.50)  (-2.51)      
  Fatalities     -6.9E-4 ** -9.1E-4 **     -4.7E-3 * -5.0E-3 * 
     (-3.45)  (-4.31)      (-2.26)  (-2.41)  
Sub-group of interest                 
  Living in rural area 0.057 ** 0.053 ** 0.057 ** 0.052 ** 0.052 ** 0.045 ** 0.052 ** 0.050 ** 
 (9.37)  (8.28)  (9.38)  (8.11)  (7.54)  (4.73)  (7.56)  (5.84)  
Interaction terms                 
  Living in rural area · terror   3.8E-5 *   4.6E-4 *   1.9E-3    1.9E-3  
   (2.24)    (2.48)    (1.20)    (0.75)  
HH income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 55,137  55,137  55,137  55,137  31,412  31,412  31,412  31,412  
Number of clusters 63  63  63  63  61  61  61  61  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
R2 0.084  0.084  0.084  0.084  0.077  0.077  0.077  0.077  
Marginal effect of terror for                 
  Reference group   -9.8E-5 **   -9.1E-4 **   -2.1E-3 *   -5.0E-3 * 
  Sub-group of interest   -6.0E-5 **   -4.5E-4 *   -2.2E-4    -3.1E-3  
To be continued. 
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Table 20, part 2 
Dependent Variable U.K. and Ireland France 
Life satisfaction IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI 
Terrorism                 
  Incidents -9.8E-5 ** -9.8E-5 **     -5.9E-3 * -3.3E-3      
 (-3.88)  (-3.91)      (-2.42)  (-1.17)      
  Fatalities     -7.9E-04 ** -7.9E-04 **     -6.1E-03  -2.0E-03  
     (-3.87)  (-3.89)      (-1.42)  (-0.45)  
Sub-group of interest                 
  Agnostic -0.053 ** -0.050 ** -0.052 ** -0.048 ** -0.083 ** -0.052 * -0.083 ** -0.072 ** 
 (-6.09)  (-5.62)  (-5.92)  (-5.21)  (-4.48)  (-2.49)  (-4.48)  (-3.91)  
Interaction terms                 
  Agnostic · terror   -4.0E-05    -4.2E-04    -7.6E-03 *   -1.1E-02 (*) 
   (-1.04)    (-0.79)    (-2.50)    (-1.77)  
HH income Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 34,875  34,875  34,875  34,875  21,088  21,088  21,088  21,088  
Number of clusters 45  45  45  45  47  47  47  47  
Prob > F n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
R2 0.084  0.084  0.083  0.083  0.075  0.076  0.075  0.075  
Marginal effect of terror for                 
  Reference group   -9.8E-05 **   -7.9E-04 **   -3.3E-03    -2.0E-03  
  Sub-group of interest   -1.4E-04 **   -1.2E-03 *   -1.1E-02 **   -1.3E-02 (*) 
To be continued. 
 131
Table 20, part 3 
Dependent Variable U.K. and Ireland 
Life satisfaction XVII XVIII 
Terrorism     
  Incidents -9.5E-5 **   
 (-3.40)    
  Fatalities   -7.5E-04 ** 
   (-3.44)  
Sub-group of interest     
  Catholic -0.004  0.000  
 (-0.37)  (0.00)  
Interaction terms     
  Catholic · terror -1.3E-5  -2.1E-4  
 (-0.74)  (-1.04)  
HH income Yes Yes 
Personal characteristics Yes Yes 
Region specific effects Yes Yes 
Year specific effects Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
Number of observations 34,875  34,875  
Number of clusters 45  45  
Prob > F n.a.  n.a.  
R2 0.084  0.083  
Marginal effect of terror for     
  Reference group -9.5E-05 ** -7.5E-04 ** 
  Sub-group of interest -1.1E-04 ** -9.6E-04 ** 
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. (2) t-values are in parentheses. (3) 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within regions per year. 
(4) ** is significant at the 99% level, * at the 95% level, and (*) at 
the 90% level. 
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As can be seen from table 20, the estimates are consistent with the hypotheses. The effect of 
terrorism for people living in rural areas is only between one half and two thirds of the size of 
the effect for people living urban areas; for the number of incidents in France it vanishes al-
most entirely. According to all models, agnostics are more heavily affected by terrorism than 
their religious counterparts, in the United Kingdom and Ireland by a factor of 1.5, in France by 
a factor of 3.3 to 6.5. Finally, Catholics suffer more from political violence in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, although the difference is less pronounced compared to the other differ-
entiations. 
5.4 Implicit willingness-to-pay 
WTP estimates are presented for people living in regions prone to terrorism. Specifically, we 
calculate the hypothetical WTP for residents of Paris and Northern Ireland for a reduction in 
the number of incidents and the number of fatalities to bring them on a par with the rest of 
France (except for the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur) and the rest of Great Britain re-
spectively. All CSs are calculated for an individual with the average annual household income. 
The results reported in table 21 are based on coefficients from least square estimations (table 
18) and from ordered probit estimations. 
Table 21. WTP estimates for a reduction in terrorism 
 U.K. and Ireland, 1975-1998 France, 1973-1998 
Average annual household income $20,501  $26,067
Reduction of terrorism 1,022.76 acts 77.04 deaths 9.58 acts 2.16 deaths
Basis: least square estimations (table 18) 
  Compensating surplus (CS) $7,641
($891)
$5,252
($892)
$2,149 
($683) 
$1,099
($413)
  CS in percent of income 37.3%
(4.3%)
25.6%
(4.4%)
8.2% 
(2.6%) 
4.2%
(1.6%)
Basis: ordered probit estimations 
  Compensating surplus (CS) $7,877 
($864)
5,454$
($ 918)
$1,948 
($704) 
$1,050
($437)
  CS in percent of income 38.4% 
(4.2%)
26.6%
(4.5%)
7.5% 
(2.7%) 
4.0%
(1.7%)
Notes: (1) CS is calculated for residents of Paris and of Northern Ireland for a reduction in the level of terrorism to 
level prevailing in the more peaceful parts of the respective countries. (2) CS estimates are in 2004 U.S. dollars. (3) 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (1000 replications). 
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According to the results shown in table 21, for a reduction in terrorist activity to a level that 
prevails in the more peaceful parts of the country, a resident of Northern Ireland would be 
willing to pay between 37% (if terrorism is measured by the number of incidents) and 26% (if 
terrorism is measured by the number of fatalities) of his or her income. A resident of Paris 
would be willing to forego between 8% (if terrorism is measured by the number of incidents) 
and 4% (number of fatalities) of his or her income. As can be seen from table 21, ordered 
probit estimations produce similar results; the respective numbers are 38%, 27%, 8% and 4%. 
Table 21 reports not only the point estimates but also the respective standard errors of the CS 
estimates. Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 1,000 repetitions taking into account that 
the CS is calculated based on the ratio of two estimated variables. According to the standard 
errors and the respective confidence intervals, we cannot reject that the two terrorism indica-
tors, number of fatalities and number of incidents, generate the same results. For a resident of 
Northern Ireland, the 95% confidence interval of the CS for a reduction in the number of fa-
talities runs from 17% to 34%, the confidence interval for a reduction in the number of inci-
dents from 29% to 46%. For France, the respective 95% confidence intervals are 1% to 7% 
and 3% to 13%. Hence, the CS estimates for France are significantly lower than the CS esti-
mates for the British Isles. 
We now put the main results for the CSs into perspective. The result for France, on the one 
hand, is comparable to the compensations which Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) identi-
fied on the labor and housing market in the United States for individuals living in the county 
with the highest rate of violent crime vis à vis individuals living in the county with the least 
crime. The compensation in Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) amounts to $2,267 (in 1980 
U.S. dollars), or to 11% of the annual household income. 
The result for Northern Ireland, on the other hand, reflects the ferocity of the conflict. The 
number of incidents and fatalities depicted in figure 8 and 9 gives a sense of this ferocity. Fay, 
Morrissey and Smyth (1999, p. 204) estimate that around two thirds of the Northern Irish 
population live in households where someone has been injured in a conflict related incident; 
the number of around 30,000 republican and loyalist ex-prisoners illustrates how deeply so-
ciety was permeated by paramilitarism (McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 150). In addition, 
curfews, rigorous house-to-house searches and large-scale riots accompanied the worst times 
of the conflict. The statements of two senior policemen summarize the situation: “The country 
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stared into the face of great difficulty and crept right to the edge of the abyss,” and “We were 
on the brink of all-out civil war” (cited in McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 211). 
Given the ferocity of this conflict and our high estimate of a CS, one might wonder why no 
mass exodus out of Northern Ireland was observed. One reason might be that residents of 
Northern Ireland got indeed massively compensated for living in Northern Ireland: Without 
invoking a direct relationship to the figures presented in table 21, transfers from Great Britain 
to Northern Ireland (excluding defense and court expenditures) averaged one fourth of the 
Northern Irish GDP, or a third of income created in Northern Ireland itself, in the period con-
sidered. These subsidies support relatively well-paid jobs in manufacturing (over 90% of the 
manufacturing jobs are subsidized) and the public sector, and finance the health and welfare 
system as well as public housing (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999, pp. 110-113). Thus, they 
directly benefit a large part of the population in Northern Ireland. Additional transfers to 
Northern Ireland take the form of expenditures for security and justice, and subsidies from the 
European Union. (With regard to the identification of utility losses caused by terrorism it is 
important to note that these transfers do not vary with the level of terrorist activity.) However, 
despite these enormous transfers, numerous people did leave Northern Ireland in reaction to 
the violence, as figure 10 suggests (see also Registrar General Northern Ireland various years). 
Another reason for a high CS for lower terrorist activity might be people’s difficulty in as-
sessing risks of terrorism. According to Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003), people are subject to a 
propensity to predict worst-case scenarios and are prone to anomalies known from other risk 
perception contexts. Hindsight bias and embeddedness effects are particularly evident for ter-
rorism-risk perception. Downes-Le Guin and Hoffman (1993) contend that much higher 
probabilities are accorded to terrorism than to other life-threatening acts. Sunstein (2003), on 
the other hand, finds that individuals focus on the badness of the outcome rather than on the 
probability that it will occur. The “probability neglect” results in fear that greatly exceeds dis-
counted harm. These results suggest that people are far more concerned with terrorism than 
with objectively larger risks. Becker and Rubinstein (2004) also assert that terrorism can have 
consequences beyond what the underlying probabilities would suggest. But rather than attrib-
uting this to cognitive limitations in risk assessing, they base their explanation on an additional 
“fear factor”: An exogenous increase in risk not only affects utility by changing the probabili-
ties but also by reducing the utility enjoyed from the consumption of risky activities such as 
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riding a bus after suicide attacks on buses. As Becker and Rubinstein (2004, p. 7) observe, 
“[b]y generating fear, terror, even in the form of a low probability event, may generate sub-
stantial effects.” Calibrating a benchmark utility function to fit the data of Israeli bus demand 
and using commonly accepted values for the risk aversion parameter, they estimate the mar-
ginal utility of a bus ride to fall by 10 to 20 percent if suicide bomber attacks are carried out on 
buses. Thus, equating the terrorism with the probability of dying misses the distinctive feature 
of terrorism, i.e. to spread terror. Whether far-reaching consequences are explained by cogni-
tive limitations or fear, perceptions of terrorism are mainly influenced by the salience of the 
topic. Intense media coverage of terrorist acts ensures that terrorism is present in people’s 
minds. The high number of fatalities in violent periods of the conflict in Northern Ireland, for 
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example, means “that hardly a newspaper or evening television programme did not bring news 
of either a killing or a funeral” (McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 94), and that “the local televi-
sion news seemed to consist of nothing except more and more violence, the grieving bereaved, 
and threats of more to come” (McKittrick and McVea 2001, p. 194). 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 Conclusions for economics 
The previous chapters have obvious implications for two research areas in economics, namely 
happiness research and non-market valuation. An open issue is whether the effects of public 
goods on life satisfaction should be monetized. 
6.1.1 Happiness research 
The determinants of subjective well-being can be usefully grouped along the two dimensions 
running from subjective to objective and from individual to collective. While most of the pre-
vious happiness research studied subjective-individual and objective-individual determinants, 
public goods and externalities clearly belong to the group of objective-collective determinants. 
Thus, the applications in the previous chapters strengthen earlier findings that it is worthwhile 
to extend the research in this area and to consider objective-collective determinants. Further, 
the applications and findings of the previous chapters also shed additional light on the nature 
of subjective well-being data. In chapter 2, we mentioned six requirements subjective well-
being measures should meet. These requirements are important for empirical happiness re-
search in general but, arguably, even more so for research on objective-collective determi-
nants. The six requirements are (i) inclusiveness, (ii) reference to presence, (iii) sufficiently 
high signal-to-noise ratio, (iv) interpersonal (or intergroup) comparability, (v) cardinality and 
(vi) availability. Both the own applications and the applications reviewed in chapter 2 provide 
evidence on whether the subjective well-being measures are in compliance with the first three 
requirements. Before we discuss the evidence in more detail, two caveats are in order. First, 
though the evidence is indicative, the requirements are ultimately not verifiable. Second, al-
though the applications add particularly convincing evidence, it is by no means the first evi-
dence. 
Inclusiveness. Public goods such as clean air and security are archetypical representatives of 
objective circumstances which psychologists often consider to be of low relevance for subjec-
 138
tive well-being (e.g. Diener 1984).32 The large effects of public goods documented in previous 
chapters contradict this view and suggest that subjective well-being, or at least life satisfac-
tion, is a broad and inclusive concept. The notion that subjective well-being is an “exemplary 
narrow” (Adler and Posner 2006, p. 77) concept is clearly rebutted. The finding that environ-
mentally conscious persons and risk groups suffer more from air pollution casts into doubt the 
hypothesis that health, sense of responsibility etc. are “higher order” goods or subutility func-
tions of equal standing with subjective well-being (as asserted by Kimball and Willis 2006). 
Reference to presence and signal-to-noise ratio. The negative effects of the public goods on 
life satisfaction are prima facie evidence that subjective well-being reflects, at least partly, 
current circumstances and that the signal-to-noise ratio is sufficiently high to make empirical 
research productive. The findings in the previous chapters show that the signal-to-noise ratio is 
high enough even to detect relatively small effects of external circumstances and not only the 
larger effects of demographic factors and personal characteristics. However, the results pro-
vide no evidence whether subjective well-being also reflects expected future utility and 
whether it is systematically biased in a way that interferes with estimating the coefficient of 
interest. These issues are important and require further research in the future. 
6.1.2 Non-market valuation 
Provided one accepts that subjective well-being is an adequate and valid approximation to 
utility, the data allow researchers to test the underlying assumptions of the standard non-mar-
ket valuation techniques. For example, as explained in chapter 2, the negative relationship 
between life satisfaction and air pollution documented in chapter 3 indicates that air pollution 
is incompletely capitalized. Thus, the hedonic method understates the value of clean air. On 
the other hand, the close correspondence between the WTP estimates based on the life satis-
faction approach and the estimates based on the hedonic method shown in chapter 4 invites to 
speculate that the problem of undercapitalization is more severe for externalities which are 
rapidly changing and which have important indirect effects than for stable and salient risks. 
However, the argument can be reversed. Provided that the underlying assumptions of the stan-
dard approaches hold, the negative relationship between life satisfaction and pollution indi-
                                                 
32 This position of psychologists is often based on the low proportion of variance explained by objective circum-
stances. However, the low proportion of variance explained only indicates that subjective well-being is either 
determined by additional factors or simply has substantial random disturbances. 
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cates that life satisfaction is not an adequate and valid approximation to utility. Yet, the former 
interpretation of the negative relationship between pollution and life satisfaction, i.e. the inter-
pretation of the negative relationship as an indication for incomplete capitalization of pollution 
in the housing market, is also supported by the behavioral evidence mentioned in chapter 2. 
It was the aim of the previous chapters to convince the reader that subjective well-being data 
can be used to value public goods and, hence, that the life satisfaction approach expands the 
economists’ toolbox in the area of non-market valuation. In chapter 2, we discussed specific 
advantages of the life satisfaction approach over the traditional methods. This discussion is not 
repeated here. On a meta-level, the life satisfaction approach differs from the standard ap-
proaches along two dimensions. First, the life satisfaction approach is based on survey data 
while most standard approaches are based on behavioral data (an exception is the contingent 
valuation method). Second, the life satisfaction approach captures experienced utility, the 
standard approaches decision utility. Although some aspects of these dimensions are discussed 
in chapter 2, the two dimensions deserve some further consideration to assess the main merits, 
but also limitations, of the life satisfaction approach. 
Survey versus behavioral data. While for early economists introspection and communication 
were legitimate sources of data (Bruni and Sugden 2007), the positivistic movement in the 
social sciences instilled a deep suspicion of survey data in economists. Most economists sub-
scribe to the standard behaviorist argument that subjective experience has no role in scientific 
analysis because it is not publicly observable (Sen 1982, p. 9; Kahneman and Varey 1991, p. 
129). According to Sen (1986, p. 18), “[t]he popularity of this view in economics may be due 
to a mixture of an obsessive concern with observability and a peculiar belief that choice (in 
particular, market choice) is the only human aspect that can be observed.” This distrust of sur-
vey data is based on two, somewhat contradictory, arguments (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2001). On the one hand, respondents are seen as “cognitive misers” (a term coined by Fiske 
and Taylor 1984) that make little mental effort in answering survey questions. Therefore, sur-
vey questions are unduly influenced by all sorts of contextual factors and the like. On the other 
hand, respondents are believed to anticipate all the consequences of their answers and strategi-
cally adjust their answering behavior so as to maximize their expected benefits from answer-
ing the question. Because market choices have consequences which lead individuals to inter-
nalize the benefits of incremental cognitive efforts and also part of the costs of strategic be-
 140
havior, they are perceived as more reliable. This view is reflected, for example, in the guide-
lines of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) of the White House: “Other things 
equal, you should prefer revealed preference data over stated preference data because revealed 
preference data are based on actual decisions, where market participants enjoy or suffer the 
consequences of their decisions” (OMB 2003, p. 24). 
For several reasons, this reliable behavioral data versus unreliable survey data dichotomy is 
too simplistic. First, experimental findings show that people behave similarly in low- and in 
high-stake situations (e.g. Hoffman, E., McCabe and Smith 1996; Fehr, Fischbacher and 
Tougareva 2002; for contrary evidence, see the references in Levitt and List 2007). Second, 
there also is a possibility of strategic non-verbal choice behavior (Sen 1982, p. 9). Third, in 
order to interpret behavior, strong assumptions are necessary, assumptions which have been 
repeatedly falsified (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, the locus classicus for deviations from 
the expected utility theory, or Fair and Jaffee 1972 and Rosen and Quandt 1978 for empirical 
studies on disequilibria in the housing and labor markets). Fourth, the relevant behavior is of-
ten unobservable. Finally, critics fail to differentiate between different types of survey data. 
While the concerns are valid in principle, their importance is not independent of the question 
asked. As discussed at length in chapter 2, we suggest both problems to be less severe in the 
case of the life satisfaction approach compared to contingent valuation surveys. Overall, econ-
omists have been prone to overstate difficulties of survey data and underestimate the problem 
associated with behavioral data (Sen 1982, p. 72). Instead of rejecting one source of data in its 
entirety and uncritically embrace the other source, the relevant question should be what type 
of survey data or behavioral data is adequate for which questions. 
Experience versus decision utility. The second difference between the standard approaches and 
the life satisfaction approach on a meta-level is that the former capture decision utility while 
the latter captures experienced utility. In revealed preference theory, the two concepts are 
equated as a matter of definition. The rationality assumption, with consistent and stable pref-
erences, precludes divergence between experience and decision utility. Thus, preferences and 
utility can be interpreted as constructs summarizing choice in formal analysis and, simulta-
neously, as welfare measures in informal discussion and welfare statements (for a critical dis-
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cussion, see e.g. Sen 1982, pp. 54-73; Kahneman and Sugden 2005; Camerer 2006).33 In chap-
ter 2, we took side with the view prevalent in behavioral economics that experience and deci-
sion utility diverge and that only the former is an adequate measure of individual welfare. Two 
considerations motivate this position. First, it is reasonable to assume that people try to max-
imize experienced utility (Kahneman and Thaler 1991) and that they would change decisions 
that are inferior in this respect were it not for limited cognitive abilities, ignorance and a lack 
of willpower (Thaler and Sunstein 2003). Second, if people are boundedly rational, no coher-
ent preferences are revealed and no measure of decision utility exists (Kahneman and Sugden 
2005). Thus, there are good reasons to favor experience over decision utility. However, in the 
context of policy evaluation and decision making, this position needs to be qualified. If a deci-
sion regarding the adequate level of public good provision is based on measures of expe-
rienced utility rather than measures of decision utility, the decision may amount to paternal-
ism, in fact, to paternalism in its textbook form (e.g. Dworking, G. 2005) and not to paternal-
ism in its less intrusive ‘libertarian’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2003) or ‘asymmetric’ (Camerer et 
al. 2003) form. Such a decision may also result in offsetting behavior (Peltzman 1975; Viscusi 
and Aldy 2003). Therefore, it is important to identify what drives the wedge between the value 
for public goods revealed in actual and stated choices and the value reflected in measures of 
experienced utility. 
A first cause for this wedge are positional concerns. While income may be a positional good, 
valued in terms of relative position, public goods are likely to be non-positional goods that are 
valued for their own sake. If individuals act in isolation and buy public goods in the housing 
and labor markets, they experience not only an absolute but also a relative decline in disposa-
ble income. Therefore, the hedonic method understates the value of a change in public good 
provision if that change leaves the original income distribution intact (Frank 2000; Frank and 
Sunstein 2001; see also Kniesner and Viscusi 2003 arguing against the relevance of positional 
concerns in the area of non-market valuation). Second, hyperbolic discounting is a problem for 
traditional methods if intertemporal choices are involved, e.g. if individuals in contingent val-
                                                 
33 Sumner (1996, p. 122) accuses economists that they “trade on the ambiguity latent in the notion of preference.” 
Similarly, Sen (1982, p. 94) criticizes that traditional economic theory and welfare economics relies on the iden-
tity of choice and welfare, an identity “obscured by the ambiguity of the term ‘preference’ […].” Welfare econo-
mists aware of this problematic dual link propose to base welfare economic entirely on a choice-theoretic ap-
proach (Bernheim and Rangel 2007) and view welfare economics as a part of positive economics with no norma-
tive content (Gul and Pesendorfer 2007). 
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uation surveys have to decide on immediate costs of regulations with delayed environmental 
benefits or if individuals trade off current income for future health benefits. In a stated pref-
erence (conjoint) survey on WTP for improvements in water quality, Viscusi and Huber (2006) 
find indeed a pattern of discount factors that is consistent with hyperbolic discounting (see 
also Cropper and Laibson 1999 for implications of hyperbolic discounting on project evalua-
tion). Third, as discussed in chapter 3, the standard approaches understate experienced utility 
derived from public goods if adaptation to income is faster and/or more complete than adapta-
tion to public goods and if adaptation is not anticipated or underestimated. Finally, there are 
several other factors which are also mentioned in chapter 2 such as ignorance, incorrect intui-
tive theories on the determinants of happiness and focusing illusion. 
Whether a decision is potentially perceived as paternalistic and induces offsetting behavior 
depends on the cause of the wedge between experience and decision utility. On the one hand, 
if positional concerns are important and people knowingly suffer from self-control problems, a 
decision that is justified solely on the basis of experienced utility will not be perceived as pa-
ternalistic and induce no offsetting behavior. In contrast, such policies may be welcomed as a 
means to mitigate the negative consequences of consumption externalities and self-control 
problems (this is similar to the idea expressed in Frey and Eichenberger 1994 that individuals 
have an incentive to avoid decision anomalies trough individual or collective actions). All 
other causes, on the other hand, have to do with a lack of information. Individuals are ignorant 
about the degree or rate of adaptation, the level or effects of public goods, the falsity of their 
intuitive theories etc. Hence, the crucial question becomes how fast individuals learn once the 
decision has been taken. If they learn quickly, they will probably not perceive the decision as 
paternalistic and no offsetting behavior will occur. However, from a politico-economic per-
spective, such a decision will be difficult to implement. If the individuals learn only slowly or 
not at all, a decision based on measures of experienced utility is also problematic from a nor-
mative perspective. 
One might wish to read a more unambiguous verdict in favor of one approach or the other in 
the concluding remarks. However, we are confident that the discussion of the two major dif-
ferences between the life satisfaction approach and the standard non-market valuation tech-
niques as well as the more practical issues presented in chapter 2 help to decide which ap-
proach or which combination of approaches is adequate in a particular situation. 
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6.1.3 Open issue: Monetization 
The standard argument for monetization of externalities and public goods is that money is a 
convenient measuring rod that allows decision makers to compare various benefits and costs. 
For example, Fullerton and Stavins (1998, p. 438) suggestively ask: “How else can we com-
bine the benefits of ten extra miles of visibility plus some amount of reduced morbidity, and 
then compare these total benefits with the total cost of installing scrubbers to clean stack gases 
at coal-fired power plants?” However, it has long been recognized that WTP for a change in 
public good provision is an imperfect approximation for the effects of the change of overall 
welfare because of the wealth effects and the variable marginal utility of income or, in other 
words, because of the diminishing marginal utility of income. Suppose, for example, that a 
public project benefits the poor but hurts the rich. Such a project may increase aggregate wel-
fare even though the sum of individual WTP is negative. Therefore, several authors suggest to 
use distributional weights (e.g. Layard and Walters 1994; Sunstein 2007). Further, if public 
goods are monetized with the life satisfaction approach, estimates on the effect of income on 
life satisfaction play a crucial role. Unfortunately, as explained in chapter 3, estimating the 
effect of income on life satisfaction is associated with serious problems, most importantly en-
dogeneity and omitted variable problems. Therefore, it seems natural to ask whether moneti-
zation is necessary at all. The conceptual and practical difficulties in connection with moneti-
zation may well speak in favor of subjective well-being scores as an alternative non-monetary 
scale. 
Without taking side, several counterarguments speak in favor of monetization. First, compar-
ing the costs and benefits of a project directly in life satisfaction terms may be advantageous if 
both costs and benefits accrue in non-monetary form. For example, if the major cost of a pro-
posed environmental regulation is an increase in unemployment, the life satisfaction conse-
quences of an increase in unemployment can be compared to the life satisfaction consequences 
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of the environmental improvement.34 However, if costs naturally accrue in monetary form, e.g. 
if compliance costs decrease firms’ profits and increase consumer prices, these costs have to 
be converted into life satisfaction scores. Converting monetary figures into life satisfaction 
scores is associated with exactly the same potential problems as the reverse operation. A 
second and related concern is that in many situations, the life satisfaction approach is com-
plementary to the standard techniques and captures the residual shadow benefits only (see 
chapter 2). In these situations, WTP estimates based on different methods have to be summed-
up in order to calculate the total shadow benefits of a public good. Again, therefore, either the 
effects on life satisfaction monetized have to be monetized or the monetary WTP estimates 
have to be translated into life satisfaction terms. Third, for some potential uses of the life satis-
faction approach, welfare effects ultimately have to be expressed in monetary terms. An ex-
ample are tort cases. Tort law serves two purposes. It aims at compensating the plaintiffs 
(“making the plaintiffs whole”) and at deterring torts. For both purposes, it is necessary to as-
sess the consequences of the tortfeasors’ behavior on plaintiffs’ utility and translate these con-
sequences into a monetary fine (see e.g. Posner and Sunstein 2005). Fourth, a large body of 
literature exists that contains a wealth of information on people’s WTP for public goods. For 
academic curiosity and for practical purposes, one might want to compare estimates based on 
the life satisfaction approach to these WTP estimates. For example, in conducting cost benefit 
analyses, agencies often make no original benefit assessment but revert to existing studies. 
Non-monetized estimates based on the life satisfaction approach are of little use in this con-
text. Experience shows that non-monetized costs or benefits included in cost benefit analyses 
are usually not considered in addition to the monetized effects, but rather not at all (Viscusi 
2006). Of course, for comparative purposes, the more often the life satisfaction approach is 
applied and, hence, the more public goods are valued in life satisfaction terms, the less impor-
tant monetization becomes. However, as Adler (2006, p. 1968) reckons, building up an ade-
                                                 
34 The “environment versus jobs” trade-off routinely features in public debates on environmental policy. In a 
1990 poll conducted by the Wall Street Journal, 33% of respondents thought it was likely or somewhat likely that 
their own job was threatened by environmental regulation (Rosewicz 1990). Before air quality regulations are 
tightened, business leaders often predict massive layoffs as a consequence of the regulation (see e.g. Hahn and 
Steger 1990). Retrospective analyses by economists paint a less gloomy picture. Gollop and Roberts (1983) esti-
mate that air quality regulations increases labor demand for fossil-fueled power generation (though it decreases 
productivity), and Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (2002) find no significant change in employment for four other 
heavily polluting industries. Nevertheless, at the regional level, the trade-off can be relevant. Several studies find 
negative employment effects in U.S. counties that did not meet federal air quality standards and that are therefore 
subject to stricter regulations, such as lower growth rates in manufacturing employment (Henderson 1996), in-
creased rates of plant shutdowns and lower rates of plant births (Becker, R. and Henderson 2000) and substantial 
job losses (Greenstone 2002). 
 145
quate stock of information takes time: “In two or three generations, perhaps, welfarist policy 
analysis might dispense with money as its commensurating device and express costs and bene-
fits in terms of interpersonal utility units. But – given the huge amount of information about 
money values provided by behavioral data as well as existing CV [contingent valuation] stud-
ies, and the absence of a comparable body of interpersonal utility information – that prospect 
seems distant.” 
6.2 Conclusions for policy 
In the following, we discuss the policy implications of the estimates reported in previous 
chapters. But in order to realistically appreciate what role such estimates can play in the politi-
cal process, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the role of cost benefit analysis and benefit 
assessment more generally. 
6.2.1 Preliminary note: The role of cost benefit analysis 
To assess the role that cost benefit analysis can play in the political process, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between two perspectives on the political process, namely the social planner or 
benevolent dictator model versus the public choice view. 
In the social planner model, cost benefit analysis has a clear and strong place (Hettich and 
Winer 1993; Becker, G. S. 2000). The benevolent dictator view reverberates in the proposals 
of Supreme Court Justice Breyer (1993) and Sunstein (2002a, b; 2005) for more rational regu-
lations. They attribute regulatory inconsistencies to an undue influence of the public’s ill-
founded fears and blunders on elected officials. Therefore, they demand more responsibilities 
for politically insulated expert agencies. These expert agencies would largely rely on cost ben-
efit analysis as a corrective for the cognitive limitations of citizens. The proposals are a “plea 
for a strong role for technocrats” (Sunstein 2002b, p. 151) and meant to harness “the inherent 
virtues of civil service” (Breyer 1993, p. 67). Of course, regulators who are insulated from the 
scrutiny from elected officials and the public may further their own agenda and be more vul-
nerable to regulatory capture (Pollak 1998). These, however, are concerns from a public 
choice perspective to which we now turn. 
 146
According to the public choice theory, politicians and civil servants lack information and in-
centives to make regulatory decisions in the public interest (e.g. Frey 1978; Mueller 2003). 
Evidently, cost benefit analysis can help to overcome the informational problem, but its influ-
ence depends on the incentive structure and its effect thereon.35 In the following, we discuss 
how cost benefit analysis can affect policy outcomes if it is conducted by (i) the government, 
(ii) the regulatory agencies or (iii) the courts. 
Government. In representative democracies, the most important constraint on the behavior of 
an incumbent government is the need to be re-elected. The political competition and the re-
election constraint give incumbent governments and their challengers in the opposition an in-
centive to acquire information on citizens’ preferences (Pommerehne 1987, p. 4).36 Politically 
defined costs and benefits often differ from economically defined ones, but cost benefit analy-
sis nevertheless provides a great deal of politically pertinent information (see Hettich 1983 for 
a case study of Canadian cost benefit analyses). Even if policy outcomes are mainly deter-
mined by the relative strength of lobbying by interest groups, projects with larger net benefits 
are more likely to be adopted. This is because the more a project’s benefits outweigh its costs, 
the larger will be the difference in political spending by supporters compared to opponents 
ceteris paribus (Becker, G. S. 2000). In addition to the re-election constraint, other possible 
constraints on politicians’ behavior are direct democratic participation rights (e.g. 
Kirchgässner, Feld and Savoiz 1999; Frey and Stutzer 2006) and auditing committees, espe-
cially if they have the authority to make counter-proposals (Eichenberger and Schelker 2007). 
These institutions make specific policies subject to public approval and give outsiders agenda 
setting power. Because the government probably does not like to see its policy proposals re-
jected in a referendum or to lose to a counter-proposal of the auditing committee, it has addi-
tional incentives to be informed. Similarly, initiatives and counter-proposals have a better 
chance to be accepted if they are tailored to the preferences of the voters. Information on the 
                                                 
35 Missing incentives of politicians to further the general welfare are also an important argument against the pro-
posal of developing National Well-Being Indicators and the implied obligation of politicians to maximize aggre-
gate happiness (Frey and Stutzer 2007). 
36 Electoral incentives seem to play an important role even for secondary policy issues such as environmental 
regulation. In contrast to the popular view that secondary policies are largely determined by lobbying, empirical 
results of List and Sturm (2006) suggest that there are strong effects of electoral incentives. Using panel data on 
environmental policy choices in the U.S. states, they find that environmental policy differs considerably between 
years in which the incumbent governor can be re-elected and years in which he faces a binding term limit. The 
direction and magnitude of the difference is determined by the voters’ preferences and the degree of political 
competition. 
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benefits of a proposal may also be an important argument in a referendum campaign. Thus, 
both institutions increase political competition and may, thereby, well increase the demand for 
cost benefit analysis (see Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1998 on cost benefit analysis and direct 
democracy). 
Regulatory agencies. Both in practice and in the academic literature, cost benefit analyses 
conducted by regulatory agencies play the most important role. In the United States, presiden-
tial executive orders require cost benefit analysis of all major regulations (where this is statu-
torily permissible) and give the OMB the power to review regulations and related cost benefit 
analyses of the responsible agency. The OMB reviews a large number of rules and also in-
creasingly changes the rules (see Croley 2003). Courts frequently mandate cost-benefit ana-
lyses, asking agencies to monetize costs and benefits. Thus, as a default the executive and ju-
diciary require agencies to perform cost benefit analyses unless the Congress expressly prec-
ludes it (Sunstein 2002a, b).37 In some European countries, for example in the United King-
dom, a central unit performs regulatory impact assessment including cost benefit analyses. In 
others, for example in Germany, oversight is fragmented and relatively autonomous agencies 
perform their own cost benefit analyses (Hahn and Litan 2005). In Switzerland, the Bundesrat 
(federal government) can commission agencies to conduct a cost benefit analysis; most costs 
benefit analyses are related to transport (Maibach and Peter 2000; Walter et al. 2000; Werder 
2000). Thus, in all countries, cost benefit analyses are mostly conducted by agencies on behalf 
of the government. 
This role of cost benefit analysis in the regulatory reality has inspired theoretical models that 
see cost benefit analysis mainly as a device of elected officials to monitor and discipline agen-
cies (e.g. Posner 2001; Johnston 2002; Adler and Posner 2006). In Posner’s (2001) model, for 
example, an interventionist agency with an informational advantage can make a take-it-or-
leave-it regulatory proposal to the government. Without cost benefit analysis, the government 
can only infer the pre-regulatory state of the world from the proposed regulation and the agen-
cies ideal point on the policy dimension. In some situations, the agency has to propose exces-
sive regulation (even from its own perspective) in order to convince the government of the 
                                                 
37 Cost benefit analysis is so firmly established in the U.S. regulatory process that Sunstein (2002a, p. xi; 2002b, 
pp. 5-6) speaks of a victory for the advocates of cost benefit analysis in the “first generation” debate on whether 
cost benefit analysis should play a role. The “second generation” debate now concentrates on the appropriate 
method for valuing costs and benefits. 
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necessity of regulation. In other words, the informational asymmetry precludes mutually bene-
ficial regulatory proposals. In this situation, cost benefit analysis can play an important role. 
This is even true if the cost benefit analysis can be manipulated. The only condition is that the 
costlier it is to fake a plausible analysis, the less efficient the proposal is. In such a situation, 
cost benefit analysis has two effects. First, the agency can convince the government of the 
necessity of regulation by conducting an expensive cost benefit analysis rather than by pro-
posing excessive regulation. Second, in order to preserve funds for other projects rather than 
wasting them on costly cost benefit analyses, the agency has an incentive to issue efficient 
regulations.38 Although it is possible to criticize various aspects of Posner’s (2001) model, it 
illustrates that cost benefit analysis can improve regulations even if the regulators have their 
own agenda and the cost benefit analysis is not the decisive decision criterion. Most likely, 
cost benefit analysis will increase transparency of agency decision making and, thereby, facil-
itate oversight by elected officials and the public. For some authors, this transparency-en-
hancing effect of cost benefit analysis restricts the informational advantage and thus the influ-
ence of interest groups (e.g. Becker, G. S. 2000; Adler and Posner 2006). For others, cost ben-
efit analysis is likely to increase interest group influence because it is an additional forum for 
interest groups to block regulations. 
Courts. In two different contexts, cost benefit analysis and benefit assessment become impor-
tant for courts. First, in some countries (e.g. in the United States) courts can review regulations 
issued by government agencies. In this context, courts do usually not conduct their own cost 
benefit analysis but vacate regulations if the agency’s analysis is seriously flawed. In this way, 
the courts increase the consistency and quality of agencies’ cost benefit analyses (Sunstein 
2002b, pp. 181, 191-228; Adler and Posner 2006, pp. 111-114). Second, benefit assessment is 
of direct relevance in courts if externalities are controlled by means of liability rules (Calabresi 
1970; see also White and Wittman 1983; Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson 1990 on the relationship 
between regulation and liability rules). In the United States, the standard non-market valuation 
methods such as the contingent valuation method, the hedonic method and the travel cost ap-
proach have been used in various legal cases (Thompson 2002). For example, in the Exxon 
                                                 
38 The costs of conducting a cost benefit analysis and a proper benefit assessment are not trivial. Morgenstern and 
Landy (1997) estimate the average costs of preparing a cost benefit analysis for OMB review to lie in the vicinity 
of between $1 million and $2 million. An astonishing amount of between $8 million and $10 million was spent 
on the contingent valuation survey assessing the non-use values lost due to the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Thompson 
2002) (all amounts are in U.S. dollars; year not known). 
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Valdez oil spill litigation, the contingent valuation method has been used to assess the non-use 
values for determining punitive damages and the hedonic method has been used for damage 
assessment to native Alaskans subsistence use of fish and wildlife (Duffield 1997; Carson et 
al. 2003). 
Therefore, although the role of cost benefit analysis is less clear if the political process is seen 
trough the lenses of the public choice approach rather than the social planner model, it is still a 
useful framework for consistently organizing disparate information and thereby improving the 
political process and the resulting policies (Arrow et al. 1996). 
6.2.2 Policy implications 
Keeping in mind the potential role of cost benefit analysis outlined in the previous section, the 
estimates presented in chapters 3 through 5 can serve as benefit estimates in cost benefit anal-
ysis. The estimates can be used to retrospectively evaluate policies such as the large combus-
tion plant ordinance or to assess the welfare gains from the pacification of Northern Ireland. 
The estimates may also contain useful information for prospective evaluation of policies and 
priority setting. For example, the estimates on the effect of flood disasters may guide the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers that is instructed by one of the oldest laws mandating cost benefit 
analysis to undertake a project useful for “flood control purposes if the benefits to whom-
soever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs” (U.S. Flood Control Act of 1936, 
§1). 
For all public bads analyzed in the previous chapters, we find large negative effects on life 
satisfaction that translate into considerable WTP estimates for a reduction in the exposure to 
these bads. This suggests that the improvement in air quality in Germany documented in 
chapter 3 and the peace process in Northern Ireland with the associated decline in violence, 
recently consolidated trough the power sharing deal between Sinn Fein and Paisley’s Demo-
cratic Unionist Party (Economist 2007a), brought about tremendous welfare gains. The large 
combustion plant ordinance in Germany belongs to the heave-handed and costly command-
and-control regulations. Nevertheless, though no reliable estimates of the social costs of the 
ordinance are available, its benefits are likely to outweigh its costs by a safe margin (see 
chapter 3). More tentatively, the findings suggest that it may be worthwhile to curb other pol-
lutants (e.g. NO2 and TSP) and air pollution in other countries (e.g. in Russia and China with 
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SO2 concentrations in urban areas in the mid-nineties of around 100 μg/m3; see Yale Center 
for Environmental Law and Policy 2002) or to counter terrorist activities in various parts of 
the world. Of course, the larger the differences in the attributes of the public goods, in the 
populations enjoying the benefits or in the contexts within which the goods are provided be-
come, the more problematic a one-to-one transfer of benefit estimates will be (these issues are 
acknowledged and discussed in the literature on benefit transfer; see e.g. Boyle and Bergstrom 
1992; Ready and Navrud 2005). Nevertheless, some generalizations can be safely drawn. First, 
whatever the exact WTP for clean air, it is larger than previously thought. Thus, regulatory 
proposals rejected on the basis of a small benefit-cost ratio may be worth reconsidering. 
Second, at least in the developed countries of the West, the major losses from flood disasters 
are insurable material costs and only to a lesser extent non-insurable psychic costs. Third, ter-
rorism has far larger repercussions than what the bare mortality risk would imply. Therefore, 
there are reasons to treat different mortality risks differently and allow for discrepancies in the 
costs per life saved in the area of health and safety regulations as well as security. 
The size of the benefits tells us nothing about the means by which the public good should be 
provided. In the case of air quality, a heavier reliance on incentive-based mechanisms could 
increase the positive net effect of regulations even more. Economists have argued for a long 
time that incentive-based instruments such as tradable permits, pollution charges and govern-
ment subsidy reductions are more efficient and have lower compliance costs (e.g. Baumol and 
Oates 1975; for an empirical analysis, see e.g. Schmalensee 1998). Similarly, flood disasters 
can be prevented by active measures such as technical defense works or by passive measures 
such as hazard zone maps (Steininger and Weck-Hannemann 2002). Alternatively, the effects 
of flood disasters can be mitigated through construction standards (e.g. Lave and Apt 2006) or 
risk transfer mechanisms. Regarding the latter, mandatory insurance systems or public-private 
partnerships that overcome failures in the market for hazard insurance are generally preferable 
to government disaster relief, be it ad-hoc transfers or institutionalized disaster relief programs 
(Kunreuther 1996; Kunreuther and Pauly 2006; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 2007). Also 
in the case of terrorism, possibly superior alternatives to the widely used deterrence policy are 
available. For example, terrorist activity may be reduced by lowering the benefits of terrorism 
to prospective terrorists or by increasing the opportunity costs of terrorism through positive 
incentives (e.g. Frey and Luechinger 2003; 2004; Frey 2004). In all three areas, there is a mod-
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erate increase in the use of the preferred policy instruments. This tendency is most pronounced 
in environmental regulation (e.g. Hahn 2000; Stavins 2003; Stavins and Revesz 2007). Yet 
even in counter-terrorism policies, it is possible to find hesitant attempts to use positive incen-
tives (see e.g. Derichsweiler 2007; Frey and Luechinger 2007; Gaupp 2007). Nevertheless, 
politico-economic considerations suggest that such alternative policies will resist widespread 
use (e.g. Frey 1972; Kirchgässner and Schneider 2003; Weck-Hannemann 2003 on environ-
mental policies; Steininger and Weck-Hannemann 2002; Raschky and Weck-Hannemann 
2007 on natural hazard policies; Frey and Luechinger 2003 on counter-terrorism policies). 
6.3 Prospects for future research 
There are two areas that warrant further research in the future. First, important insights will be 
gained by additional comparisons of the life satisfaction approach with the standard methods. 
On the one hand, such comparisons will improve non-market valuation. We have singled out 
one fruitful confrontation between the life satisfaction approach and one of the standard 
methods for an in-depth analysis, namely the comparison with the hedonic method. However, 
life satisfaction data could also be used to test the underlying assumptions of other non-market 
valuation techniques, to assess the utility consequences of individuals’ behavioral responses to 
changes in the public good provision, or to estimate the residual shadow costs that are not 
captured by the standard methods. For example, subjective well-being data would allow us to 
test the crucial assumption of the travel cost approach that traveling to a recreational site pro-
vides no direct utility or disutility. Or, they could be used to quantify the non-pecuniary costs 
of defense behavior that is relevant for the defense expenditure approach. On the other hand, 
comparisons of the life satisfaction approach with the standard approaches will inform eco-
nomics more generally. For example, they will allow us to derive conditions under which the 
gap between experience and decision utility is likely to be large and conditions under which 
the gap is likely to be small. 
The second area for future research relates to improvements of the life satisfaction approach. 
One major issue in this respect is a need for better estimates of the effect of income on life 
satisfaction. So far, estimates based on exogenous changes in income are rare. This issue also 
points to a more general aspect. Happiness research has begun to take economics more se-
riously. After an early phase in which partial correlations have been interpreted in a 
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straightforward and direct manner as the effect of one variable on another, researchers in-
creasingly realize that many correlates are actually choice variables (e.g. Frey and Stutzer 
2004b for commuting). As we all know, choices involve trade-offs. Thus, it should strike no 
economist by surprise if – at least at the margin – the raw effect of the choice variable on life 
satisfaction is small. Another issue concerns the subjective well-being measures. We argued 
that existing measures of subjective well-being, particularly global self-reports, are well suited 
for the purpose of valuing public goods. Yet there is still the concern that these measures and 
the estimates based thereon are systematically biased because of conceptual problems and 
contextual factors such as question order effects and the lack of cardinal, intergroup compara-
bility. The life satisfaction approach would greatly benefit if these problems were taken se-
riously in the development of the next generation of subjective well-being measures. 
In all, therefore, there is still room for improvement and many of the questions raised in this 
thesis remain unanswered. However, if we convinced the reader that subjective well-being 
data can be potentially used to value public goods and that it is worthwhile to address the open 
issues, we have achieved our aim. 
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